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 i 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis covers data fusion for aircraft navigation systems in distributed sensor 
systems. Data fusion methodologies are developed for the design, development, 
analysis and simulation of multisensor aircraft navigation systems. The problems of 
sensor failure detection and isolation (FDI), distributed data fusion algorithms and 
inertial state integrity monitoring in inertial network systems are studied.  
Various existing integrated navigation systems and Kalman filter architectures are 
reviewed and a new generalised multisensor data fusion model is presented for the 
design and development of multisensor navigation systems. Normalised navigation 
algorithms are described for data fusion filter design of inertial network systems.  
A normalised measurement model of skewed redundant inertial measurement units 
(SRIMU) is presented and performance criteria are developed to evaluate optimal 
configurations of SRIMUs in terms of the measurement accuracy and FDI capability. 
Novel sensor error compensation filters are designed for the correction of SRIMU 
measurement errors. Generalised likelihood ratio test (GLRT) methods are improved 
to detect various failure modes, including short time and sequential moving-window 
GLRT algorithms. 
State-identical and state-associated fusion algorithms are developed for two forms of 
distributed sensor network systems. In particular, innovative inertial network sensing 
models and inertial network fusion algorithms are developed to provide estimates of 
inertial vector states and similar node states. Fusion filter-based integrity monitoring 
algorithms are also presented to detect network sensor failures and to examine the 
consistency of node state estimates in the inertial network system.  
The FDI and data fusion algorithms developed in this thesis are tested and their 
performance is evaluated using a multisensor software simulation system developed 
during this study programme. The moving-window GLRT algorithms for optimal 
SRIMU configurations are shown to perform well and are also able to detect jump 
and drift failures in an inertial network system. It is concluded that the inertial 
network fusion algorithms could be used in a low-cost inertial network system and 
are capable of correctly estimating the inertial vector states and the node states. 
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Chapte r  1  
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aircraft Navigation Sensors/Systems 
The purpose of aircraft navigation is to determine significant position, velocity, 
attitude, and time (PVAT) information of an aircraft with respect to reference frames. 
These PVAT parameters are referred as to the navigation states in this thesis.  
Aircraft navigational sensor systems, which measure the dynamic motion of an 
aircraft with reference to specific frames, provide continuous inertial data and other 
measurement information that is required by onboard avionics systems for the 
implementation of various functions, including aircraft flight control and guidance, 
navigation computation and attitude determination, flight management and display, 
local motion compensation and inertial system correction and alignment, as well as 
air traffic management. A navigational sensor measures quantities related to one or 
more elements of the navigation states. A set of navigational sensors, which is able to 
determine all the navigation states by using appropriate navigation algorithms, makes 
up a navigation system.  
An aircraft navigation system combines all the measurement information from 
the navigational sensor systems of an aircraft to determine the following parameters 
and information: 
• Kinematic parameters (accelerations and angular rates) 
• Navigation states 
• Trajectory and track parameters 
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• System health status information.  
The main navigation sensors/systems used by aircraft are summarised in Table 
1-1 from the literature survey. These aircraft navigation sensors/systems can be 
categorised as two types: self-contained navigation systems and external aiding 
navigation systems. The self-contained navigation systems perform the navigation 
functions independent of external signals. In contrast, the external aiding navigation 
systems implement the navigation functions through reception of signals from and/or 
transmission of signals to external systems. These two types of navigation systems 
are examined in the following subsections.  
Table 1-1 Aircraft Navigation Sensors/Systems 
System Sensors Coordinates Navigation 
Systems Subsystems Derived States Sensors Raw Data Raw 
Measurements 
INS, 
 
 
AHRS 
Position 
Velocity 
Acceleration 
Attitude 
Inertial sensors Accelerations 
and angular 
rates 
Inertial 
instrument 
frame 
Air Data 
System 
Mach  
Airspeed 
Pressure 
altitude  
Air data sensor, 
Baro-altimeter,  
Air speed 
sensor 
Static and 
dynamic 
pressures, air 
speed 
Air mass/wind 
reference 
frame 
Heading 
Indicator 
Heading Magnetic 
heading sensor 
Earth magnetic 
field 
components 
 
Radar 
Altimeter 
Height above 
ground 
Radar altimeter Range Radar antenna 
frame 
 
 
 
 
Self-
Contained 
Navigation 
Systems 
Doppler Radar Ground 
velocity 
Doppler radar Relative LOS 
range rate 
Radar antenna 
frame 
Space-Based 
Navigation 
Systems 
Position 
Velocity 
Time, Attitude 
GNSS receiver LOS range 
and range 
rate 
WGS84 
reference 
frame 
Ground-Based 
Navigation 
System 
Location  
Height  
Angles 
VOR, LORAN, 
VOR/DME, 
ILS 
Relative 
range and 
angle 
Relative 
reference 
frame 
 
 
 
External 
Aiding 
Navigation 
Systems Relative 
Navigation 
System 
Position 
Velocity 
MIDS (JTIDS) 
PLRS 
 
Relative 
range and 
range rate 
WGS-84 and 
Relative grid 
frame 
1.1.1 Self-Contained Navigation Systems 
A self-contained navigation system is a system that computes aircraft position, 
velocity and attitude relative to a reference frame by means of dead-reckoning (DR) 
techniques without reception of externally generated signals. Using DR techniques, 
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aircraft velocities are determined by integrating the measured aircraft accelerations 
from known initial velocities. Aircraft position is obtained by integrating the aircraft 
velocity from a known initial position. Typical DR procedure for a single axis case is 
illustrated in Figure 1.1 where all initial values are zero. Position and velocity errors 
caused by white noise sensor errors are shown in Figure 1.1(c). This DR procedure 
continuously accumulates sensor errors so that the navigation state errors grow over 
time and are unbounded unless they are constrained by aiding navigation systems. 
This characteristic is a vital limitation of all self-contained navigation systems.  
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Figure 1.1 Dead Reckoning Procedure 
The sensor systems applied for self-contained navigation systems are typically 
inertial sensor systems, air data sensor systems and Doppler radar. An air data system 
provides altitude with respect to mean sea level and true air speed. Doppler radar can 
measure aircraft velocity relative to the ground by transmitting a radar beam to and 
receiving the echo beam from the ground. But, Doppler radar signals are susceptible 
to interference from external signals or the environment. Doppler radar and air data 
system cannot provide all the navigation states, whereas an inertial system alone can 
determine all the navigation states.  
Two basic inertial mechanisations are used to implement an inertial navigation 
system (INS). The first method is known as a stable platform system where a set of 
Velocity
 
 
Noise 
a
 
 
Position
 
 
 

 
 

 
(a) Integrating Acceleration Twice 
Position
 
 
v
 
 
Noise  
 

 
(b) Integrating Velocity (c) DR Errors caused by white noise 
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mutually orthogonal accelerometers is mounted on a gimballed gyro platform. The 
gyros sense the angular rate of the platform and control the gimbal servos so that the 
platform maintains a stable platform orientation with respect to a known reference 
frame irrespective of the aircraft rotation. The gimbal angles provide a direct readout 
of aircraft attitude angles. The accelerometer triad on the platform provides aircraft 
accelerations relative to the known reference frame. Integration of the accelerations 
can derive the velocity and position of an aircraft. The second method is referred to 
as strapdown inertial system where gyros and accelerometers are mounted on a rigid 
frame that is strapped down to an aircraft. The inertial sensors measure accelerations 
and angular rates of the aircraft relative to inertial space. The aircraft attitude angles 
are then derived by performing a so-called analytical platform algorithm, commonly 
known as the strapdown attitude determination algorithm. The accelerometer outputs 
are transformed to this analytical platform frame and are then integrated to obtain the 
velocity and position in a navigation reference frame.  
Although inertial systems exhibit some disadvantages of the dead reckoning 
method, their high dynamic characteristics and short-term measurement accuracy are 
ideal for aircraft attitude determination and flight control systems. In addition, other 
airborne avionics systems require inertial information to stabilise and compensate for 
local motion.  
1.1.2 External Aiding Navigation Systems 
An external aiding navigation system is a radio navigation system and consists 
of two parts: airborne subsystems and external signal source systems. An airborne 
subsystem is a signal-processing unit, which receives and processes the coded signals 
transmitted by external signal sources to facilitate position fixing. An external signal 
source system is typically a network of transmitters that transmit coded signals and 
can be further classified as ground-based radio navaid systems (e.g., VOR/DME, ILS 
and LORAN) and space-based navigation systems, also known as Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS). Two communication modes are used in external aiding 
navigation systems: one-way and two-way modes. In the one-way communication 
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mode, an airborne subsystem passively receives signals and data from an external 
signal source system whereas in the two-way mode, an airborne subsystem actively 
transmits signals and receives replies from external signal sources. External aiding 
navigation systems are usually based on an algebraic geometry principle to determine 
the aircraft navigation states. The geometry is shaped by lines of sight (LOS) or lines 
of position (LOP) from external signal sources to an airborne receiver, as depicted in 
Figure 1.2(a) and (b). The coordinates of the points, which are the positions of the 
aircraft and external transmitters, are represented by a set of nonlinear or linear 
algebraic equations. The forms of and the constraints on the algebraic equations 
depend on the navigation mechanisms of external aiding navigation systems. 
Navigation mechanisms applied to external aiding navigation systems are 
primarily based on the timing/ranging techniques, angle measurement and Doppler 
techniques. The angle measuring technique measures the azimuth angle of an aircraft 
with respect to an external reference transmitter and is usually used in ground-based 
radio navaid systems. In other words, this method computes the direction of a radial 
line from the transmitter to the aircraft; that is, the coefficient of a linear algebraic 
equation, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 (b). Therefore, the position of an aircraft is the 
solution of a set of linear algebraic equations. Two transmitters provide a unique fix 
in angle measuring systems. As a result, the uncertainty of aircraft location caused by 
the measurement errors increase with distance from the aircraft to the transmitters, as 
shown in Figure 1.2(d). VOR/DME is a typical angle/range measurement navigation 
system.  
The Doppler positioning technique, which measures the rates of changes of the 
relative ranges along the signal LOS between an aircraft and external signal sources, 
was used in the first generation of GNSS, known as the Transit system. The Doppler 
technique can provide an accurate velocity measurement. However, the uncertainties 
of position solutions, caused by integrating the Doppler measurement errors, increase 
over time. For example, the positioning accuracy of the Transit system degraded with 
time. 
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Figure 1.2 Principles of External Aiding Navigation Systems 
The timing/ranging techniques use the principle of elapsed time measurement 
as the basis for the LOS range measurements. The elapsed time is the time difference 
between the time at which the ranging signal is transmitted by an external transmitter 
and the time at which it is detected by an airborne receiver. Several timing/ranging 
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techniques have been applied to ground-based radio navigation systems and space-
based navigation systems, including LORAN and GPS. The LOP geometry of GPS is 
the surface of a sphere whereas the LORAN system is a location hyperbola. Hence, 
the position of an aircraft is computed in terms of the solution of nonlinear algebraic 
equations. 
In comparison with dead reckoning techniques, a significant advantage of the 
timing/ranging techniques is that the accuracy of the navigation systems based on the 
timing/ranging techniques does not degrade over time or distance because the 
navigation states are derived from a set of nonlinear algebraic equations rather than a 
set of integral equations. Moreover, the uncertainty of a position solution is restricted 
to a circle or hyperbola of location or the surface of a position sphere instead of the 
radial line in the angle measuring systems. The Doppler positioning technique can be 
also combined with the timing/ranging techniques used in GNSS navigation systems. 
Consequently, GNSS affords long-term stability of accuracy for the position and 
velocity solution. A GNSS receiver is inexpensive, small size and low power. It is 
these advantages that make GNSS an ideal external navigation system to aid all self-
contained navigation systems, particularly inertial systems. 
The accuracy of external aiding navigation systems is affected by the geometry 
of the positions of aircraft and external transmitters[1]. In space-based navigation 
systems, the radio ranging signals transmitted by satellites propagate through the 
atmosphere to airborne receivers, the signal dispersion and refraction caused by the 
ionosphere and troposphere introduce signal propagation path delays in the range 
measurements, as shown in Figure 1.2 (c). In addition, the uncertainty of satellite 
orbits, and satellite and receiver clock errors also introduce range measurement 
errors. As a result, the measured time difference is not perfect and the resultant range 
is known as the pseudorange. 
External aiding navigation systems and other self-contained navigation systems 
(such as Doppler radar) are generally used to aid inertial navigation systems. Such 
systems are referred to as navaid systems in this thesis. 
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1.1.3 Required Navigation Performance 
The concept of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) was established by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop aircraft navigation 
standards for all phases of aircraft operations. In ICAO Document 9650, RNP is 
defined as a statement of the navigation performance accuracy, integrity, continuity 
and availability necessary for operations within a defined airspace. RNP can include 
both performance and functional requirements, which is indicated by the RNP type. 
The RNP types specify the minimum navigation performance accuracy required in an 
airspace. These standards are intended for system designers, manufacturers, and 
installers of avionics equipment, as well as service providers and users of the systems 
for global operations. Four primary parameters are used to define RNP requirements: 
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability, and their definitions in this thesis are 
based on published descriptions[2][3][4][5].  
RNP accuracy is defined in terms of the total system error (TSE) with respect 
to the reference flight trajectory required for each phase of flight. The TSE comprises 
two error components: flight technical errors and navigation system errors. The 
accuracy requirement is for the TSE to remain within a normal performance region, 
under fault-free conditions, at least 95% of the time.   
RNP integrity is defined as a measure of the trust which can be placed on the 
correctness of the information supplied by a navigation system. Integrity includes the 
ability of a navigation system to provide timely and valid alerts to flight crew when 
the navigation system must not be used for its intended purpose. Integrity risk is the 
probability that an undetected failure results in the TSE exceeding the containment 
region.  
RNP continuity is the ability of a navigation system to perform navigation 
functions without interruption during a certain period of time. Continuity risk is the 
probability that a navigation system will be interrupted and will be unable to provide 
navigation information over the intended period of operation. More specially, 
continuity is the probability that the navigation system will be available for the 
duration of operation.  
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RNP availability is an indication of the ability of a navigation system to supply 
usable service within a specified coverage area, and is defined as the portion of time 
that reliable navigation information is presented to the flight crew. Availability is 
specified in terms of the probability of the navigation function being available at the 
beginning of the intended operation. 
RNP accuracy and integrity are achieved by developing innovative data fusion 
methods while RNP continuity and availability are satisfied by fault-tolerant design. 
In this thesis, fault tolerance is the ability of an aircraft navigation system to continue 
satisfactory operation in the presence of one or more hardware or software failures.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate data fusion methodologies for the design 
and development of aircraft multisensor navigation systems in order to fulfil the RNP 
requirements. 
1.2 Multisensor Data Fusion  
1.2.1 The Concept of Multisensor Data Fusion 
Data fusion refers to the combination of data from a variety of sensors that are 
able to act in cooperation such that the total effect is greater than the sum of effects 
taken independently. The concept of multisensor data fusion (MSDF) was initially 
developed for military applications[6-8] and afterwards applied to civil industries[9-12], 
including battlefield surveillance, automatic multi-target tracking and recognition, 
guidance and control of autonomous vehicles and robotic systems. Traditionally, 
multisensor data fusion is considered as a data/information processing technology, 
covering a wide range of disciplines, for example, estimation and identification 
theory, control engineering, statistics and decision theory, signal processing and 
pattern recognition, artificial intelligence and knowledge engineering. Owing to the 
multidisciplinary nature of multisensor data fusion and a wide range of applications, 
researchers have described the concept of multisensor data fusion from diverse 
perspectives, focusing on either the description of functions to be completed or data 
processing methods used by multisensor data fusion systems. In order to improve 
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communications among researchers and system developers, the US Joint Directors of 
Laboratories (JDL) Data Fusion Working Group has developed a functional model of 
multisensor data fusion and defined multisensor data fusion as a multilevel, 
multifaceted process dealing with the automatic detection, association, correlation, 
estimation, and combination of data and information from single and multiple 
sources
[7][9]
. The JDL model and definition have been accepted by many data fusion 
researchers and primarily served for military applications, for example, command, 
control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems. Other application- 
oriented MSDF models[10][11], established by the US National Institute of Standard 
and Technology (NIST), are mostly used for industrial control systems and 
intelligent systems, such as robotic systems. The JDL and NIST models, as well as 
other models are summarised by Kokar and Kim[12], who have identified three major 
sources of misunderstanding about multisensor data fusion, including lack of precise 
methods and standards to represent multisensor data fusion architectures, low-level 
design solutions against the common practice of software engineering and definitions 
of multisensor data fusion. 
However, these proposed models are not directly applicable to the design of 
multisensor aircraft navigation systems because they ignore the consideration of 
selections of sensor systems and architectures that are the basis of fault tolerance of 
aircraft navigation systems. Moreover, the functional descriptions are not concerned 
with methods to fulfil the RNP requirements.  
1.2.2 Data Fusion for Aircraft Navigation Systems 
Traditionally, the terms integrated (integration), combined (combination) and 
hybridised (hybridisation) are used to describe multisensor-based aircraft navigation 
systems. Integration (or combination) of multiple independent navigation systems for 
aircraft navigation is referred to as fault-tolerant design[13] and the resultant system is 
known as a fault-tolerant navigation system. The integration of multiple cooperative 
sensors to form a navigation system is known as an integrated navigation system. 
These two forms of aircraft navigation systems have been developed since the 1970s. 
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More interests have also been given to both the development of fault-tolerant system 
architectures[14-23] and the improvement of integrated filter architectures and filtering 
algorithms[42-64]. However, the traditional fault-tolerant navigation systems are a 
static fault tolerance design where multiple navigation systems are structured in a 
federated architecture and the system fault detection is completed by use of simple 
weighted mean methods or majority voting methods. This traditional approach to 
design cannot effectively exploit the advantages of redundant sensor systems and a 
fault-tolerant system cannot be dynamically reconfigured by using redundant sensor 
systems.  
A recent approach is the use of distributed modular avionics architecture where 
multiple inertial sensor systems are located in several positions in an aircraft in order 
to increase survivability and provide the localised compensation for other airborne 
avionic systems[20][33]. This distributed architecture affords an enhanced level of fault 
tolerance by reconfiguration and sharing spare computing resources, which can be 
dynamically allocated to functioning sensor systems. 
The term multisensor data fusion used in aircraft navigation applications has 
appeared in recent years with the advent of  
• Low-cost, small-size and low-mass navigation sensors (e.g. optical gyros, 
MEMS inertial sensors and GNSS sensors),  
• High-speed, large memories and embedded microprocessors, and  
• Distributed and integrated modular avionics architectures.  
Significant advancements in the inertial sensor technologies and predictable 
improvements in the performance, low cost, small size and low mass of the new 
generation of inertial sensors will enable widespread use of inertial sensor networks 
integrated with navaid systems (especially GNSS) in many commercial and military 
aircraft systems. The use of an inertial network architecture not only improves the 
accuracy and fault tolerance of aircraft navigation systems, but also increases the 
survivability of the navigation system and provides local motion compensation and 
stabilisation for other avionic systems. The novel integration of emerging navigation 
sensor technologies and distributed modular avionics architectures based on high-
speed data buses and embedded microprocessors will change the traditional methods 
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used in the design and development of aircraft navigation systems.  
However, the literature survey undertaken in this thesis has not identified any 
rational definitions or comprehensive MSDF models, which can be used to guide 
researchers and engineers to develop aircraft multisensor navigation systems. For 
example, Kayton and Friend, Huddle and Brown[1], in the book Avionics Navigation 
System, describes multisensor navigation as a process of estimating the navigation 
variables of position, velocity, and attitude from a sequence of measurement from 
more than one navigation sensor. Obviously this definition implies development of 
various novel state estimate algorithms, but it does not clearly indicate how to design 
and develop an aircraft multisensor navigation system.  
This thesis treats multisensor data fusion as a system engineering methodology 
that can guide system developers, by using appropriate sensor allocations, failure 
detection and isolation techniques and data fusion algorithms, to design, develop and 
implement a highly reliable multisensor-based navigation system in order to obtain 
required navigation system performance in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity 
and availability. This definition covers the whole system design process from system 
requirements to system architecture design. 
1.3 Aims 
As the existing multisensor data fusion models are either application-oriented 
intelligent systems or military C4I systems, it is proposed to develop a generalised 
MSDF model for aircraft navigation systems. This model will provide a framework 
for system engineers and researchers to design and develop multisensor navigation 
systems. 
A further motivation for this study is the emerging concepts and technologies 
in aviation, including seamless navigation/positioning and free flight concepts, and 
the applications of MEMS inertial technologies and integrated modular avionics 
architectures. A major development, which underpins the recent developments in 
navigation systems, is global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). These concepts 
and technologies will be used in future Air Traffic Management/Communication 
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Navigation Surveillance (ATM/CNS) systems. The core of these innovative concepts 
is the techniques for high precision positioning. It is expected that modern navigation 
systems, based on the fusion of various multiple redundant navigation sensors, can 
provide 10 degree-of-freedom (DOF) parameters in a 4-dimensional space, including 
time, position and velocity, and attitude values. In addition, techniques developed for 
the MSDF-based navigation systems can also be applied to the spacecraft industries 
and intelligent transportation systems.  
Recently, a great deal of interest has arisen in manufacturing processes that 
allow the monolithic integration of MEMS with driving, controlling, and signal 
processing electronics. With the development of MEMS inertial sensors and high-
speed and large memory microprocessor, complex data fusion algorithms and multi-
state sensor error dynamic models will be able to be implemented in a single 
microprocessor in a distributed integrated modular avionics architecture.  
This study also originated from an EU Framework 5 project, the SHINE (smart 
hybridised integrated navigation equipment) programme, which was to develop a 
low-cost redundant inertial/GNSS-based attitude integrated navigation system for 
aircraft. In this project, the author was responsible for performing the SHINE system 
safety analysis, evaluation of the different SRIMU configurations, and development 
and simulation of multi-model Kalman filtering algorithms and FDI algorithms for 
SHINE system. During my PhD study, these researches were further extended into 
the development of inertial network data fusion algorithms for wider applications of 
airborne distributed inertial systems. Most research results obtained from this PhD 
programme were delivered into the SHINE project.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
This thesis examines the problem of multisensor data fusion for aircraft 
navigation in distributed sensor network systems and investigates data fusion 
methodologies for the design, analysis, development and simulation of multisensor 
aircraft navigation systems. It is expected that such multisensor navigation systems 
can improve the system reliability and the navigation performance in terms of 
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accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity and enhance the fault tolerance of 
aircraft navigation systems by using FDI and integrity monitoring techniques. The 
specific objectives of the study programme are: 
• To gain a theoretical understanding of the problems of multisensor data fusion 
for aircraft navigation and to develop a generalised multisensor data fusion 
model for aircraft navigation systems.  
• To investigate methods for evaluation and analysis of various architectures of 
redundant sensor configurations and to develop error dynamic models for 
skewed redundant inertial measurement units (SRIMU). 
• To establish the normalised navigation and attitude determination equations of 
inertial reference systems and other navaid systems, and to analyse their error 
dynamics.  
• To develop methods for the detection and isolation of various sensor failures 
and for monitoring of the integrity of the navigation states and inertial vector 
state in inertial network systems in order to ensure the safety of multisensor 
aircraft navigation systems. 
• To develop innovative distributed data fusion algorithms in order to enhance 
the accuracy of the distributed inertial states and navigation states estimates. 
• To develop a simulation system for the evaluation of the performance of 
inertial sensors of varying quality in an inertial network system, and FDI and 
distributed data fusion filter algorithms developed in this thesis. 
• To undertake a series of case studies and simulations of sensor configurations. 
This thesis will contribute new understanding to the design methodologies used 
in the integration of distributed low cost sensors for aircraft navigation. The research 
programme will cover the development of software tools for multisensor data fusion 
and performance analysis, and provide insight into the effectiveness of these systems 
in the form of simulation models of sensor systems and navigation systems. 
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1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews traditional data fusion methods and architectures applied to 
integrated navigation systems, including various fault-tolerant navigation system 
architectures, data fusion filter architectures and filtering algorithms, sensor failure 
detection and isolation techniques and integrity monitoring methods. The advantages 
and disadvantages of these traditional methods and architectures are summarised and 
compared. Based on the literature survey, a generalised MSDF model is presented as 
a frame for development of multisensor aircraft navigation system in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 introduces the mathematical formulations of statistical estimation 
theory and hypothesis testing theory, which are required in this thesis to understand 
the development of multisensor data fusion algorithms for multisensor aircraft 
navigation systems. Estimation theory is a powerful mathematical tool that has been 
used in various engineering fields to accurately estimate the states of complex 
dynamic systems and to implement the most effective control of the systems. This 
chapter first introduces conventional Kalman filter algorithms, including linear and 
extended Kalman filters. The information form of the Kalman filter is then given in 
order to deduce various distributed data fusion filter algorithms.  
Statistical testing theory is an auxiliary tool that is used to further confirm the 
validity of sensor data and the estimated system states. This chapter also introduces 
Bayesian detection and Newman-Pearson detection problems and the statistics of the 
Kalman estimate errors and residuals (innovations). 
Chapter 4 first introduces various coordinate systems used in this thesis and 
evolution of the inertial technology, and examines the performance of different-grade 
inertial sensors. The major efforts of this chapter are to establish the normalised 
navigation equations of major navigation systems and to analyse their error dynamic 
models, including inertial systems and global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). 
These normalised navigation, attitude determination and error dynamic equations 
constitute the mathematical foundations to design, develop and simulate multisensor 
data fusion filters. 
Chapter 5 analyses and evaluates redundant sensor system configurations and 
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develops sensor-level data fusion methods. The main purpose of sensor-level data 
fusion is to provide highly reliable and accurate sensor data for subsequent system–
level data fusion modules and an ability to detect sensor failures and reconfigure 
SRIMU systems and inertial state vectors in sensor network systems in the event of 
sensors failures. Two detection methods are developed to improve the generalised 
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) method for monitoring sensor failures of different 
modes. This chapter also presents SRIMU error compensation filters to enhance the 
performance of the GLRT-based methods. This chapter provides the basis for the 
design of fault-tolerant navigation systems with highly reliable integrity. 
Chapter 6 addresses the problem of distributed sensor network systems and 
develops data fusion methods for distributed sensor network systems, including 
inertial measurement (data) algorithms, state fusion algorithms and inertial network 
integrity monitoring algorithms. For the first time, this chapter presents inertial 
network sensing models and develops dynamic relationships among the inertial 
network nodes. Two kinds of inertial sensor network architectures are identified in 
this chapter, each with two different communication modes. In the first kind of the 
distributed systems, all of the sensor systems directly or indirectly measure identical 
system states. In the second kind of distributed systems, different sensor subsystems 
observe their local states. However, all of the local system states are dynamically 
related though dynamic relationships. For these different distributed systems, four 
distributed data fusion filters are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 develops a simulation system environment to test and evaluate the 
FDI and integrity monitoring algorithms, and the data fusion algorithms developed 
during this study programme. For this purpose, this chapter describes the overall 
architecture of this software simulation system and the sub-architectures of the 
inertial simulation system and the GPS simulation system. The results of simulation 
studies are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 summarises the work of this thesis and provides final conclusions. 
Finally, areas of further work are recommended.  
 
 OVERVIEW & METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 17 
Chapte r  2  
2 MULTISENSOR DATA FUSION FOR AIRCRAFT 
NAVIGATION: OVERVIEW & METHODOLOGY  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews existing fault-tolerant navigation system architectures and 
data fusion methods for the development of multiple sensor navigation systems. In 
Section 2.2, conventional fault-tolerant architectures used for the design of aircraft 
navigation systems are outlined and briefly compared. The progression of various 
Kalman filter architectures and filtering algorithms employed in many integrated 
aircraft navigation systems are assessed and their advantages and disadvantages are 
summarised in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines the evolution of sensor failure 
detection and isolation (FDI) and integrity monitoring techniques, which are used in 
GNSS and inertial sensor systems. On the basis of the literature survey, Section 2.5 
presents a generalised multisensor data fusion model (MSDF), which will be used for 
the development of future aircraft multisensor navigation systems. 
2.2 Overview of Fault-Tolerant Navigation Systems 
Fault-tolerant navigation systems have been in use for over 30 years. The 
design methods incorporate fault-tolerant strategies and data fusion techniques to 
enhance the reliability and safety and also to improve the performance of aircraft 
navigation systems. During this development, three forms of redundancy have been 
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proposed: hardware redundancy, software redundancy and analytical redundancy. 
Figure 2.1 outlines the fault-tolerant design methods used in aircraft navigation. 
Hardware redundancy takes advantage of multiple navigation sensors/systems to 
achieve fault tolerance and to improve the performance of a navigation system. This 
approach is based on the fact that measurements from various sensor systems may be 
independent, redundant, complementary or cooperative. These different types of 
measurements can be fused by means of sensor data fusion algorithms so that the 
overall system performance is better than that each system can obtain independently. 
Hardware redundancy techniques have been widely applied to many avionics 
systems[21-23].  
Software redundancy makes use of different software versions to increase the 
safety and reliability of navigation solutions by avoiding possible errors caused by 
software design and computing failures. However, software redundancy cannot 
increase the accuracy of navigation solutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical Structure of Fault-Tolerant Design Methods  
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Analytical redundancy is based on the knowledge of rotational kinematics and 
translational dynamics of an aircraft to enhance hardware redundancy[24], and is 
usually used to generate additional redundant information for the diagnosis of sensor/ 
system failures rather than the improvement of accuracy of navigation systems[25]. 
Therefore, the analytical redundancy is considered as a failure detection method in 
many practical systems.  
Hardware redundancy plays an essential role in the design of fault-tolerant 
navigation systems and the level of fault tolerance depends on both the architectures 
of hardware redundant systems and the data fusion methods implemented. Two types 
of hardware redundancy have been developed for the design of fault-tolerant aircraft 
navigation systems, system-level redundancy and sensor-level redundancy, which are 
described in the following subsections. 
2.2.1 System-Level Redundancy 
A system-level redundancy architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.2 where each 
INS in a triplex or quadruplex system must operate independently. It is also known 
as an independent system architecture because there is no data communication 
between these INSs. Each inertial system can also be integrated with other navaid 
systems to improve the navigation accuracy and to control the accumulation of 
inertial sensor errors with time. Fault-tolerant management checks the consistency of 
the outputs of all INSs to diagnose a failed inertial system, typically by using a 
majority-voting method or a weighted-mean method. In order to provide fail-
operational/fail-safe operation, the fault-tolerant navigation system must have at least 
three INSs. In other words, nine pairs of inertial sensors (accelerometers and gyros) 
are needed where each INS is a conventional orthogonal configuration.  
The main advantages of this architecture are that the design and integration are 
simple and that it does not need complex fault-tolerant techniques for diagnosis of 
system failures. However, if any one sensor in one INS fails, then this INS has to be 
removed from the fault-tolerant architecture. As a result, this architecture cannot 
exploit the benefits of redundant inertial sensors to dynamically reconfigure an 
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aircraft navigation system in the event of one INS failure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 System-Level Redundancy Architecture 
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tolerance and effectively makes use of existing IMU equipment. But, the resultant 
fault-tolerant system is still expensive. Considerable efforts are being made to reduce 
volume, weight and cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 IMU-Level Redundancy Architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Multisensor Redundancy Architecture 
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2.4 where the multisensor suite consists of a dodecahedron configuration. Six inertial 
sensors are installed perpendicular to the parallel faces of a regular dodecahedron. 
Outputs from the multisensor suite are sent to several redundant processors, which 
individually perform navigation and attitude computations, sensor FDI functions and 
navigation system reconfiguration.  
Multisensor redundancy is a cost-effective method that exploits the benefits of 
emerging inertial sensor technologies and high-speed embedded microprocessor 
systems. Multisensor technology provides the basis for the future generations of 
navigation systems. 
2.2.3 Distributed Redundant Architecture 
The distributed redundant architecture is a new fault-tolerant concept, which 
was developed with the introduction of distributed and integrated modular avionics 
architectures. For example, a current combat platform may have a total of twelve 
traditional IMUs of various quality providing the inertial state vector information 
required by avionics systems and weapon systems[33]. In this architecture, inertial 
sensor systems are mounted at several locations in an aircraft not only to meet the 
fault tolerance requirements of navigation systems but also to provide highly 
accurate local inertial data for other systems, for example, weapon system controls, 
radar stabilization and motion compensation. The concept of an inertial network used 
for aircraft avionics was initially proposed by Kelley, Carlson and Berning[32] in 1994 
and then further developed by Berning, Howe and Jenkins[33] in 1996 and by Kaiser, 
Beck and Berning[34] in 1998.  
However, the research published to date does not provide a systematic study of 
this inertial network architecture, specially in terms of data fusion methods, dynamic 
alignment and correction of distributed inertial sensor systems, and distributed sensor 
failure detection and isolation techniques. Therefore, there is a need for systematic 
investigation of data fusion methodologies in the design, development and simulation 
of fault-tolerant aircraft navigation system based on distributed inertial network 
architectures.  
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2.3 Data Fusion Filter Architectures 
Kalman filtering techniques have been developed for applications in aircraft 
navigation, control and guidance since the 1970s. During this period, various Kalman 
filter architectures and filtering algorithms have been proposed as prime data fusion 
methods for fusing multiple navigation sensors/systems in order to achieve the 
required navigation performance. The data fusion filter architectures currently used 
in aircraft integrated navigation systems can be categorised as four types: centralised, 
cascaded, federated and distributed data fusion architectures.  
2.3.1 Centralised Filter Architecture  
The centralised filter architecture is shown in Figure 2.5. Measurements or data 
from all navigation sensors/systems are processed in a central data fusion filter to 
obtain the accurate estimates of the navigation states. It is the most common filter 
design implemented in current integrated navigation systems, for example, INS/GPS/ 
Doppler integrated systems[36], Doppler/GPS integrated systems[37] and almost all 
tightly-coupled GPS/inertial systems[35][38][39] where raw GPS measurements and INS 
outputs are combined in a centralised filter to estimate the navigation state errors and 
sensor errors, including the GPS receiver clock errors, inertial sensor errors and baro-
altimeter errors.  
  Numerous covariance analysis methods and numerical computations of the 
standard and extended Kalman filters have been reported[40][41]. Theoretically, the 
centralised filter can obtain optimal estimates of the aircraft motion states. However, 
with the increasing numbers of sensor systems in aircraft, the filtering algorithms can 
be quite complex and the centralised filter computation can be time-consuming as a 
result of the large state dimension in the dynamic models of the filter. Accordingly, 
the centralised filter may not necessarily be a proper approach to the development of 
fault-tolerant multisensor navigation systems[49][62][67]. To overcome the weaknesses 
of the centralised filter, other filter architectures have been proposed in the recent 
years. 
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Figure 2.5 Centralised Data Fusion Architecture 
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Figure 2.6 Cascaded Data Fusion Architecture 
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and loosely coupled GPS/INS integrated navigation systems where the GPS-based 
navigation solutions derived by an GPS internal filter and INS data are combined in a 
separate cascaded filter external to the GPS receiver to estimate the navigation state 
errors and the inertial sensor errors. The GPS filter estimates the GPS receiver clock 
errors. However, the GPS filter is usually based on a simplified model and may not 
output computed error covariances. Consequently, the cascaded filter may not have 
access to covariance information. 
Schlee et al[42] develop a cascaded filtering algorithm to improve the accuracy 
of an existing GPS/inertial system, known as a master INS, which utilised an internal 
GPS filter to estimate the master INS navigation solutions and the GPS clock errors. 
This cascaded algorithm also provides transfer alignment between the master INS 
and a second inertial system. This study has shown that improvement in the accuracy 
of the master INS and the obtainable accuracy of the transfer alignment largely 
depend on the update rate of the cascaded filter. However, correlations of the state 
errors caused by the internal GPS filter are ignored in the measurement noise matrix 
of the cascaded filter. From Kalman filter theory, the non-diagonal elements of the 
state error covariance matrix of the GPS filter (which represent the correlations) can 
only be ignored if the filter contains highly accurate estimates of the navigation states 
and the values of non-diagonal elements are far less than the main diagonal elements. 
Otherwise, the performance of the cascaded filter may be degraded as a result of 
ignoring the correlation. 
Wade and Grewal[43] analyse the effect of this correlation on the accuracy of 
cascaded GPS/INS systems and their results show that the accuracy of the cascaded 
systems depends on the correlation matrix in many cases. When the state errors 
estimated by the internal GPS filter are closely correlated, the cascaded filter may 
incorrectly estimate the navigation state errors and the inertial sensor errors. Wade 
and Grewal further suggested adjusting the measurement noise matrix by using 
adaptive process noise in the cascaded filter. However, development of this adaptive 
process and identification of the measurement noise matrix are not reported.  
In order to improve the robustness of the cascaded filter to input conditions and 
adverse environments, Karatsinides[44] proposes two methods for dealing with the 
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GPS position biases and identifying the statistical values of the measurement noise 
for the cascaded filter. The GPS positioning solution contains bias resulting from 
satellite clock errors, ephemeris errors, ranging signal propagation delay and the 
geometry of satellites. Although this GPS position bias is unobservable and cannot 
be estimated in the GPS filter, it can influence the accuracy of cascaded GPS/INS 
systems through the error covariance matrix. The first method models the GPS 
position biases as a first-order Gauss-Markov process and then uses these biases as 
the consider-states of a Schmidt-Kalman filter. But, the part of the Schmidt-Kalman 
gain matrix related to the consider-states is set to zero in order to ignore the 
estimated consider-states. The second method computes the variances and 
covariances of the errors of the navigation states derived by the GPS filter using 
conventional computation equations of variance and covariances provided that the 
update rate of the cascaded filter is less than the GPS filter. 
The cascaded filter architecture is readily implemented by means of existing 
navigation systems and needs minimisation of required modifications for customised 
applications. In practice, most existing navigation systems do not output covariance 
data of the navigation state errors. Consequently, the cascaded filter is extremely 
dependent upon the methods that are used to estimate covariances of the primary 
filter and the performance of the primary filter. Moreover, tuning of the primary filter 
is of critical importance to the performance of the cascaded filter[43].  
2.3.3 Federated Filter Architecture  
The federated filter architecture was initially recommended by Carlson[46] for 
integrating multiple navigation sensor systems in order to provide a high level of 
fault tolerance and accuracy. This is actually a two-stage filtering architecture, as 
shown in Figure 2.7 where all parallel local filters combine their own sensor systems 
with a common reference system, usually an inertial navigation system, to obtain the 
local estimates of the system states. These local estimates are subsequently fused in a 
master filter to achieve the global estimations. By using a common reference system, 
all parallel filters have a common state vector. The federated filter is generally 
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designed on the basis of two different strategies[46][47]. In the first method, the local 
filters are designed independent of the global performance of the federated filter and 
estimate n sets of local state vectors and their associated covariances by using their 
own local measurements. These n sets of the local state estimates are then weighted 
by their error covariances to obtain the global state estimates. The second method is 
based on the global optimality of the federated filter and the local filters are derived 
from the global model of the federated filter and estimate n versions of the global 
states from local sensor measurements. These n versions of estimates are weighted 
by their error covariances to obtain the global optimality. The master filter is a 
weighted least-squares estimator. Furthermore, Carlson[48] developed a square-root 
form of the federated filtering algorithm to increase the computational precision and 
the numerical stability of the federated filter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Federated Data Fusion Architecture 
A significant feature of the federated filtering process is that a reference INS 
must be used to create the common system states in the local and master filters, 
which are the aircraft navigation states. Therefore, each local filter can obtain the 
suboptimal global navigation states. A comparison of the federated and centralised 
filters[49] has shown that the federated architecture offers improvements in failure 
detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) and the fault tolerance over the centralised 
filter.  
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Levy[50] uses dual state suboptimal analysis to model the true world state vector 
and develops covariance analysis algorithms for assessing the suboptimality of both 
the cascaded and the federated filters. The dual state contains the states of the first 
and second filters in the case of the cascaded filter (or the states of all parallel filters 
and the master filter in the case of the federated filter). Levy’s results have shown 
that the cascaded and federated filters are seldom optimal in comparison with the 
centralised Kalman filter. As the master filter updates become sparser, the actual 
performance of the federated filter degrades in comparison with the centralised filter. 
The federated filter is only optimal (or equivalent to the centralised filter) when the 
full global state is modelled in each local filter and the master filter is run at the 
update rate of the local filters.   
Tupysev[51] develops a federated filtering algorithm based on the  principles of 
state vector augmentation and the rejection of partial information. Unlike Carlson’s 
filter, the global state model that is used to derive the parallel local filters contains a 
common state vector plus individual local bias state vectors instead of all the states 
of the local filters. The local state is a subset of the global states.   
However, the use of a reference navigation system as a common information 
source of all local filters in the federated filter architecture means that common mode 
failures in the reference system can corrupt the performance of these filters. This 
influence can further degrade the level of fault tolerance and FDIR functions. This 
problem seems to have been ignored in current designs of federated integrated 
navigation systems. In addition, this federated filter architecture and corresponding 
filtering algorithms are not applicable to integration of distributed inertial sensor 
systems with navaid systems because there are no common system states in the 
distributed inertial sensor systems. 
The federated filter has been applied to several multisensor navigation systems, 
for example, GPS/INS/SAR/terrain aided navigation and tracking systems[52-54] and 
is sometimes referred to as the decentralised filter[55][56]. To avoid confusion, the term 
decentralised is used as a synonym of distributed in this thesis.  
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2.3.4 Distributed Filter Architecture  
The distributed filter architecture was originally developed for target tracking 
and identification where distributed sensor systems (possibly in different platforms) 
are combined in order to estimate and identify various moving targets in military 
applications[57]. Liggins et al[58] give a comprehensive survey of the distributed 
fusion architectures for target tracking. Distributed filtering techniques used for the 
design and development of fault-tolerant navigation systems have appeared since the 
1990s[55]. Different from the filter architectures described above, distributed filter 
architectures have no standard model. From the perspective of use of information, 
there are two main data fusion approaches to the design of distributed filters, known 
as measurement fusion and state fusion. In state fusion, the local states estimated by 
the local filters are fused in a central filter to obtain global estimations. By contrast, 
in measurement fusion, various subsets of all the sensor measurements are fused by 
means of a bank of Kalman filters to obtain multiple state estimation versions of the 
global system states, which are compared or weighted to obtain the more accurate 
global state estimation and to detect sensor or system failures. However, there may 
be no central data fusion in a fully distributed multisensor data fusion system. In fact, 
the distributed filter architecture offers the most flexible scheme in the design of 
multisensor navigation systems.  
Kerr[55] proposes a decentralised filtering structure which uses a voter/monitor 
method to check outputs of all local filters for failure detection, but the distributed 
filter algorithms developed for this structure are not explained in detail. In terms of 
the filter architecture, Kerr’s version is similar to the federated filter architecture 
given by Carlson[46]. The differences between them are the individual methods used 
for detection and isolation of subsystem failures. For example, Carlson’s filter uses 
filter residuals to detect sensor and subsystem failures whereas Kerr’s filter uses the 
voter/monitoring methods based on Gaussian confidence regions of the estimated 
states. However, some filtering algorithms, for example, Speyer’s parallel filtering 
algorithms[62] or others, may be used for this decentralised structure. Strictly, Kerr's 
structure is not a distributed filter architecture and it lacks systematic study on the 
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corresponding filtering algorithms.  
Brumback and Srinath[59] describe a distributed filtering mechanism. This is a 
hierarchical filtering architecture where the local filters fuse different subsets of all 
measurements for local state estimates and failure detection and isolation. A master 
filter combines the outputs of failure-free local filters to yield the global estimation. 
The local filters in the distributed filter architecture can have system models, which 
are different from the global model. The cascaded and federated filter algorithms are 
special cases of the distributed filter architectures. 
Several distributed filtering algorithms have been developed since the 1980s 
for the design of various distributed control systems, target tracking systems and 
navigation systems[60-69]. Speyer[60] designed a distributed filtering algorithm in 
which each of K local filters has its own local sensor measurements and the same 
state model. Each local filter computes the global estimate of the system state vector. 
The information shared between these local filters consists of the local estimates, the 
local error covariances, and an additional (locally computed) data-dependent term, 
which is a dynamic compensation to account for the correlation between the local 
estimates. Speyer’s filter is a fully distributed filtering architecture and has a high 
level of fault tolerance. However, by using the same state model, this filtering 
algorithm cannot be used in a distributed inertial sensor system where the local state 
vector is needed for specialised purposes, for example, local motion compensation.  
Willsky et al[61] consider a problem where two local filters have state models 
which are different from the global model. Each local filter processes its local 
measurements and a fusion algorithm (based on the global model) computes a 
dynamic correlation correction term, combining the local estimates to obtain the 
global estimate. A necessary and sufficient condition for recovering the global state 
from the local states is that a relationship must exist between the observation matrix 
of the global state model and that of the local state models. This relationship is 
explained as a static matrix transformation. In other words, the local state vector is a 
subset of components of the global state vector. This algorithm has been extended to 
the design of a multisensor navigation system[59]. However, these algorithms imply 
that the local and the global states are represented in the same coordinate system and 
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this is not necessarily true for distributed inertial sensor systems. 
Hashemipour et al[62] introduce decentralised Kalman filtering algorithms for 
three types of multisensor networks: sensors collected, time sequential measurements 
and a hybridisation of these two types. In Hashemipour’s filter, each local filter has 
the same state model as the central filter and the observation matrix of each local 
model corresponds to one sub-matrix of the observation matrix of the global model. 
Each local filter computes the global estimation and the local error covariance that 
are subsequently fused in a central filter to obtain the global optimal estimation. 
Accordingly, this filtering algorithm is similar to Speyer’s filter. But it uses the 
information form of the Kalman filter and does not need feedback from the central 
filter to the local filters. Although this algorithm can be used to solve target-tracking 
problems, it cannot be used for distributed multisensor navigation systems because 
the local subsystem states are different in a distributed inertial sensor system. 
Hong[63][64] introduces a distributed multisensor integration algorithm in which 
the local measurements, together with the previous global estimate obtained via the 
communication network, are locally processed to obtain the local state estimate and 
the local error covariance. These local estimates (state and covariance) are fused in a 
central filter to obtain the global estimate. Because the local state and covariance 
predictions are derived from the previous global estimates, the local filters have no 
the state models. However, the rotation matrixes and the translation transformations 
are introduced to establish the relationships between the local states and the global 
(central) state. Moreover, this algorithm was designed to minimise the uncertainties 
of these transformations. It should be noted that the same relationships are also used 
for measurement transformations from the local nodes to the central node. This is not 
necessarily true in distributed inertial sensor systems, especially when a nonlinear 
relationship exists between the measurements and the states. In comparison with 
Speyer’s filtering algorithm, this method simplifies the complexity of the distributed 
filtering algorithms. However, the local states greatly depend on the global states 
because this method lacks local dynamic models. 
Roy et al[65] proposes a square root filtering structure where parallel local filters 
have a smaller dimension than the global filter. Paik et al[66] develops a gain fusion 
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algorithm for decentralised parallel Kalman filters to obtain computation-efficient 
suboptimal estimation results. Raol et al[67] describe a decentralised square-root 
information filtering scheme where all information fusion is processed locally at each 
node and there is no central fusion. These algorithms improve the computational 
precision and numerical stability of the existing distributed filtering algorithms. 
A fully distributed filtering architecture and information fusion algorithm are 
developed, where no central data fusion centre is needed[68][69]. Each local filter has 
its own local system model and processes the local measurements and information 
assimilated from other filters to obtain a global estimate of the system state. 
However, there is still a key problem to be considered; the dynamic relation between 
the local states must be determined, especially if the local state models are different. 
Berg et al[70] describe the static relation between the local states and the global state 
by an approach similar to Speyer’s method[60].  
Multisensor data fusion for aircraft navigation aims at the improvements of the 
performance in terms of the three aspects: 
• Aircraft navigation system RNP parameters;  
• Fault tolerance of navigation system; and 
• Estimation of local motion states.  
The majority of previous developments have generally focused on the first two 
aspects. In other words, existing distributed filtering algorithms have preserved the 
global optimality of the navigation states, which is a desirable feature and serves as a 
benchmark for other avionic systems. However, these methods rarely consider the 
dynamics of the local subsystems and the dynamic relationships between the local 
subsystems. Some algorithms still require extensive computations of local and global 
inverse covariances. Very few studies have addressed estimation of the local states. 
In fact, distributed inertial sensor systems consisting of several IMUs mounted in an 
aircraft affords both redundant inertial measurement information and distributed 
inertial state vectors, which can be used both for aircraft navigation, guidance and 
control, and also for the implementation of local motion compensation functions. 
These IMUs measure local motion with reference to specific coordinate frames 
defined by their installation positions, and have individual error dynamics. Therefore, 
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the local states must be accurately estimated to determine the local dynamic motion. 
The development of distributed filtering algorithms can also be used to investigate 
methods for dynamic alignment and calibration of distributed IMUs. Problems 
related to these considerations have not been addressed in the open literature and this 
thesis addresses the solutions of these problems by developing innovative distributed 
data fusion filters algorithms. 
2.4 Multisensor Navigation System Integrity 
Multisensor aircraft navigation systems can be subject to unforeseen changes 
resulting from sensor failures, the uncertainty of system models and variations in the 
operating conditions, which can lead to the degradation of the overall navigation 
performance. Such changes are known as failures even if they may not represent 
actual failures of physical sensors or components. In order to ensure the reliability of 
an aircraft navigation system, the data fusion mechanism has to detect and isolate 
sensor or system failures from the navigation system and also monitor the integrity of 
the navigation states derived by the fusion filter. These two important procedures are 
usually known as sensor/system failure detection and isolation (FDI) and navigation 
solution integrity monitoring (NSIM). Both functions must check the consistency and 
availability of data. The FDI procedure assesses data from sensor systems and issues 
a confidence range of the sensor data. The NSIM procedure confirms the integrity of 
the navigation solutions and provides alarms and system status information to flight 
crew.  
A typical FDI or NISM algorithm has in general two objectives:  
• To detect the failures,  
• To isolate the failed sensors or components.  
In some cases, an additional objective may be included to estimate the failure 
signals. FDI and NISM procedures rely on redundant data provided by hardware and 
software and analytical redundancy to fulfil the above objectives. A representative 
FDI or NSIM procedure usually consists of three steps, as shown in Figure 2.8. The 
first step, the Residual Generator, processes redundant data to generate a decision 
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function (referred to as test statistic), which is a function of the data residual and a 
measure of the inconsistency of redundant data. Ideally, the decision function is 
independent of the true navigation states or measured states. To decrease the 
influence of noise on the decision function, a pre-processing filter may be used to 
enlarge the signal-to-noise ratio of the failure signals so that failure signals can be 
more easily detected and identified. The second step, the Statistical Test, establishes 
a decision threshold on the basis of certain criteria that are a measure of both the 
performance of the FDI/NISM algorithms and the accuracy of sensor measurements 
or the navigation states. The third step is a decision-making procedure that compares 
the test statistic with the decision threshold to verify if a sensor or component failure 
has occurred or if there are abnormalities in the navigation states or sensor data. 
Depending on the form of the decision functions, the statistical testing procedure can 
be performed by using Gaussian, Rayleigh, 2χ - or t -distribution statistical tests.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 A Typical FDI/NSIM Procedure 
There are numerous approaches to the generation of residuals. But, the three 
commonly used methods are parity matrix transformation, least-squares residuals and 
data fusion filter residuals (or innovation).   
The FDI and NSIM performance is generally characterised by the probabilities 
of two decision errors: false alarms and missed alarms, which are the functions of the 
decision thresholds and are also related to the requirement of the navigation system 
accuracy. 
All FDI and NSIM techniques can be categorised as either snapshot techniques 
or sequential techniques. The snapshot techniques use a single sample to detect and/ 
or isolate instantaneous sensor failures, typically for relatively large magnitudes of 
failures. The sequential techniques employ the cumulative information provided by 
the complete data history to detect drift failures and other soft failures, normally for 
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smaller magnitude failure signals. The snapshot technique has the advantage that it 
does not rely on any assumptions on how a data fusion filter attains its current state 
whereas the sequential technique can improve the FDI reliability because it uses 
history data of the system. 
2.5 Snapshot FDI Techniques 
Many snapshot FDI algorithms have been developed over the past decades and 
the majority of these methods are based on the parity vector/space techniques. Evans 
and Wilcox[71] introduce a test matrix method and Gilmore and Mckern[72]  present a 
parity equations comparison method. Both methods are used to detect and isolate 
failures of redundant inertial sensor systems in a dodecahedron configuration. The 
parity equations comparison tests a set of 15 parity equations each containing output 
values of four sensors while the test matrix method uses a 15x6-dimensional matrix 
with each row consisting of coefficients of one parity equation and performing a test 
on a different subset of four sensors. By minimising the maximum measurement 
residual magnitude, Potter and Deckert[73] develop a so-called minimax FDI 
algorithm for non-orthogonal redundant inertial systems in which any set of four 
sensors are tested and compared. Generally, these methods all need to compute and 
compare each parity equation and employ a least-squares estimator to estimate the 
measured states. Obviously, it becomes a time-expensive procedure for a large 
number of redundant sensors.  
Wilcox[74] gives comparisons of eight earlier FDI algorithms for strapdown 
redundant inertial systems in a dodecahedron configuration. The differences between 
these algorithms are in the approaches used to generate test signals. One method uses 
a Kalman-Bucy filter for failure correction while all the other algorithms compute 
the measured states by means of weighted least-squares estimators. However, these 
algorithms did not link the integrity of the navigation system to the performance of 
the FDI algorithms.  
To overcome the shortcomings of earlier FDI methods, generalised likelihood 
ratio test (GLRT) methods[75][76] have been introduced for the detection and isolation 
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of failures in redundant inertial sensor systems. The GLRT methods are based on the 
maximum likelihood estimate of residual magnitudes where the resultant test statistic 
is a function of the parity vector. One of the advantages of GLRT algorithms is that 
the performance of the FDI algorithms is related to the integrity performance of the 
navigation system and the failed signals can theoretically be estimated. However, the 
GLRT algorithms are not able to detect two simultaneous sensor failures. 
Hall et al[77] designed a 12-state Kalman filter to compensate the parity vector 
by eliminating the effects of normal sensor errors on test signals. This compensation 
technique enhances the effect of true failure signals on the resultant parity vector and 
improves the GLRT performance. However, after the parity space transformation, the 
filter state represents a combination of the sensor errors rather than physical sensor 
errors. In other words, the state estimates no longer correspond to physical sensor 
errors and consequently, the practical sensor errors cannot be dynamically corrected. 
Sturza[78][79] describes the parity vector approach to the detection of jump 
failures of skewed redundant inertial systems and GPS signals, as well as statistical 
methods for the determination of detection thresholds of RAIM and FDI algorithms. 
Brown and Sturza[80] further analysed the effect of geometry of the GPS satellites on 
the parity vector-based RAIM.  
Sturza and Brown[81] give two RAIM algorithms CFAR (constant false alarm 
rate) and CPOD (constant probability of detection) for GPS integrity monitoring. In 
the CFAR algorithm, the detection threshold is based on a constant false alarm rate. 
In the CPOD algorithm, the detection threshold varies in order to provide a constant 
missed alarm rate. Clearly, these methods are not suited to SRIMU configurations 
because the measured states and the navigation states are the same for GPS RAIM. 
For SRIMU FDI, the navigation states are derived from the measured states by 
solving a set of differential equations.  
The mathematical background of the RAIM methods is given by van Diggelen 
and Brown[82]. A number of GPS signal failure detection algorithms, known as 
receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) methods, are based on the parity 
vector technique[83]. 
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These proposed parity vector-based FDI or RAIM algorithms can effectively 
detect jump failures of navigation sensor systems or GPS signals. However, they are 
not able to detect any soft failures arising from drifts or two or more simultaneous 
sensor failures. 
2.5.1 Sequential FDI Techniques 
Several sequential FDI algorithms have also been developed to detect both 
jump and time-drift failures in dynamic systems. Sequential FDI techniques can be 
classified as two types. One type directly uses the history data of the sensor outputs. 
Wald originally introduced a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) algorithm to 
make a binary decision of one mode (degradation) against an alternative mode 
(normal). Chien and Adams[84] present an improved SPRT algorithm whose design 
criterion is based on the minimization of the mean detection time to detect system 
failures subject to constraints on the false alarm and missed alarm probabilities. The 
time minimization is implemented using positive feedback control of the likelihood 
function. It is also used for the detection of jump mode failures.  
The other type implicitly employs the history data of system outputs. This type 
of sequential FDI method is usually based on analytical redundancy techniques that 
require the development of dynamic models of detected systems and this FDI method 
is known as a model-based FDI method. Willsky and Jones[85] describe an improved 
GLRT method for detecting abrupt changes in linear dynamic systems by using the 
sequential system outputs. Willsky[86], Gertler[24] and Patton[25] summarise various 
FDI methods used in dynamic systems. The majority of these model-based FDI 
methods apply various GLRTs to test the Kalman residuals for the presence of sensor 
failures or abrupt change of system states. They may also detect system degradation 
but cannot detect time-drift sensor failures. From a survey of the literature, many 
existing sequential or model-based FDI algorithms are often used to detect jump 
failures. 
Kerr[87] proposes a method known as the two-confidence region comparison 
approach to failure detection. One confidence region is determined by the Kalman 
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predictor and is centred about the expected unfailed state and reflects the uncertainty 
of the system noise. The other confidence region is created by the Kalman estimator 
and is centred about the Kalman estimate. This region reflects the uncertainties of the 
system states and the measurement noise. A failure is detected by comparing these 
two confidence regions. As Kerr states in his paper, as long as the two confidence 
intervals overlap, the true state may be in both confidence intervals; however, when 
both confidence intervals are disjoint, the true state cannot be in both intervals 
simultaneously and a failure is declared. However, the increasing number of sensors 
makes the computation of failure thresholds very complex. In addition, because an 
identical system dynamic model is used in the state predictor and the state estimator, 
uncertainties of the filter dynamic model may cause false alarms. In the design of an 
INS/GNSS integrated filter, the filter dynamic model can be derived by disturbing 
the inertial navigation equation about the nominal navigation states. In this case, the 
sensor drift failures can contribute to errors in the nominal navigation states. This 
disturbance error further affects both the predictor and estimator. This effect may 
lead to missed alarms. Accordingly, this method does not apply to error dynamic 
models where the errors of the navigation states are used as the filter state rather than 
the navigation states.  
NSIM methods are based on sequential FDI techniques, which analyse the 
covariance matrix and residuals (or innovations) of the data fusion filter. The most 
direct method is to compare different versions of the navigation states estimated by a 
bank of Kalman filters. For example, Brenner[88] proposes a solution separation 
method for GPS/INS integrated system. In this method, a bank of Kalman filters is 
used to obtain both full-set solutions and sub-set solutions. The test statistic and the 
decision thresholds are determined on the basis of the horizontal separations between 
the full-set solution and sub-set solutions, and the Kalman filter covariance matrices. 
Diesel et al[89] give an autonomous integrity monitored extrapolation (AIME) 
algorithm used in the Litton GPS/IRS integrated system. AIME is an open control 
system using range differential measurements as the filter observables, which are the 
differences between the observed GPS pseudoranges and the computed ranges based 
on the predicted navigation states and the satellite positions. The difference between 
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the time-updated (predicted) state and the measurement-updated (estimated) state of 
a Kalman filter are used as the test statistic to monitor the navigation states. Hanlon 
and Maybeck[90] analyse the effects of mismodelled input matrix, output matrix and 
state transition matrix on the residuals resulting from a bank of Kalman filters, each 
using a different filter model to describe the same dynamic system. They also 
develop a hypothesis testing algorithm using these residuals to detect failure status of 
a flight control system and to estimate the true system model. Although this method 
has advantages in the design of a reliable flight control system, it cannot be used in 
distributed inertial sensor systems. However, this method may be suitable for the 
federated filter architecture or traditional multisensor-based navigation systems 
where the main purpose is to estimate the centralised navigation states. 
All of the published sensor FDI algorithms that have been located are capable 
of detecting hard sensor failures in clustered inertial sensor system architectures. 
Although some of these FDI algorithms can enhance the performance of sensor FDI, 
they cannot improve the accuracy of an SRIMU system. Earlier NSIM methods were 
developed for special GPS/INS integrated navigation systems with a centralised 
filtering architecture. However, they are not amenable to expansion and cannot be 
used in distributed inertial network systems. In this thesis, several improved FDI and 
NSIM methods are presented to detect the drift sensor failures and the navigation 
state abnormalities in distributed inertial network systems. The compensation filters 
are developed for the correction of SRIMU measurements.  
2.6 Multisensor Fusion Model for Navigation Systems 
Multisensor data fusion covers fault-tolerant design and data fusion methods. 
As identified in Chapter 1, the JPL MSDF model and other models do not apply to 
the development of distributed multisensor navigation systems. From the definition 
of multisensor data fusion given in Chapter 1, a multisensor data fusion model for 
aircraft navigation systems is a conceptualised framework in which sensor network 
topology architecture, data communication mechanism, system functions and related 
operational modes are defined. The data fusion methodologies are then developed to 
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implement the required system functions and operational modes. This thesis presents 
a generalised MSDF model for the design, analysis, development and simulation of 
multisensor aircraft navigation systems, as illustrated in Figure 2.9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Generalised MSDF Model for Aircraft Navigation Systems 
2.6.1 Sensor Topology Network 
The sensor topology network provides a hardware foundation for the design 
and development of multisensor navigation systems and describes distributions and 
allocations of various sensor systems in the network. The architecture of a sensor 
topology network is specified according to the system design requirements. A sensor 
network topology can be a serial, parallel or hybridised architecture; or a completely 
packaged, distributed network or combination of both. Parallel and distributed sensor 
network architectures are the most commonly used sensor topologies in modern 
aircraft. 
Optimisation of the topological architectures of a sensor network determines 
the optimal sensor system configurations and allocations in an aircraft navigation 
system. The allocations of sensor systems depend on the requirements of both the 
aircraft navigation system (e.g. survivability and fault tolerance) and other avionics 
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systems for the inertial and navigation states. For example, many avionics systems 
require highly reliable, continuous inertial data to implement individual functions, as 
stated in Section 1.1. Some inertial systems must be located close to specific avionics 
systems to provide the precise local motion states for stabilisation of specific 
avionics systems, such as weapon pointing systems and imaging radars.  
The data communication specifies the architecture of a communication 
network and the requirements for data buses in order to exchange data among 
individual sensor systems and to transmit data to other avionics systems. The data 
protocol and transfer speed must be selected so that the data communication network 
can meet the requirements that data fusion algorithms require from sensor data. 
The evaluation of technology obsolescence is a key to the mitigation of ageing 
technologies and to the application of emerging technologies to meet the long-term 
operational lifetime requirements for aircraft navigation systems. 
Data fusion methodologies can then be developed so that the resultant data 
fusion algorithms, in combination with a data communication network, can fuse 
various sensor data to achieve the required performance for aircraft navigation and 
other airborne applications.   
2.6.2 Sensor-Level Data Fusion 
Sensor-level data fusion is preliminary data fusion. It analyses and qualifies all 
sensor measurements to provide highly reliable sensor data for subsequent system-
level data fusion. It can also transmit health status information of all sensor systems 
to the sensor management. At this level, the following functions are performed:  
• Sensor corrections and compensations to obtain accurate sensor data;  
• Data alignment in time and space to ensure that associated measurements 
of all sensor systems are time-synchronised and common-coordinated;  
• Detection of sensor failures and isolation of failed sensors if necessary;  
• Reconfiguration of sensor systems based on certain sensor reconfiguration 
strategies.  
Sensor failure detection and isolation (FDI) is the core of this functional module. 
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2.6.3 System-Level Data Fusion 
System-level data fusion is the kernel of a multisensor data fusion system. It 
fuses data from sensors and subsystems in terms of optimised data fusion algorithms 
to estimate the required system states and to monitor the integrity of the estimated 
states by performing specific error covariance analysis and statistical tests. At this 
level, the following functions are undertaken:  
• State estimation. This function covers the design and development of both 
data fusion filter architectures on the basis of the topological architecture of 
sensor network and optimal data fusion algorithms suitable for the filter 
architectures;  
• Navigation solution integrity monitoring and system FDI. These functions 
are required in order to obtain the integrity of the navigation system. They 
are concerned with analysis and evaluation of the state error covariance and 
residual information of the data fusion filter;  
• Alignment and correction of inertial systems in distributed sensor network. 
This function is concerned with development of data fusion algorithms to 
dynamically align and correct distributed inertial systems. 
• Reconfiguration of system models. This function implements fault-tolerant 
design in a multisensor navigation system. It is provided to fulfil system 
reconfiguration strategies and operational modes.  
2.6.4 Sensor/System Management 
Sensor/system management performs three types of management functions: 
sensor network system management, data communication management and human-
machine interface management. According to the health status information from the 
sensor-level data fusion and system-level data fusion modules, and command inputs 
from the pilot, the sensor network system management determines the operational 
modes and reconfiguration strategies of the navigation system, and transmits the 
associated commands to the two data fusion modules. The sensor-level data fusion 
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module and the system-level data fusion module then separately reconfigure the 
sensor systems and navigation system to meet the required navigation performance 
and fault tolerance of the navigation system. Sensor/system management strategies 
are specific to the architecture of sensor network and fault tolerance requirements. 
Data communication management manages the data exchange among the 
nodes of the sensor network system according to the sensor/system reconfiguration 
strategies and external commands. Communication management strategies allow 
sensor systems to be added or failed sensor systems to be removed from the sensor 
network architecture without affecting the data communication architecture and 
operation of the complete system. Human-machine interface management provides a 
user-friendly interface for flight crew. 
In operation, the sensor/system management dynamically allocates tasks to the 
functionary sensor systems and software components to execute the required system 
functions. 
Investigations to be performed in this thesis will follow this generalised MSDF 
model. 
2.7 Summary  
This chapter has reviewed developments of fault-tolerant aircraft navigation 
systems and data fusion methods based on a wide range of literature survey. The 
main issues covered in this chapter are as follows: 
1. Review of three fault-tolerant navigation system architectures, which have 
been employed in aircraft navigation systems. 
2. Analysis and comparison of four forms of data fusion filter architectures, 
which are currently used in integrated aircraft navigation systems. 
3. Description of FDI and NSIM techniques applied to inertial sensor systems 
and GNSS.  
4. Development of a generalised multisensor data fusion model, which will be 
used to design and develop future aircraft multisensor navigation systems. 
5. Identification of several main problems existing in the design of current 
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multisensor fusion navigation systems, including detection of time-drift 
sensor/system failures, SRIMU error compensation, and multisensor data 
fusion methods and distributed state vector integrity monitoring strategies 
for distributed dynamic systems, especially inertial network systems. This 
PhD study will address the solutions of these problems.  
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Chapte r  3  
3 STATISTICAL ESTIMATION AND TESTING 
THEORIES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces mathematical formulations on statistical estimation 
theory and hypothesis testing theory, which are required in this thesis to understand 
the development of multisensor data fusion algorithms. Estimation theory is a 
powerful mathematical tool, which has been used in various engineering fields to 
accurately estimate the states of complex dynamic systems and to implement the 
effective control of the systems. Statistical testing theory is an auxiliary tool that is 
used to further confirm the validity of sensor data and the estimated system states. In 
aerospace engineering, these theories have successfully applied to the development 
of aircraft guidance, navigation and control systems. Section 3.2 introduces the 
conventional Kalman filter algorithms and analyses the statistical characteristics of 
the Kalman filter. Section 3.3 gives the information filter and Section 3.4 describes 
statistical hypothesis testing methods. Finally, a summary is given in Section 3.5. 
3.2 The Kalman Filter 
3.2.1 Stochastic Process Model  
Since the Kalman filter was originally presented by R. E. Kalman, it has 
become a standard estimation method that is widely used in the development of 
navigation systems. In order to develop various forms of Kalman filter algorithms, 
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the dynamic model of a stochastic process (system) must be constructed in the form 
of state space representations. In this thesis, the Kalman filter is used as a state 
estimator and does not perform any control functions. Therefore, the control input to 
the system is not considered in the system model. 
The stochastic process model develops dynamic relations between the states of 
a stochastic process. It consists of a set of the first-order differential equations driven 
by random input noise, which describe the evolution of the stochastic system state in 
time. It can be represented in a generalised formulation in the continuous-time form 
as follows: 
00 )(         );(]),([]),([)( xxnxGxfx =+= ttttttt  (3.1) 
where f  is an −n known function vector, t  denotes time, )(tx  is an −n system state 
vector at time t  with the initial value of 0x , )(tn  is an −q  additive process noise 
vector and ]),([ kk ttxG  is an qn ×  function matrix. The process noise )(tn  takes into 
account the perturbations to the system.  
The discrete-time form of this continuous-time system model is needed for the 
computer implementation of the Kalman filter and can be formulated as follows: 
0011 )(          );(]),([],),([)( xxnxGxfx =+= ++ tttttttt kkkkkkk  (3.2) 
where kt is the sampling time. 
The discrete-time process model can be deduced by integrating the continuous-
time process model between successive sampling times. The associated process noise 
and control input vectors must also be redefined to reflect the integration[41][91]. 
Hereafter, only the discrete-time process model will be considered in this thesis. 
For the stochastic process model, the Kalman filter assumes that the sequence 
of the process noise )( ktn  is a white Gaussian process with zero mean and known 
covariance, and is independent of the system state )( ktx . The sequence of the system 
states )( ktx  is a Gauss-Markov process. The initial system state )( 0tx  has known 
mean and covariance. Therefore, the following assumptions[91] are given: 
))(),(ˆ(~)( kkk ttt Pxx N  
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)(})](ˆ)()][(ˆ)({[ T kkkkk ttttt Pxxxx =−−Ε  
))(,0(~)( kk tt Qn N  
kikik ttt δ)()]()([ T Qnn =Ε  
0)]()([ T =Ε ik tt xn  
where N  represents the Gaussian (normal) distribution, )(ˆ ktx is the estimate or mean 
value of )( ktx , )( ktP is the symmetric, positive semidefinite covariance matrix of the 
state errors, ][⋅Ε  denotes the expectation operator, )( ktQ is a covariance matrix of the 
process noise, which is positive semidefinite and kiδ  is the Kronecker delta function. 
3.2.2 Stochastic Measurement Model  
The stochastic measurement model develops the relations between the system 
states and physical quantities measured by the sensor systems. It can be represented 
in a generalised formulation in the discrete-time form as follows: 
)(]),([)( kkkk tttt wxhz +=  (3.3) 
where h  is an −m known function vector, and the vectors )( ktz and )( ktw  are an 
−m measurement vector of a sensor system and an −m additive measurement noise 
vector, respectively. The measurement noise accounts for effects of the measurement 
system errors on the measured physical quantities.  
For the stochastic measurement model, the Kalman filter assumes that )( ktz  is 
a Gaussian distributed random variable at each sampling time and the sequence of 
the noise )( ktw  is a white Gaussian process with zero mean and known covariance 
and is independent of )( ktn  and )( ktx , separately. The following assumptions[91] are 
then given: 
))(,0(~)( kk tt Rw N  
kikik ttt δ)()]()([ T Rww =Ε  
0)]()([ T =Ε ik tt xw  
0)]()([ T =Ε ik tt nw  
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where )( ktR is a positive definite covariance matrix of the measurement noise.  
However, in some stochastic processes and measurement systems, it may be 
not appropriate to represent both the process noise and the measurement noise by 
using a white Gaussian process. Hence, state augmentation techniques are frequently 
used to adjust the system model and the measurement model to fit the requirements 
of the Kalman filter[41][91]. 
3.2.3 Stochastic Estimation Model  
The Kalman filter estimates the state of a stochastic process using the process 
and measurement models with the assumptions given in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
Two estimates of the state are distinguished: the estimate of the state )( ktx , )(ˆ +ktx , is 
a conditional estimate conditioned on the measurement history up to the current time 
kt , whereas the estimate of the state )( ktx , )(ˆ −ktx , is an estimate conditioned on the 
measurement history up through the previous sample time 1−kt . )(ˆ −ktx is known as the 
predicted state derived from the process model with the time update. The associated 
conditional mean and covariances are defined as follows: 
)}]({)([)(ˆ kkk ttt zxx Ε=+  
)}]({)([)(ˆ 1−− Ε= kkk ttt zxx  
Defining the errors corresponding to these two estimates as 
)(ˆ)()(~ ++ −= kkk ttt xxx  
)(ˆ)()(~ −− −= kkk ttt xxx  
then the covariances of these errors can be defined as follows: 
})}({)](ˆ)()][(ˆ)({[)](~)(~[)( TT kkkkkkkk tttttttt zxxxxxxP +++++ −−Ε=Ε=  
})}({)](ˆ)()][(ˆ)({[)](~)(~[)( 1TT −−−−−− −−Ε=Ε= kkkkkkkk tttttttt zxxxxxxP  
The estimation process of the Kalman filter is illustrated in Figure 3.1 where 
the predicated state and the current measurement are combined by the Kalman filter 
to obtain the current state estimate. 
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Figure 3.1 The Estimation Process 
3.2.4 Linear Kalman Filter  
The linear Kalman filter is a standard Kalman filter applicable to linear 
stochastic processes. The Kalman filter models are formulated as follows: 
)()()(),()( 1111 −−−− +Φ= kkkkkk tttttt nGxx           (3.4) 
)()()()( kkkk tttt wxHz +=             (3.5) 
where Φ  is an nn ×  state transition matrix and H  is an nm ×  measurement matrix. 
The predicted state and measurement are computed as follows[41]: 
)(ˆ),()(ˆ 11 +−−− Φ= kkkk tttt xx             (3.6) 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ −− = kkk ttt xHz              (3.7) 
then the covariance of  the predicted state error is: 
})]()()(~),()][()()(~),({[         
})}({)](ˆ)()][(ˆ)({[         
)](~)(~[)(
T
11111111
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nGxnGx
zxxxx
xxP
 
According to the assumptions given in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the above equation 
can be simplified as follows:  
)()()(),()(),()( 1T111T11 −−−−+−−− +ΦΦ= kkkkkkkkk ttttttttt GQGPP         (3.8) 
Defining the innovation )( ktr as 
)()(~)()(ˆ)()( kkkkkk tttttt wxHzzr +=−= −−           (3.9) 
then the covariance of the innovation is computed as: 
)( ktz  
)( −ktx  )( +ktx  Predict the State by 
using Process Model 
Measurement Model 
Kalman Filter 
Estimator 
 STATISTICAL ESTIMATION AND TESTING THEORIES 
 
3.2 The Kalman Filter 
 
 50 
)()()()(        
)]()([)(
T
T
kkkk
kkk
tttt
ttt
RHPH
rrS
+=
Ε=
−
           (3.10) 
And the covariances of the innovation and predicted state error are  
)()()](~)([)( T~ −− =Ε= kkkkk ttttt PHxrS xr            (3.11) 
)()()]()(~[)( TT~ kkkkk ttttt HPrxS rx −− =Ε=            (3.12) 
Therefore, )()( T~~ kk tt xrrx SS =  
With the assumption that the prior state and measurement )(ˆ −ktx  and )(ˆ −ktz  are 
known, the current measurement )( ktz  can be used to update the prior state estimate 
in accordance with the following equation 
)()()(ˆ)(ˆ kkkk tttt rKxx += −+             (3.13) 
or      
)()()(ˆ)]()([         
)](ˆ)()[()(ˆ)(ˆ
kkkkk
kkkkk
ttttt
ttttt
zKxHKI
zzKxx
+−=
−+=
−
−+
           (3.14) 
where )( ktK  is  a blending factor to be determined. Then, the error covariance of the 
updated state estimate )(ˆ +ktx , )( +ktP , can be computed as follows: 
})]()()(~))][(()(~){[(         
})](ˆ)()][(ˆ)({[         
)](~)(~[)(
T
T
T
kkkkk
kkkk
kkk
ttttt
tttt
ttt
wKxKHIKwxKHI
xxxx
xxP
−−−−Ε=
−−Ε=
Ε=
−−
++
+++
 
Note that the a priori estimation error )(~ −ktx is independent of the measurement noise 
)( ktw , therefore, 
)()()()()()()()()( TT kkkkkkkk ttttttttt KRK]HK[I]PHK[IP +−−= −+  (3.15) 
An optimal blending factor )( ktK , which minimise the mean-square estimation error 
and is known as the Kalman gain, can be obtained by the optimisation of Eq. (3.15) 
as follows[41]  
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt −−= SHPK  (3.16) 
Expanding Eq. (3.15) and substituting Eq. (3.16) into the resultant equation leads to 
)()()()()( −−+ −= kkkkk ttttt PHKPP  (3.17) 
or      )()]()([)( −+ −= kkkk tttt PHKIP  (3.18) 
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or      )()()()()( T kkkkk ttttt KSKPP −= −+  (3.19) 
These three expressions for )( +ktP  fail to assure both the positive definiteness and 
symmetry of the error covariance update, and are valid only for the Kalman optimal 
gain. In contrast, Eq. (3.15), known as the Joseph form, can maintain the symmetry 
and the positive definiteness of the error covariance propagation and is valid for any 
value of gain.  
The mechanism of the standard Kalman filter algorithm is summarised in Table 
3-1. 
Table 3-1 Standard Kalman Filter Algorithms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5 Extended Kalman Filter  
The extended Kalman filter is used to handle the estimation problems which 
occur in non-linear stochastic processes. A typical non-linear process model can be 
written in the form: 
)(]),([],),([)( 11111 −−−−− += kkkkkkk ttttttt nxGxfx  (3.20) 
)(]),([)( kkkk tttt wxhz +=  (3.21) 
where f  and h  are known non-linear functions. 
To apply the Kalman filter to estimation problems in a nonlinear process, these 
nonlinear models must be linearised. Two methods can be used to linearise nonlinear 
models. One method linearises the nonlinear models about some nominal trajectory 
in the state space, which is independent of the measurements. The nominal trajectory 
Step 1:  Initialisation 
00 )( PP =t ; 00 )(ˆ xx =t  
Step 2:  Time update (effect of dynamics) 
)(ˆ),()(ˆ 11 +−−− Φ= kkkk tttt xx  
)()()(),()(),()( 1T111T11 −−−−+−−− +ΦΦ= kkkkkkkkk ttttttttt GQGPP  
Step 3: Measurement update (effect of measurement) 
)(ˆ)()()( −−= kkkk tttt xHzr , )()()()()( T kkkkk ttttt RHPHS += −  
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt −−= SHPK  
)()()(ˆ)(ˆ kkkk tttt rKxx += −+ , )()()()()( −−+ −= kkkkk ttttt PHKPP  
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is pre-computable. The resultant filter is referred to as a linearised Kalman filter. The 
other method linearises the non-linear models about an estimated trajectory that is 
continuously updated by the state estimates resulting from the measurements. The 
filter is known as an extended Kalman filter.  
The predicted state and measurement are computed as 
],),(ˆ[)(ˆ 11 −+−− = kkkk tttt xfx  (3.22) 
]),(ˆ[)(ˆ kkk ttt −− = xhz  (3.23) 
Consider the perturbation of the current state from the predicted state )(ˆ 1+−ktx . The 
system model in Eq. (3.20) can be approximated by expanding about )(ˆ 1+−ktx  as 
follows:  
)(]),([            
)(~],),(ˆ[],),(ˆ[)(
111
11111
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+
−
+
−−
+
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+
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kkkkkkkk
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 (3.24) 
where the higher terms of the Taylor series expansion have been ignored and 
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)(ˆ)()(~ 111 +−−+− −= kkk ttt xxx  
Subtracting Eq. (3.22) from Eq. (3.24), the predicted state error is derived as follows: 
)(]),([)(~],),(ˆ[)(~ 111111 −−+−+−−+−− +Φ= kkkkkkkk tttttttt nxGxxx   (3.25) 
where 
)(ˆ)()(~ −− −= kkk ttt xxx  
From Eq.(3.25), the associated error covariance is computed as: 
]),([)(]),([              
],),(ˆ[)(],),(ˆ[)(
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tttttttt
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Now consider the perturbation of the measurement model from the predicted 
state )(ˆ −ktx . The measurement model in Eq. (3.21) can be approximated as follows: 
)()(~]),(ˆ[]),(ˆ[)( kkkkkkk ttttttt wxxHxhz ++≈ −−−  (3.26) 
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where the higher terms of the Taylor series expansion have been ignored and 














∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
−
=
−
n
mm
n
tt
kk
kk
xx
xxtt
tt
kk hh
hh
]),([]),(ˆ[
1
1
1
1
)(ˆ)(



xx
x
xh
xH  
Subtracting Eq. (3.23) from Eq. (3.26), the measurement innovation is given by 
)()(~]),(ˆ[)(ˆ)()( kkkkkkk ttttttt wxxHzzr +=−= −−−  (3.27) 
then the covariance of the measurement innovation is computed as: 
)(]),(ˆ[)(]),(ˆ[        
)]()([)(
T
T
kkkkkk
kkk
tttttt
ttt
RxHPxH
rrS
+=
Ε=
−−−
           (3.28) 
Applying the standard Kalman filter to the linearised models given in Eqs. (3.25) and 
(3.27), the measurement updates are computed by 
)()()(ˆ)(ˆ kkkk tttt rKxx += −+             (3.29) 
)(]),(ˆ[)()()( −−−+ −= kkkkkk tttttt PxHKPP           (3.30) 
where )( ktK is the Kalman filter gain matrix. 
)(]),(ˆ[)()( 1T kkkkk ttttt −−−= SxHPK             (3.31) 
The extended Kalman filter algorithm is summarised in Table 3-2. 
In this thesis, the linear and extended Kalman filter algorithms are referred to 
as conventional Kalman filter algorithms. An iterative modular algorithm structure 
for the conventional Kalman filter algorithm is shown in Figure 3.2 where the three 
modules are initialisation, predictor and estimator. 
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Table 3-2 The Extended Kalman Filter Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Conventional Kalman Filter Algorithm Structure 
Step 1:  Initialisation 
00 )( PP =t ; 00 )(ˆ xx =t  
Step 2:  Time update (effect of dynamics) 
],),(ˆ[)(ˆ 11 −+−− = kkkk tttt xfx  
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Step 3: Measurement update (effect of measurement) 
]),(ˆ[)()( kkkk tttt −−= xhzr  
)(]),(ˆ[)(]),(ˆ[)( T kkkkkkk ttttttt RxHPxHS += −−−  
)(]),(ˆ[)()( 1T kkkkk ttttt −−−= SxHPK  
)()()(ˆ)(ˆ kkkk tttt rKxx += −+  
)(]),(ˆ[)()()( −−−+ −= kkkkkk tttttt PxHKPP  
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)( ktz  )(ˆ +ktx  
Estimator:  
)()()(ˆ)(ˆ kkkk tttt rKxx += −+  
)()()()()( −−+ −= kkkkk ttttt PHKPP  
where 
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt −−= SHPK  
 
 
Predictor: 
)(ˆ),()(ˆ 11 +−−− Φ= kkkk tttt xx  
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)(ˆ)()()( −−= kkkk tttt xHzr  
)()()()()( T kkkkk ttttt RHPHS += −  
Initialisation: 
00 )( PP =t , 00 )(ˆ xx =t  
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3.2.6 Statistics of Kalman Estimation Errors and Residuals 
The conventional Kalman filter algorithm has been used as a standard means of 
optimal or near-optimal estimation of the states of a stochastic system. By examining 
the predictor and the estimator given in Figure 3.2, the filter algorithm also provides 
very useful statistical information that can be used to monitor both the convergence 
and the consistency of the filter estimation procedure. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, 
these statistics can be obtained by generating information at different stages of the 
filter algorithm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Kalman Filter Outputs 
The outputs of the filter predictor )( ktr  and )( ktS  are the filter innovation and 
the filter innovation covariance, respectively. The outputs of the filter estimator )( +ktr  
and )( +ktS  are the filter residual and the filter residual covariance as follows:  
)()()()( ++ −= kkkk tttt xHzr   
)()()()()( T kkkkk ttttt RHPHS += ++  
Theoretically, it has been shown that the filter innovation and residual processes[41] 
)(ˆ −ktz
)( ktR )( ktS  
)(ˆ −ktx
)( ktr  )(
k
tz
State Transition 
)(ˆ),( 11 +−−Φ kkk ttt x
 
)(ˆ +ktx
)( ktH
)( ktK  
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt KSHP −−
Unit Delay 
)( −ktP
)( +ktP
)( 1−ktQ  
Covariance Transition 
),()(),( 1T11 −+−− ΦΦ kkkkk ttttt P  
)()()( 1T11 −−− kkk ttt GQG )()]()([ −− kkk ttt PHKI  
Unit Delay 
)()()()()( T kkkkk ttttt SRHPH +−  
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are a zero-mean white Gaussian random process of the given covariance. This feature 
can be exploited in the analysis of the Kalman filter integrity for some practical 
purposes, for example, consistency checking of the measurement data, sensor failure 
detection and analysis of the filter divergence.  
Defining a normalised quadratic innovation function by the following terms 
)()()()( 1T kkkk ttttNQI rSr −=  (3.32) 
then, the )( ktNQI  is a measure of the inconsistency of the measurement data or the 
filter innovation (residual) and is a 2χ -distributed random variable with m degrees of 
freedom where m  is the number of statistically independent measurements. Testing 
)( ktNQI  for consistency of the filter innovation can be used to detect sensor failure. 
The output of the filter estimator )( +ktP  is a measure of the uncertainty of the 
filter state estimate )(ˆ +ktx . The uncertainties along the different state space directions 
can be represented geometrically as follows: 
1)](ˆ)()[()](ˆ)([ 1T =−− ++−+ kkkkk ttttt xxPxx  (3.33) 
For a 2-dimensional state vector, it is given by an ellipse shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The Ellipsoid of Estimate Uncertainty 
The axes of the ellipsoid are oriented along the singular directions of )( +ktP . 
Applying the singular value decomposition to )( +ktP , Eq.(3.33) can be rewritten in 
the following form. 
)(2 ktx
)(ˆ1 +ktx
)(1 ktx
)(ˆ2 +ktx  1d  
2d  
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1)](~)[()](~[ 11T1 =+−+−+ kkk- ttt xUDxU  
where D  is a diagonal matrix containing the singular values of )( +ktP , which are the 
lengths of the ellipsoid axes. The columns of U are singular vectors that indicate the 
singular directions and form the orthogonal basis in the state space. Small singular 
values correspond to directions in the state space with small uncertainties while large 
singular values indicate directions with large uncertainties. Convergence of the state 
estimate means that the ellipsoid shrinks in all directions. Therefore, analysis of the 
error covariance matrix )( +ktP  is used to determine whether the estimation procedure 
is convergent or divergent. 
Defining a normalised error quadratic function as follows: 
)]()(ˆ)[()]()(ˆ[)( 1T kkkkkk ttttttNEQ xxPxx −−= ++−+  (3.34) 
where )( ktx  is the true value of the system state )( ktx .  
)( ktNEQ  is a measure of the uncertainty of the filter state estimate and is a 
2χ -distributed random variable with n  degrees of freedom. Testing )( ktNEQ  for 
consistency of the state estimation enables abnormalities of the estimated system 
states to be detected. However, this test is only applicable to system simulation 
because )( ktx  has to be known. 
Defining )(ˆ)(ˆ)( +− −=∆ kkk ttt xxx , then )( ktx∆  is a zero-mean Gaussian random 
variable with the known covariance of )()()()( −∆ = kkkk tttt PHKP x . When the system 
model is highly accurate, an improved NEQ  function is designed to check abnormal 
changes of the estimated system states as follows: 
)()()()( 1T kkkk ttttINEQ xPx x ∆∆= +−∆  (3.35) 
Analysis of the state error covariance matrix is used to determine if the Kalman 
filter converges, but is unable to verify if the Kalman filter converges to the correct 
value.  
From Figure 3.4, the accuracy of the error covariance matrix depends solely on 
the system model ( 0,, PQ ) and the measurement model ( RH, ). In other words, the 
covariance recursion is independent of the actual measurements taken, and thus it can 
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be computed without knowledge of the realised measurement values. For this reason, 
)( −ktP  and )( +ktP  can be pre-computed before actual measurements are available. 
This pre-computability allows early design tradeoffs of expected estimation accuracy 
versus sensor system accuracy to be undertaken. Proper estimation accuracy can be 
evaluated by off line simulation of different sensor systems and system models until 
the error covariance analysis meets the required accuracy. 
3.2.7 Drawbacks of Kalman Filter 
The conventional Kalman filter algorithms, when implemented on a computer, 
may undergo computational inaccuracies owing to computer roundoff errors and the 
occurrence of very small values in the error covariance matrix. In particular, 
computational inaccuracies in the covariance matrix update procedure can cause the 
computed covariance matrix to become numerically inaccurate, resulting in a loss of 
symmetry and positive semi-definitiveness of the covariance matrix. These situations 
may lead to divergence and instability of the conventional Kalman filter.  
In order to overcome the computational inaccuracies in the conventional 
Kalman filter algorithms, many numerically accurate forms of the Kalman filter have 
been introduced, for example, various squared-root filters or the Potter filter[40][91]. 
These improved Kalman filter algorithms seek to propagate and update some 
factorisation of the error covariance matrix rather than the error covariance matrix 
itself. However, it should be noted that the Potter filter increases the computational 
accuracy of the error covariance matrix but loses the simplicity of the standard 
Kalman filter algorithm. 
3.3 The Information Filter 
Both the conventional Kalman and the Potter filters need an accurate estimate 
of the initial error covariance 0P . However, it may be impractical to obtain an 
accurate estimate of 0P  in some applications because there may be no a priori 
knowledge of the initial system states or the initial states available are inconsistent. 
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In addition, with the increase of the number of measurements, for example, the data 
fusion filters in distributed multiple sensor systems must execute matrix inverse 
operation on the innovation covariance, which may be time consuming particularly. 
In order to resolve such problems, an information form of the Kalman filter has been 
introduced. This information filter is an algebraically equivalent Kalman filter, but 
processes and propagates the inverse matrix or the inverse matrix square root of the 
error covariance. This form possesses several unique characteristics and is suited to 
problems where the measurement dimension is large or where there is no a priori 
knowledge of the initial system state (particularly allowing a startup procedure in the 
case of singular 0P ). 
3.3.1 The Linear Information Filter 
In the linear Kalman filter algorithm, the state update equation is given by  
)()()(ˆ)]()([)(ˆ kkkkkk tttttt zKxHKIx +−= −+           (3.36) 
Assuming )( −ktP  is non-singular, Eq. (3.18) can be represented as  
)()()]()([ 1 −−+=− kkkk tttt PPHKI  (3.37) 
Substituting Eq. (3.37) into Eq. (3.36) and pre-multiplying the resultant expression 
by )(1 +− ktP leads to  
)()()()(ˆ)()(ˆ)( 111 kkkkkkk ttttttt zKPxPxP +−−−−++− +=  (3.38) 
From Eqs. (3.10), (3.16) and (3.18), 
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt −+= RHPK  (3.39) 
Substituting Eq. (3.39) into Eq. (3.38) leads to 
)()()()(ˆ)()(ˆ)( 1T11 kkkkkkk ttttttt zRHxPxP −−−−++− +=  (3.40) 
This expression is known as the inverse covariance state update equation.  
From Eqs. (3.37) and (3.39), 
)()()()()( 1T11 kkkkk ttttt HRHPP −−−+− +=  (3.41) 
This expression is known as the inverse covariance update equation.  
From Eq. (3.8), the inverse of the a priori error covariance is given by 
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1
1
T
111
T
11
1 )]()()(),()(),([)( −
−−−−
+
−−
−− += kkkkkkkkk ttttttttt GQGPP  (3.42) 
Applying the matrix inversion lemma  
1T1T111T )()( −−−−− +−=+ YZXYZIXZZYXZ  
to the right side of Eq. (3.42) by identifying 
),()(),( 1T11 −+−−= kkkkk ttttt PZ ; )()( 11T −−= kk tt QGX ; )( 1T −= ktGY , 
it has been shown that[40]  
)()]()([)( 1T1 kkkk tttt MGIP −−− −=  (3.43) 
where 
),()(),()( 1111T kkkkkk tttttt −+−−−= PM  (3.44) 
1
1
1
11
T
1 )]()()()()[()()( −−−−−− += kkkkkkk ttttttt QGMGGM  (3.45) 
In the information filter, the a priori information state estimate )(ˆ −kty , the a 
priori information matrix )( −ktY , the information state )(ˆ +kty , the information matrix 
)( +ktY , the new information vector )( ktu  and the new information matrix )( ktU are 
defined as follows: 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ 1 −−−− = kkk ttt xPy  (3.46a) 
)()( 1 −−− = kk tt PY  (3.46b) 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ 1 ++−+ = kkk ttt xPy  (3.46c) 
)()( 1 +−+ = kk tt PY  (3.46d) 
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt zRHu −=  (3.46e) 
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt HRHU −=  (3.46f) 
From Eqs. (3.43), (3.46a) and (3.46c) 
)(ˆ),()]()([)(ˆ 11T1T +−−−− −= kkkkkk tttttt yGIy        (3.47a) 
Substituting Eqs. (3.46a), (3.46c) and (3.46e) into Eq. (3.40) leads to 
)()(ˆ)(ˆ kkk ttt uyy += −+           (3.47b) 
Substituting Eqs. (3.46b), (3.46d) and (3.46f) into Eq. (3.41) yields 
)()()( kkk ttt UYY += −+           (3.47c) 
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From Eq. (3.44), the inverse of the state transition matrix instead of the state 
transition matrix ),(),( 11-1 kkkk tttt −− =  has been introduced in the information 
filter. The information filter algorithm is summarised in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-3 The Information Filter Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, the information filter simplifies the information update procedure 
but increases the computation complexity of the time update procedure. 
3.4 Statistical Hypothesis Test 
A failure occurring in a multisensor navigation system can be seen as a sudden 
change in one or more of the system parameters, system outputs, or sensor outputs. 
Such changes can be classified as: additive failures or non-additive failures. Additive 
failures produce a change in the mean of the sensor measurements or the navigation 
state outputs. Non-additive failures result in changes in covariance of either the state 
estimate errors or the sensor measurement noise, or in the system parameters caused 
by the uncertainties of the system models. These failures may cause the performance 
Step 1: Initialisation 
1
00 )( −= PY t ; 000 )()(ˆ xYy tt =  
Step 2: Time Update 
)(ˆ),()]()([)(ˆ 11T1T +−−−− −= kkkkkk tttttt yGIy  
)()]()([)( 1T kkkk tttt MGIY −− −=  
Step 3: Information Update 
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt zRHu −=  
)()(ˆ)(ˆ kkk ttt uyy += −+  
)()()()( 1T kkkk tttt HRHU −=  
)()()( kkk ttt UYY += −+  
Step 4: State Recovery  
)(ˆ)()(ˆ 1 ++−+ = kkk ttt yYx  
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of an aircraft navigation system to be degraded and can even lead to catastrophic 
events. In order to guarantee the safety of aircraft system, statistical hypothesis tests 
are used to check for anomalies in the mean of the sensor measurements and the 
navigation states or abnormalities of the covariances of the state estimate errors or 
measurement noise. 
3.4.1 Hypothesis Test 
A hypothesis is tested for possible rejection on the assumption that it is true. 
The concept was originally introduced by R. A. Fisher. In failure detection problems 
considered in this thesis, the determination of valid navigation states reduces to two 
competitive claims/hypotheses; the null hypothesis 0H and the alternative hypothesis 
1H . The null hypothesis 0H  represents a statement that no failures have happened in 
the aircraft multisensor navigation system while the alternative hypothesis 1H  is a 
statement that failures have occurred in the system. Based on these two hypotheses, a 
test statistic is calculated from sensor or system data and its value is used to decide 
which of these two hypotheses should be rejected in the hypothesis test. The choice 
of a test statistic depends on the assumed probability model and the hypotheses under 
question. 
In a hypothesis test, two types of erroneous decisions may be made, known as 
type I error and type II error in statistical theory. A type I error occurs when the null 
hypothesis is rejected if it is in fact true; that is, 1H  is wrongly declared when 0H  is 
present. A type II error occurs when the null hypothesis is not rejected if it is in fact 
false, that is, 0H  is wrongly declared when 1H  is present.  
In this thesis and for navigation systems in general, the type I error is known as 
a false alarm whereas the type II error is known as a missed alarm. The performance 
of a hypothesis test procedure is usually measured in terms of several probability 
values related to these two errors as follows.  
The probability of a false alarm is denoted by FAP  and defined as follows:  
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γγ
Ξ
==
1
)|()present | Declare( 001 dHpHHPPFA  (3.48) 
where γ  represents a test statistic, )(γp  is the probability density function of γ  and 
1Ξ  is called a rejection or critical region containing γ  under the hypothesis 1H . 
The probability of a missed alarm is denoted by MAP  and defined as:  

Ξ
==
0
)|()present | Declare( 110 γγ dHpHHPPMA  (3.49) 
where 0Ξ  is an acceptance region containing γ  under the hypothesis 0H . Moreover, 
Ξ=ΞΞ 10   is the full set of observations of γ  and Ο=ΞΞ 10   is the null set. 
The probability of detection is denoted by DP  and defined by 
MAD PdHpHHPP −=== 
Ξ
1  )|()present | Declare(
1
111 γγ  (3.50) 
Assume that a priori probabilities for each hypothesis 0H  and 1H  are )( 00 HP  
and )( 11 HP , then the probability of the hypothesis test error is given by 
MAFAE PPPPP 10 +=  (3.51) 
A good detection algorithm is usually designed to minimise average probability 
of the hypothesis test error given by Eq. (3.51). Because 0P  is far larger than 1P , a 
false alarm is often considered to be more serious in the design of multisensor 
aircraft navigation systems, and therefore more important to take evasive action, than 
a missed alarm. Consequently, a hypothesis test procedure should be adjusted to 
obtain a guaranteed 'low' probability of false alarm. A confidence interval, that is, the 
probability that a test statistic will fall within a given critical region, is normally used 
to indicate a range of the uncertainty of test results and is expressed as a certain 
percentage. The concept of confidence interval is more informative than the simple 
results of a hypothesis test.  
To find a range associated with a given confidence interval, a critical value is 
specified for a hypothesis test and is referred to as a threshold η  so that the 
probability of a false alarm can be computed as  
αη =)(FAP   (3.52) 
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where α  is called a significance level and is expressed as a percentage. The 
confidence level is then given by α−1 . The threshold for a hypothesis test depends 
on the significance level at which the test is carried out. 
The probability of a missed alarm error is usually unknown, but is symbolised 
by β  and written as 
β=MAP  (3.53) 
3.4.2 Bayesian Detection 
Bayesian detection methods are based on the minimisation of error probability 
in a hypothesis test, as given in Eq. (3.51). Let )1 ,0 ;1 ,0(  == jiCij  represent the 
risks of declaring iH  true when jH  is present. The Bayesian decision rule minimises 
the following Bayesian risk function (BRF). 
γγ dHpHPC
HHPHPCBRF
i j
jjij
j
i j
ijij
i
)|()(        
)present  Declare()(
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
		 
		
= = Ξ
= =
=
=
 (3.54) 
Considering 
Ξ
== 1 ,0  ,1)|( idHp i γγ , Eq. (3.54) can be simplified as  
[ ] [ ]( ) γγγ dHpCCPHpCCPCPCPBRF 
Ξ
−−−++=
0
)|()()|()( 000100111011111100  (3.55) 
Minimising BRF  generates a likelihood ratio test (LRT) as follows[92] 
η
γ
γγλ =
−
−
<
>
= )(
)(
)|(
)|()(
11011
00100
0
1
0
1
CCP
CCP
H
H
Hp
Hp
 (3.56) 
where )(γλ  is called the LRT function and η  is the threshold. Eq. (3.56) shows that 
the decision 1H  is made if )(γλ  is larger than η , otherwise the decision 0H  is made. 
The log form of LRT function, as given in Eq. (3.57), is often used to simplify the 
computation of LRT. 
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)log()](log[
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ηγλ
H
H
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>
 (3.57) 
Eq. (3.56) or (3.57) is known as the Bayesian detection rule and is widely used in 
many failure detection problems where the a priori probabilities )( 00 HP  and )( 11 HP  
are known. 
3.4.3 Neyman-Pearson Detection 
In some practical multisensor navigation systems, the a priori probabilities of 
two hypotheses may be unknown and the risk assignments are difficulty to estimate. 
These situations constrain the applications of Bayesian detection methods in sensor/ 
system failure detection problems. However, the constraints occurring in Bayesian 
detection do not take place in Neyman-Pearson detection methods. The objective of 
Neyman-Pearson detection is to maximise the probability of detection DP  for a given 
probability of false alarm FAP . In other words, Newman-Pearson detection can obtain 
the minimum probability of a missed alarm MAP  under the condition that the 
acceptable value of FAP  is less α . 
In failure detection problems, it is desirable to make both FAP  and MAP  as small 
as possible. Unfortunately, these are conflicting objectives. To obtain a tradeoff, a 
cost function F  is constructed by using Eqs. (3.48), (3.49 and (3.50) as follows:  

Ξ
−+−=
−+=
0
)]|()|([)1(    
)(
01 γγηγαη
αη
dHpHp
PPF FAMA
 (3.58) 
where 0≥η  is the Lagrange multiplier. 
Minimising the cost function and employing the LRT leads to the following 
hypothesis test[92]  
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η
γ
γγλ
0
1
0
1
)|(
)|()(
H
H
Hp
Hp
<
>
=  (3.59) 
Therefore, the threshold of this test is the Lagrange multiplier η , which is chosen to 
satisfy the given significance level α . 
αλλγγ
η
===  
Ξ
∞
1
)|()|( 00 dHpdHpPFA  (3.60) 
Eq. (3.59) is referred to as the Newman-Pearson detection rule and is applied to 
many failure detection problems where the a priori probabilities )( 00 HP  and )( 11 HP  
are difficulty to determine. 
From the above analysis, it is important to determine the forms of probability 
density function )(γp  under the two hypotheses, which are associated with the 
measure of the performance of a hypothesis test procedure. The probability density 
function is formulated on the basis of the statistical analysis of sensor measurement 
noise and residuals or the errors of the system state estimates.  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced mathematical fundamentals of the statistical 
estimation and hypothesis testing theories. The main activities covered include: 
1. Introduction of three forms of Kalman filtering techniques and algorithms, 
including the conventional Kalman filter and the information filter.  
2. Analysis of the statistical characteristics of Kalman filter estimation errors 
and residuals. 
3. Introduction of statistical hypothesis test methods, including Bayesian 
detection and Newman-Pearson detection methods. 
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Chapte r  4  
4 NAVIGATION EQUATIONS AND ERROR 
DYNAMICS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops navigation equations and system error dynamic models 
of several aircraft navigation systems, including inertial and main navigation aiding 
systems. These equations and models constitute the mathematical foundations to 
design, develop and simulate fault-tolerant multisensor aircraft navigation systems. 
Section 4.2 introduces various coordinate systems used in this thesis. Evolution 
of inertial sensor technologies and performance of different grade inertial sensors are 
highlighted in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 inertial navigation equations are developed. 
Section 4.5 analyses the error dynamic models of inertial system. In Section 4.6 
normalised navigation equation equations of major navaid systems are developed. A 
summary of this chapter is given in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Coordinate Systems 
Coordinate systems are established to develop the navigation equations and to 
describe the dynamic motion of an aircraft. Aircraft navigation systems resolve the 
navigation equations to determine position, velocity, attitude and time (PVAT) 
information with respect to specific frames. Several reference coordinate systems are 
used in the development and design of multisensor fusion navigation systems to 
represent the navigation system states, aircraft kinematic parameters and navigation 
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sensor measurements. This section reviews the definitions of some commonly used 
reference frames and their relationships.  
Earth Centred Inertial (ECI) Frame )z,y,x( III  This frame has its origin at 
the centre of the Earth. Its axes are non-rotating relative to the inertial space. For 
aircraft navigation, the ECI frame is an approximation of the Newtonian inertial 
frame. The Ix  axis is in the Earth’s equatorial plane and points toward the vernal 
equinox. The Iz  axis is aligned with the Earth rotation axis. The Iy  axis completes 
the right-hand system.  
 
Greenwich  Meridian 
Local Meridian 
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λ 
Equatorial  Plane 
E 
N 
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ye 
Reference Ellipsoid 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Coordinate Systems 
Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) Frame )z,y,x( eee  This frame is fixed 
to and rotating with the Earth. The ECEF frame has its origin at the Earth’s centre of 
mass, as shown in Figure 4.1(a). This is a right-hand Cartesian coordinate system. 
The ez  axis is the Earth’s rotation axis and points towards the direction of the 
Conventional Terrestrial Pole (CTP) for polar motion, as defined by BIH on the basis 
of the coordinates adopted for the BIH stations[93]. The ex  axis lies in the Earth’s 
equatorial plane and points the intersection of the CTP’s equator and the reference 
meridian being the zero meridian defined by the BIH on the basis of the coordinates 
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adopted for the BIH stations. The ey axis realises the right-hand system. The World 
Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS-84) is a commonly used ECEF frame that defines 
the Earth model and the reference ellipsoid. Geodetic parameters of the WGS-84 
ellipsoid are summarised in Table A-1 of Appendix A. The position of aircraft above 
the surface of the Earth is defined in the ECEF frame by the geodetic coordinates. 
The WGS-84 coordinate system is used by global satellite navigation systems, 
for example, the Global Positioning System (GPS), to describe the satellite orbits. 
The coordinates of a point position in the WGS-84 frame can be expressed in the 
geodetic or Cartesian coordinates, and the transformation from geodetic coordinates 
to Cartesian coordinates is given by the following equations: 
)sin(*h]N*)1[(z
))sin(cos(*h)(Ny
)cos(*)cos(*h)(Nx
2e
e
e
ϕ
λϕ
λϕ
+−=
+=
+=
e
 (4.1) 
where )z,y,x( eee  are the Cartesian coordinates of a point position, ( , , )ϕ λ h  are 
the geodetic coordinates of the point position (latitude, longitude and height above 
the reference ellipsoid of the Earth), and N
R
e
=
− ∗
a
1 2 2sin ( )ϕ
 is the radius of 
curvature in the prime vertical. 
Navigation Frame )z,y,x( nnn  This frame is attached to the aircraft and has 
its origin at the aircraft centre of gravity, as shown in Figure 4.1(a)(b). The nz  axis 
points down perpendicular to the reference ellipsoid. The nx  and ny  axes lie in a 
plane tangent to the reference ellipsoid. Therefore, the navigation frame is a local 
level frame and a Cartesian coordinate system. 
This navigation frame is a north-slaved frame if the ex  axis points north and 
the ey  axis points east, and is generally referred to as a North-East-Down (NED) 
frame. It is known as the wander azimuth frame )z,y,x( www  if the nx - ny  plane is 
allowed to rotate freely about the nz  axis. The wander azimuth mechanisation 
permits the operation of an inertial system at latitudes close to the Polar Regions, 
avoiding the singularity associated with the north-slaved mechanisation. In this 
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thesis, inertial navigation equations are developed in the wander azimuth frame. The 
relationship between the wander azimuth frame and the NED frame is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 and is formulated in Eq.(4.2), where α  is the wander azimuth angle, ψ  is 
the heading angle and wψ  is the heading angle of the wander frame. 
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Figure 4.2 Wander Azimuth Frame 
The location of the origin of the navigation frame is specified relative to the 
ECEF frame by the geodetic coordinates (λ, ϕ, h ). Aircraft velocity and attitude 
angles are defined with respect to the navigation frame. The transformation matrix 
between the NED and ECEF frames is known as the position direction cosine matrix 
(DCM) and can be obtained through a series of rotation transformations as follows:  
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Let weC  be the transformation matrix from the ECEF frame to the wander-azimuth 
frame, then 
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Body Frame )z,y,x( bbb  This frame is fixed to the aircraft and has its origin at 
the aircraft centre of gravity or mass, as shown in Figure 4.1(b). The bx  and bz  axes 
are in the plane of symmetry of the aircraft, where bx  points toward the nose of the 
aircraft and bz  axis points downward. The by  axis points down the starboard wing. 
The body frame is a Cartesian coordinate system. 
The orientation of the body frame relative to the navigation frame is specified 
by the Euler angles (rollφ , pitch  and yaw ), as shown in Figure 4.1(b). The 
transformation matrix between the body frame and the navigation frame is referred to 
as the attitude direction cosine matrix. The transformation from the body frame to the 
wander frame is formulated by a series of rotation transformations as follows: 
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The body frame is used to develop the aircraft equations of motion and for the 
attitude control and determination. Aircraft kinematic parameters are defined with 
reference to this frame. For example, the acceleration and angular rate information 
required by a flight control system or autopilot are normally represented in terms of 
the body frame. 
Instrument Frame )s,...,s,s,s( n321  This frame specifies the orientations of the 
“sensing axes” of a sensor system with respect to a reference frame (for example, the 
body or the navigation frame) and has its origin at the installation location of sensor 
system, as illustrated in Figure 4.1(c). For example, in inertial sensor systems, the 
sensing axes are the installation axes of the inertial sensors. If an inertial instrument 
frame is a Cartesian coordinate system, this inertial sensor system is an orthogonal 
configuration. In Doppler radar systems, the instrument frame is the radar antenna 
frame that defines the orientations of radar beams relative to a reference frame. In a 
radio navigation system, the ‘sensing axes’ are usually the directions of lines of sight 
(LOS) from receiver antenna to transmitters. 
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The transformation matrix from an instrument frame to a reference frame (the 
body or navigation frame) is usually known as the design or measurement matrix of 
the navigational sensor system. Sensor measurements are represented in terms of the 
instrument coordinates.  
4.3 Inertial Sensor Technology 
4.3.1 Inertial Sensor System 
Inertial sensors are classified as gyroscopes and accelerometers. Gyroscopes 
are angular rate sensors while accelerometers are specific force sensors. The specific 
force is a combination of the gravitational forces or their projections and total inertial 
force acting on aircraft. Gyroscopes and accelerometers can be integrated into a case 
to form an inertial reference system (IRS), also known as an inertial measurement 
unit (IMU). An inertial reference system can measure all the kinematic parameters of 
an aircraft. Integration of an IMU system and a computer solving inertial navigation 
algorithms makes up an inertial navigation system (INS). In an INS, gyroscopes are 
used to maintain a stable reference platform or establish it by analytical means. The 
measurements from the accelerometers can be referenced to this reference frame for 
computation of the navigation states. Misalignments of the reference frame caused 
by gyro drifts couple the measured accelerations along each axis so that the distance 
error is the time-cubical dependence[94]. Consequently, gyroscope performance plays 
a critical role in the improvement of the accuracy of inertial navigation system and 
development of inertial sensor technology has focused on gyroscope technology. 
Inertial sensor systems, depending on the numbers of sensors and installations, 
can be classified as orthogonal or non-orthogonal configurations. Non-orthogonal 
configurations will be discussed in Chapter 5. For development of inertial navigation 
algorithms, it is assumed here that three accelerometers and three gyros are mounted 
in orthogonal triads and their input axes are aligned with the axes of the body frame. 
In this case, the IMU outputs are coordinated in the body frame. Strapdown inertial 
navigation algorithms will be developed in Section 4.4. 
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Inertial sensor systems, according to the accuracy requirements for different 
applications, can categorised as from low quality though tactical to navigation grade 
(high quality) shown in Table A-2 of Appendix A. The navigation-grade IMU can be 
alone used to implement an inertial navigation system with level of allowable errors 
for one-hour flight. The control grade IMU is generally used to provide inertial 
measurements for control systems. The tactical grade IMU can be applied for the 
attitude display and flight control and short-time navigation and guidance. When 
inertial sensor systems are combined with aiding navigation systems, for example, 
GNSS, the accuracy requirements for inertial sensors can be further relaxed from the 
navigational to low grades. Therefore, many emerging inertial sensor technologies 
can be used for the development of aircraft multisensor navigation systems[95][96]. 
4.3.2 Inertial Sensor Performance 
For navigation applications and the development of the inertial system error 
model in this thesis, the performance of inertial sensors are dominantly characterised 
by the following parameters. 
An inertial sensor provides an output signal in response to its input, either 
rotation or acceleration of aircraft. The scale factor is a transform factor that defines 
the ratio of the output signal to the input signal. Ideally, the scale factor is a constant 
and there exists a linear relationship between the sensor output and input. Owing to 
imperfections of the manufacturing and signal processing process, the linearity of 
scale factor may change over different input ranges. As a result, the scale factor may 
give different values for different input ranges or may have second or higher-order 
terms relating the output signal to input. This leads to the nonlinearity or instability 
of scale factor. Furthermore, a sensor may have a different scale factor for positive 
and negative inputs, known as scale factor asymmetry.  
Sensor bias is an offset of an inertial sensor when an output is detected for no 
input or input signal change. This bias may be different for positive and negative 
inputs and may be turn-on dependent. The uncertainty or instability of sensor bias is 
an important parameter in assessing the accuracy of sensor measurements. For a 
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gyroscope, the sensor output error caused by nonlinearity, instability or asymmetry 
of scale factor and sensor bias is known as the gyro drift. 
When inertial sensors are integrated in a case to form an inertial system, the 
input axis of each sensor should be aligned to its associated case reference axis. The 
angle between the input axis and its associated axis is defined as the input-axis 
misalignment.  
These performance parameters are common for all kinds of inertial sensors. 
But, because of diverse design principles and manufacturing procedures, individual 
sensors may have specific error sources. The main performance parameters of 
inertial sensors for aircraft navigation applications are summarised in Table A-2. 
4.3.3 Gyroscope Technology 
The evolution of gyroscope technologies covers three generations. The first 
generation is the traditional rigid rotor gyroscopes, which are distinguished as two 
classes: attitude gyros and rate gyros. Attitude gyros were based on the principle of 
conservation of angular momentum and were specially adapted to the stable platform 
systems. Rate gyros are principally based on the Newton’s second law and were used 
for strapdown navigation systems. Traditional rotor gyros have the highest accuracy 
but expensive cost and large volume. Physical implementations of various rotor 
gyroscopes can be mainly featured by the methods in which the maintenance of 
reference angular momentum of the rotor is achieved. This ranges from simple 
inexpensive flywheel design to highly accurate and complex design, for example, the 
floated integrating gyro and the electro-statically suspended gyro. Rotor gyros are the 
most mature in the development of gyroscope technology. The traditional rotor gyros 
are continually used in marine navigation applications, but have been replaced by 
optical gyroscopes for aircraft navigation applications. 
The second generation is the optical gyroscopes, which are based on the 
Sagnac effect[94][97]. The Sagnac effect is an optical phenomenon of the relativistic 
effect. In an optical gyroscope, two laser beams from the same laser source propagate 
around a closed path in opposite directions. If this closed path is rotating around its 
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rotation axis, these two beams will arrive at a detector at slightly different times 
because the optical path travelled by one beam along the direction of rotation 
becomes longer than the path travelled by the other beam. The angular rate of this 
closed path rotation can be measured by detecting the time difference between the 
two paths. Optical gyroscopes can be classified as two kinds of classes: the ring laser 
gyroscope (RLG) and the fibre optic gyroscope (FOG). Optical gyroscopes were 
developed for strapdown systems and have replaced the mechanical gyros in many 
applications. Optical gyroscopes have smaller volume, lower cost and wider dynamic 
rate range in comparison with mechanical gyros. 
In the RLG, two counter-propagating laser beams travel through a laser cavity 
with reflecting mirrors (resonant cavity). When the resonant cavity is rotating around 
its sensitive axis, these two waves resonate in the rotating cavity to generate the 
frequency shift, which is proportional to the angular rate of laser cavity rotation. A 
photodiode detector can detect this frequency shift in the form of interfering fringes 
to derive the angular rate. Current RLG sensors have reached to the performance of 
traditional rotor gyroscopes[97]. However, in order to attain such high measurement 
accuracy, a RLG needs a large volume to increase the length of the optical cavity. In 
addition, the RLG sensors are expensive.  
In the FOG, two counter-propagating lasers travel along a closed-loop optical 
fibre. When FOG is rotating around its sensitive axis, these two counter-propagating 
waves interfere with each other to induce the Sagnac phase (or frequency) shift that 
can be measured by a photo-detector to obtain the angular rate of FOG rotation. The 
FOG sensor has some desirable features, such as reduced weight. It is smaller than 
the RLG and significantly cheaper. However, FOG has lower sensitivity and current 
FOG technology cannot reach the performance of a RLG sensor. Sensors based on an 
interferometric FOG and a resonant FOG sensors have been developed for tactical, 
AHRS and aided navigation applications. Recent developments in optical gyroscope 
are concerned with integrated optic gyro (IOG), which is insensitive to environment 
effects and is relatively inexpensive.  
The third generation of gyroscope involves MicroElectroMechanical Systems 
(MEMS) inertial sensors. All MEMS-based gyroscopes make use of the Coriolis 
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principle[98]. MEMS inertial sensors have the smallest volume and cheapest cost but 
at present, their accuracy is less than optical gyros. MEMS gyros have been applied 
in the automobile industries and for guided munitions. With further development and 
maturation of MEMS sensor technologies, it is expected that MEMS gyros will 
achieve a performance of better than 1 deg/hr and will replace some optical gyros in 
many aerospace applications. For example, the current test results from the Charles 
Stark Draper Laboratory[99] have shown that the bias stability of MEMS gyro over 
small temperature ranges of 0.5oC has surpassed 10 deg/hr in tests lasting six hours, 
while the companion accelerometer demonstrates submilli-g performance.  
4.3.4 Accelerometer Technology 
The development of accelerometer technology can be classified by two types. 
The first type uses the principal of the force rebalance. For both translational proof-
mass and pendulous proof-mass accelerometers, the displacement of the proof-mass 
resulting from external force or acceleration is measured by a detector and the 
position of the mass is restored by closed-loop control. This displacement is a direct 
measure of the acceleration. This type of accelerometer has been used in most 
inertial navigation systems. 
The second type is based on the vibratory accelerometer, which senses 
acceleration by detecting transverse resonant frequency of a pendulous proof-mass. 
There are several different versions, including the vibrating string accelerometer, the 
vibrating beam accelerometer, the quartz resonator accelerometer and the integrated 
silicon accelerometers. This type of accelerometer has been used in aided inertial 
navigation systems but currently, cannot reach to the performance of the first type for 
inertial navigation systems. However, they offer the advantage of direct digital 
output, they consume relatively little power and they are more rugged.  
MEMS accelerometers have been based on both the force rebalance and the 
quartz resonator principle and several MEMS accelerometers are currently used in 
aided inertial navigation systems. The performance and trends of MEMS inertial 
sensors are briefly summarised in Table A-3 of Appendix A.  
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4.4 Inertial Navigation Equations 
This section develops the set of differential equations defining the navigation 
states, which are expressed in terms of the sensed accelerations and angular rates 
available from an IMU. The principal of inertial navigation is based on Newton’s 
second law of motion, which is valid in an inertial frame. Aircraft navigation 
however occurs in a terrestrial navigation frame. Therefore, the navigation states 
have to be referenced to the local geodetic coordinates and the navigation frames. In 
this thesis, the wander azimuth frame is used to represent the navigation frame for 
the reasons outlined in Section 4.1. 
4.4.1 Velocity Equations 
The velocity differential equations are derived on the basis of the Coriolis 
theorem. The physical interpretation of the Coriolis theorem is that the rate of change 
of a vector takes a different quantity when observed in two relative moving reference 
frames. In vector operator notation, the Coriolis theorem is written as[100] 
])([ A/BBABA uuCu ×+=               (4.6) 
where u  is an arbitrary vector, A  and B  are two relative moving reference frames 
and A/B  represents angular rate vector of rotation of B  relative to A .  
By applying the above relative motion equation to Newton’s second law, the 
velocity equation in the wander frame can be obtained.  
When an aircraft flies around the Earth, rotating again around the ECI frame, 
the aircraft velocity in the wander frame wv is defined in terms of the aircraft position 
er  in the rotating ECEF frame as follows: 
ew
e
w rCv =  (4.7) 
Furthermore, the aircraft position er  in the ECEF frame is represented in terms of its 
corresponding position Ir  in the ECI frame as 
Ie
I
e rCr =                  (4.8) 
where eIC  is the rotation transformation matrix from the ECI to ECEF frames.  
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The time derivatives of Eqs.(4.7) and (4.8) lead to 
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w )()( rCvrCrCrCrCv  +×−=+×−=+=  (4.9) 
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e )( rCrCrCrCr  +×−=+=   (4.10) 
where we/w  is the angular rate vector of rotation of the wander frame relative to the 
ECEF frame in terms of the wander coordinates and II/e  is the Earth’s rotation rate 
vector in the ECI coordinates. For aircraft navigation, II/e  is assumed to be a 
constant. 
Again the time derivative of Eq. (4.10) is 
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Substituting Eqs. (4.7) and (4.10) into Eq. (4.11) results in  
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e 2))(( rCvCrCr  +×−××−=  (4.12) 
Substituting Eq. (4.12) into Eq. (4.9) leads to 
]))(([)](2)[( III/eII/eIwIwwI/ewe/ww rrCvv ××−+×+×−=   (4.13) 
where III/e
I
I/e ))(( r ××  is the centripetal acceleration caused by the Earth’s rotation 
and Ir  is the inertial acceleration of aircraft.  
However, accelerometer does not directly measure the acceleration Ir  rather 
than the specific force bf  coordinated in the body frame in a strapdown system. This 
specific force is a combination of both the inertial and gravitational accelerations:  
IIbI
b GrfC −=   (4.14) 
The total gravitational acceleration includes the local gravity component Ig  and the 
centripetal acceleration: 
II
I/e
I
I/e
II ))(( rgG ××+=  (4.15) 
Substituting Eqs. (4.14) and (4.15) into Eq.(4.13) produces 
][)](2)[( IbIbwIwwI/ewe/ww gfCCvv ++×+×−=  
Therefore, the velocity equation in the wander frame is given as follows: 
www
i/e
w
e/w
bw
b
w )](2)[( gvfCv +×+×−=  (4.16) 
where wbwb ffC ≡  is the measured specific force vector coordinated in the wander 
 NAVIGATION EQUATIONS AND ERROR DYNAMICS 
 
4.3 Inertial Sensor Technology 
 
 79 
frame, ×   is the skew-symmetric matrix of the vector  , wv  is the velocity vector 
of aircraft in terms of the wander coordinates, we/w  is the transport rate vector of 
aircraft, wI/e  is the earth rate vector represented in the wander coordinates and wg  is 
the gravity vector. The expressions of wg and we/w  are given in Appendix B. 
4.4.2 Attitude Equations 
In order to derive the velocity in Eq. (4.16), the attitude DCM wbC  must first be 
determined so that the sensed specific force vector from an IMU can be referenced to 
the wander frame. From the transport equation given in Eq. (4.6), the differential 
equation of the attitude DCM wbC  can be derived as follows
[101]
  
w
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b/w
w
b )( CC ×−=  (4.17) 
where wb/w  is the angular rate vector of rotation of the wander frame relative to the 
body frame, coordinated in the wander azimuth frame. From the addition of angular 
velocities, wb/w  can be decomposed as follows:  
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Substituting Eq. (4.18) into Eq. (4.17) leads to  
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b )]()[()( CCC ×+×−×=          (4.19) 
where bI/b  is the measured body angular rate vector from a strapdown IMU.  
Eq. (4.19) is known as the attitude matrix differential equation. The attitude 
DCM establishes an analytical platform. From Eq. (4.16), the measurements from the 
accelerometers must be resolved in this analytical platform in order to derive the 
navigation states. Because wbC  is a symmetric orthogonal matrix, at least six first-
order differential equations in Eq. (4.19) must be resolved to obtain the attitude 
DCM. To simplify the computation of the attitude DCM differential equation, a 
quaternion form of the attitude matrix differential equation is commonly used. The 
quaternion differential equation and the relationship between the quaternion and the 
attitude DCM elements are given in Appendix C. 
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4.4.3 Position Equations 
The differential equation of the position DCM can also be derived from the 
transport theorem as follows: 
w
e
w
e/w
w
e )( CC ×−=                (4.20) 
w
e/w  is the transport rate of an aircraft and is given by Eq.(4.21). From an initial 
position DCM or position, Eq.(4.20) can be integrated to give the current position 
DCM. From Eq. (4.4), the geographic location of aircraft and the wander angle can 
be computed as follows: 
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The altitude of aircraft above the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid is obtained 
by integrating the vertical component of aircraft velocity zv  as follows: 
zvh −=                (4.22) 
Therefore, Eqs. (4.16), (2.19) or (C.3) and (4.20) constitute the navigation algorithms 
of strapdown inertial navigation systems.  
The architecture of the strapdown inertial navigation algorithms is illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. 
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4.4.4 Disadvantages of Inertial Navigation Systems 
From the previous subsections, in order to integrate the velocity, the attitude 
DCM and the position DCM differential equations, initial values of the navigation 
states must be known accurately. Even though a high quality IMU can determine the 
initial attitude DCM by performing a so-called initial alignment procedure, initial 
velocity and position values have to be provided by other navigation aiding means. 
In addition, the integrating procedure will accumulate the navigation state errors 
caused by various sensor error sources. Accordingly, inertial navigation systems are 
generally aided by other aiding navigation systems.  
Initial alignment is a static ground alignment procedure and comprises two 
steps: coarse alignment and fine alignment. The coarse alignment makes use of the 
known properties of the Earth’s gravity and rotation at specific geographic locations 
to estimate the initial attitudes.  
Assume that an aircraft is at a known location, the Earth’s gravity and rotation 
at this known location point can be accurately computed in the wander frame as 
follows: 
ew
e
w gCg =               (4.23) 
e
I/e
w
e
w
I/e C =  (4.24) 
In this case, outputs from a strapdown IMU can be formulated as follows: 
wb
w
bbb~ gCff =∇+=  (4.25) 
w
I/e
b
w
bb
I/e
b
I/e
~ C =∆+=  (4.26) 
where b∇ is the total accelerometer measurement error vector and b∆ is the total gyro 
measurement error vector.  
Combining Eqs (4.25) and (4.26) gives  
[ ] [ ]wI/ewwI/ewbwbI/ebbI/eb ~~~~ ggCff ×=×  (4.27a) 
or      [ ] [ ] wbTwI/ewwI/ewTbI/ebbI/eb ~~~~ Cggff ×=×  (4.27b) 
Eqs. (4.27a) and (4.27b) are known as the coarse alignment equation from which 
initial attitude DCM can be determined. The uncertainty of the coarse alignment is 
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approximated as 
[ ] [ ]TbI/ebbbbbTwI/ewwI/ewwb ~ fggC ×∇+∆×∆∇×≈ −δ    (4.28) 
From Eq.(4.28), the accuracy of initial alignment totally depends on the performance 
of inertial sensors. A low quality IMU cannot obtain expected alignment accuracy. 
The fine alignment is based the fact that aircraft’s velocity with respect to the 
ground is zero at rest. The fine alignment usually uses a Kalman filter to refine the 
attitude DCM estimated by the coarse alignment. The observable for a fine alignment 
filter includes the velocity and the Earth rotation. 
However, the initial alignment procedure cannot be used for the alignment or 
correction of an in-flight INS. In order to correct the INS-driven navigation states 
and calibrate IMU sensor errors in-flight, inertial systems are usually combined with 
other aiding navigation systems using data fusion techniques. In the following 
section, dynamic error models of strapdown inertial navigation system will be 
established. The error models are used to analyse the initial alignment accuracy, and 
to design data fusion filters and fine alignment filters.  
4.5 Error Analysis of Inertial Navigation System 
Development of strapdown inertial navigation algorithms is based on detailed 
error analysis, which is a critical aspect in the design and development of various 
multisensor data fusion navigation systems. Error analysis is not only used to assess 
the accuracy of aircraft navigation systems and verify the performance of required 
inertial sensors, but is also used to determine the design requirements for integrated 
navigation filters and measurement requirements for aiding navigation systems in a 
multisensor navigation system. Error analysis is based on the derivation of error 
dynamic models of the navigation states. Dynamic models of the navigation state 
errors provide the mathematical foundation for navigation system failure detection 
and isolation, the implementation of an integrated navigation filter in a multisensor 
navigation system and the initial alignment and dynamic calibration of inertial 
systems. 
Two basic methods have been suggested in the literature to derive error models 
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of the navigation states for inertial navigation system: the Phi-angle error model (also 
referred to as the tilt errors) and the Psi-angle error model (also known as the attitude 
errors). Both models make use of a perturbation approach but the perturbations are 
performed with reference to different reference frames. The Phi-angle error model is 
derived from a linear perturbation of the navigation equations with respect to the true 
navigation frame while the Psi-angle error model is from a linear perturbation of the 
navigation equations in the computer frame. The computer frame is the navigation 
frame retained by the navigation system and has its origin at the computed position. 
The geometric relationships between the true navigation frame, the platform frame 
and the computer frame are illustrated in Figure 4.4, where the platform frame is an 
imaginary mathematical platform in a strapdown system and is determined by the 
computed DCM from the body frame to the estimate of the wander azimuth frame. 
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Figure 4.4 Relation Between Three Frames 
Benson[102] proves the equivalence of the two error models using analytical 
methods and simulation. Goshen-Meskin and Bar-Itzhack[103] extend these methods 
and present a unified approach to the development of inertial navigation system error 
models. Scherzinger and Reid[104]  further introduce modified error models, which is   
based on  the computed velocity instead of the measured specific forces. However, 
this replacement may introduce large uncertainty into the error models’ parameters 
because the computed velocity contains accumulated sensor errors.  In this thesis, the 
error dynamic models are developed on the basis of perturbation with respect to the 
true wander navigation frame. However, the velocity error is selected to simplify the 
formulation of the error model. The representation of the Phi-angle errors has certain 
advantages for control of the navigation state errors because the estimated errors of 
the navigation states are directly related to the true navigation frame. 
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4.5.1 Velocity Error Equations 
In order to deduce the velocity error differential equation, assume that the 
angular position error ∂ , caused by uncertainty of the computed position DCM we
~C , 
and the tilt error φ∂ , caused by uncertainty of the computed attitude DCM wb~C , are 
known. The velocity obtained by integrating Eq. (4.16) can be represented in terms 
of the true velocity plus the velocity error term as follows: 
1ww )]([~ vvIv δθ +×∂−=  (4.30a) 
Let the measured specific force vector b~f  include the true specific force vector plus 
the total accelerometer measurement error b∇ , then the computed specific force 
vector in the wander frame can be expressed as 
)()]([~~~ bbwbbwbw ∇+×∂−== fCIfCf φ   
Therefore,  
www )]([~ ∇+×∂−≈ fIf φ  (4.30b) 
where w∇  is the total accelerometer error in the wander frame.  
The gravity vector is approximated as 
www~ ggg δ+=  (4.30c) 
where wgδ  is the variation of the gravity vector in terms of the wander frame. 
Substituting Eqs. (4.30a, b, c) into Eq. (4.16), the velocity error equation can be 
derived as follows: 
wwwww1w
I/e
w
e/w
1 )()](2)[( ∇+∂×+−+∂×+×+×−= θδφδδ gfgfvv  (4.31) 
This represents a simplified velocity error differential equation. The approximate 
expression of wgδ  is given in Appendix D. 
4.5.2 Position Error Equations 
The angular position error θ∂  is defined in terms of the computed position 
DCM we
~C  and the true position DCM weC as follows: 
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w
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e )]([
~ CIC ×∂−= θ  (4.32) 
It can be rewritten as  
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e
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w
e
~ CCC −=δ  (4.33a) 
w
e
w
e )( CC ×∂−= θδ  (4.33b) 
Let the latitude, longitude and wander angles be expressed in terms of their true 
values plus error terms as follows: 
δαααδϕϕϕδλλλ +=+=+=          ,~       ,~  (4.34) 
From Appendix D, the linear position error differential equation can be deduced as 
follows: 
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(4.35) 
where the linear position errors are defined as 
δϕδϕδϕ h)R(h)(R anR +≈+=   
δλϕδλϕδλ )cos()hR()cos()hR( aeR +≈+=   
4.5.3 Attitude Error Equations 
Due to inertial sensor measurement and computation errors, the attitude DCM 
obtained by integrating Eq. (4.19) contains errors. This computed attitude DCM wb
~C  
can be represented in terms of the true attitude DCM wbC  as follows:  
w
b
w
b )]([
~ CIC ×∂−= φ  (4.36) 
where φ∂  is known as the tilt error vector. 
Let    wb
w
b
w
b
~ CCC −=δ  (4.37a) 
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then wb
w
b )( CC ×∂−= φδ  (4.37b) 
Differentiating Eqs. (4.37a) and (4.37b) yields 
w
b
w
b
w
b )()( CCC  ×∂−×∂−= φφδ  (4.38) 
w
b
w
b/w
w
b
w
b/w
w
b
w
b
w
b )(
~)~(~ CCCCC ×+×−=−= δ  (4.39) 
From Appendix E, the tilt error differential equation can be derived as follows: 
ww
I/e
w
e/w
w
e/w
w
I/e )()]()[( ∆−∂×++∂×+×−=∂ θδφφ   (4.40) 
Let the computed Euler angles be expressed in terms of their true values plus 
error terms as follows: 
www
~
  ,
~
  ,
~ δψψψδθθθδφφφ +=+=+=  (4.41) 
From Appendix E, the attitude errors can be written in vector form as 
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where Euler_errtiltT  is the transformation matrix from the tilt errors to the Euler errors.  
4.5.4 Inertial Sensor Error Models 
An inertial sensor system measures the kinematic parameters (6DOF angular 
velocities and linear accelerations) of aircraft motion, which are used in navigation 
algorithms, as described in Section 4.3, to obtain the navigation states. Ideally, the 
output of an inertial sensor should provide an exact measurement of its input, the 
measured kinematic parameter. In practice, the output of an inertial sensor will 
contain errors, including nonlinearity of scale factor, misalignment between sensor 
sensing axis and input axis, coupling effect between angular and linear motions, 
uncertainty of sensor system design itself (including uncertainty of sensor dynamic 
model), imperfect sensor signal detection and processing and measurement noise. In 
this thesis, separate model equations are defined for gyroscopes and accelerometers. 
These models define the mathematical relationship between the outputs of inertial 
sensors and the inputs, including applied acceleration, angular velocity and angular 
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acceleration along the sensor reference axes. 
The generalised model equation of a gyro is defined as follows: 
∆Τ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆+= εωωωω )(AMisinSFRBininout T  (4.43) 
where   
outω  and inω  are the gyro output and input, respectively,  
B∆ is the gyro bias, or zero offset,  
R∆ is the gyro random drift rate, which may be caused by environmental and 
other external influences, such as disturbed torque in a mechanical gyro. 
SF∆ is the gyro scale factor error, caused by nonlinearity or instability resulting 
from the gyro scale factor.  
Mis∆ is a gyro misalignment-dependent error, caused by misalignment between 
the gyro input axis and its associated reference axis. 
A∆ is the acceleration-sensitive drift rate, which may include acceleration and 
acceleration-squared sensitivities. 
∆ is a temperature-dependent gyro drift rate, and 
∆ε is gyro measurement noise. 
For different gyro sensors, some of the terms in Eq. (4.43) may be omitted. For 
example, laser gyros usually exhibit random walk in the gyro drift but it is not 
necessary to specify acceleration-sensitive drift. However, for mechanical gyros, 
gyro drift caused by acceleration sensitivity has to be considered. 
Accelerometer errors may arise from the angular motion and the acceleration 
motion of the aircraft, random bias, scale factor, dead zone, cross-axis sensitivity, 
temperature and other factors. A generalised model equation of an accelerometer is 
defined as 
∇+∇+∇+∇+∇+∆+∇+∇+=∇+ εTAMisinSFRBinout fff      (4.44) 
where 
outf  and inf  are the output and input of an accelerometer, separately. 
B∇  is the accelerometer bias,  
R∇ is an accelerometer time-dependent random bias. The random bias is a 
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critical aspect of accelerometer performance. This bias must be estimated 
and corrected with a stochastic process in the integrated Kalman filter.  
SF∆ is the accelerometer scale factor error, 
Mis∇ is the accelerometer misalignment bias, caused by misalignment angle 
between the accelerometer input axis and its associated reference axis. 
∇  is the accelerometer output bias, caused by angular motion of aircraft, 
A∇  is the acceleration-sensitive accelerometer bias, including cross-coupling 
effect and higher order acceleration-sensitive terms. 
T∇  is a temperature-dependent accelerometer bias, and 
∇ε  is the accelerometer measurement noise. 
Generally, the first four error terms of inertial sensors in Eqs. (4.43) and (4.44) are 
critical to inertial navigation system. These error terms need to be estimated and 
corrected in flight to improve the performance of aircraft navigation systems. 
4.6 Navaid Systems  
Although an inertial reference system can provide all the necessary information 
for computation of all the navigation states, it suffers from time-accumulated drift 
errors, as described in Section 4.4. Navaid systems generally supply only partial 
information on the navigation states. However, they exhibit a long-term stability and 
high positioning accuracy dependent on navaid systems. Therefore, the navigation 
states given by navaid systems can be used as constraints on some of the navigation 
states derived by INS.  
The measurement equations and navigation models of several navaid systems, 
for example, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and Doppler radar systems, 
are developed in this section. An air data sensor system is used in aircraft systems for 
navigation and flight control. For example, the pressure altitude is widely used to aid 
the vertical channel of inertial navigation systems and to maintain vertical height. 
However, air data sensor systems will not be discussed in this thesis.  
GNSS is an all-weather, space-based radio navigation system providing global 
 NAVIGATION EQUATIONS AND ERROR DYNAMICS 
 
4.6 Navaid Systems 
 
 89 
coverage. There are at present three similar versions of GNSS: the US Global 
Positioning System (GPS), the Russian Global Orbital Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS) and the European Galileo satellite navigation system. These three 
satellite navigation systems are mainly distinguished by the satellite orbital planes, 
the number of operating satellites, representation of satellite orbit parameters, data 
modulation methods, frequency bands and signal structures. For example, GPS uses 
the code division multiple access (CDMA) technique whereas GLONASS uses the 
frequency division multiple access (FDMA). GPS has 24 operational satellites in six 
orbit planes around 20200 km above the Earth’s surface whereas the Galileo system 
will have 30 satellites in three orbit planes around 24000 km. GLONASS uses PZ-90 
coordinate frame whereas GPS uses the WGS-84 system. The GPS C/A-code rate is 
1.023 Mbit/s while GLONASS has a value of 0.511 Mbit/s.  
GNSS timing signals are very precisely defined pseudo random noise (PRN) 
codes, which are modulated on the satellite carrier signals together with the 
navigation message containing the satellite orbit parameters. GNSS satellites may 
broadcast different PRN codes on several carrier frequencies for different services. 
For example, GPS satellites broadcast the C/A-code on the L1 carrier (1575.42 MHz) 
for civilian standard positioning services and the P(Y)-code on both the L1 and L2 
(1227.60 MHz) carriers for military precise positioning services[83]. By offering dual 
frequencies as standard, Galileo will deliver higher real-time position accuracy than 
the current GPS or GLONASS positioning services. However, modernised GPS will 
offer a new L5 frequency and L2 civil signal to enhance civil and aviation services.  
These systems share the same positioning principle, that is, they all determine 
the position of a receiver by measuring time differences of timing signals travelling 
from GNSS satellites to the receiver. Therefore, the positioning and navigation 
equations developed in this section apply to all three GNSS systems. A GNSS 
receiver is designed to track and capture the satellite timing codes and to demodulate 
the navigation message in order to compute position. This method is known as the 
code-phase measurement. A GNSS receiver can also track and measure the phases of 
carrier signals transmitted by GNSS satellites, which are referred to as carrier phase 
measurement. 
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4.6.1 GNSS Observation Equations 
From the user’s perspective, GNSS satellites generate and broadcast a series of 
timing codes. These code signals propagate through the atmosphere in space to a user 
receiver. The receiver tracks and measures the time delays of these codes to estimate 
the time difference of the signal propagation. Let the time at which a GNSS satellite 
transmits its timing code signal be St and the time at which a GNSS receiver receives 
this timing code signal be Rt , then the time difference of this signal propagation is  
SR ttt −=∆  
Because the satellite and receiver clocks are not perfect, the receiver time Rt  and the 
satellite time St  will contain errors Rdt  and Sdt , respectively. Therefore, the above 
equation can be rewritten as: 
SRSRSSRR )()( dtdtttdttdttt −+−=+−+=∆  (4.45) 
Assume that the timing signals transmitted by GNSS satellites travel at the speed of 
light c , then the range between the satellite and receiver can be represented as 
SRSR )(r cdtcdtttctc −+−=∆≡  
or      SRr cdtcdt −+= ρ  (4.46) 
where ρ=− )( SR ttc  is the true distance between the GNSS satellite and receiver, 
Rcdt  is the range error caused by uncertainty of the receiver clock, Scdt  is the range 
error caused by the satellite clock error and r  is usually  known as the pseudorange 
measurement. 
Consider various signal propagation path delays, including the clock errors, 
satellite orbit errors and measurement noise. The model equation of the pseudorange 
measurement can be expressed as[83] 
rSRmptropionor ερρ +−+++++= cdtcdtdddd  (4.47) 
where 
ρd  is the range error caused by satellite orbit errors, 
ionod  is the range error caused by the ionospheric path delay, 
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tropd  is the range error caused by  the tropospheric path delay, 
mpd is the range error caused by multipath effects, reflecting surfaces around 
the GNSS receiver antenna. 
rε  is the measurement noise.  
If a GNSS receiver is able to track both the timing signals and the carrier signals, 
then carrier phase measurements can also be obtained. When the carrier signal 
transmitted by a satellite reaches a GNSS receiver, the relative motion between the 
satellite and the receiver causes a Doppler shift of the arrival carrier signal at the 
receiver side. If the receiver’s carrier phase tracking loop can lock onto the carrier 
signal, the receiver can continuously measure or count the Doppler shift, known as 
the Doppler count. Because the initial locking time is unknown, the initial Doppler 
count is unknown and is referred to as carrier phase integer ambiguity. The sum of 
the accumulated Doppler count and fractional phase measurement is the total carrier 
phase, which is an equivalent range measurement.  
The model equation of the carrier phase measurement can be represented as[83] 
ϕελρρλϕ +−+++−++= SRmptropiono cdtcdtdddNd  (4.48) 
where  
λϕ  is the equivalent pseudorange from a satellite to a receiver, 
ϕ  is the totally measured phase, 
λ  is the wavelength of measured carrier frequency, 
N  is the carrier phase integer ambiguity, which is a constant once the carrier 
signal is locked and tracked.  
ϕε  is the carrier phase measurement noise. 
Because the ionosphere causes the group speed of radio signals to be delayed and the 
phase speed of the radio signals to be advanced, the ionospheric delay ionod  is 
negative in Eq. (4.48) and positive in Eq. (4.47). 
Although the carrier phase measurement is potentially more accurate than the 
code phase measurement, the carrier phase integer ambiguity occurring in Eq. (4.48) 
is an inherent drawback in carrier tracking measurements. In order to benefit from 
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the high accuracy property of the carrier phase measurement, the integer ambiguity 
must be correctly resolved.  
The Doppler shift is a measure of the rate of change of the relative range 
between a GNSS satellite and a receiver along the line of sight. If the GNSS satellite 
velocities are known, then the instantaneous Doppler measurement can be used to 
determine the receiver velocity. The model equation of the Doppler measurement can 
be expressed as 
rSRmptropionor 
 ερρ +−+++++= tcdtcddddd  (4.49) 
where 
ϕλ  =r  is the pseudorange rate, f∆=ϕ  is the Doppler frequency shift. 
ρ  is the true range rate along the line of sight between satellite and receiver, 
ρd  is the range rate error caused by satellite velocity errors, 
ionod  is the range rate error caused by the ionosphere, 
tropd is the range rate error caused by the troposphere, 
mpd  is the range rate error caused by multipath effects, 
Rtcd  is the range rate error caused by the receiver clock frequency drift, 
Stcd  is the range rate error caused by the satellite clock frequency drift, and 
rε  is the Doppler measurement noise. 
Eqs. (4.47), (4.48 and (4.49) constitute the GNSS measurement model. Since GNSS 
satellite orbit parameters are precisely estimated by GNSS ground data processing 
centres and satellite system time is held by highly precise atomic clocks, these error 
terms can be neglected for navigation users.  
Two methods are used to reduce the error terms in the GNSS measurement 
equations. One method is to use an ionospheric and tropospheric delay models[83]. 
For example GPS generally broadcasts ionospheric correction parameters as a part of 
the navigation message. However, it is difficult to eliminate all the range errors 
caused by atmospheric path delays simply by use of these models[83].  
Another approach is to develop augmented GNSS systems. There are two kinds 
of augmentation systems: local and global augmentations. Local area augmentation 
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systems use differential GNSS[83] and pseudolite[105] techniques to correct the error 
terms in the GNSS measurements and to improve the integrity and availability of 
GNSS satellites in a local area. In a local area augmentation system, a reference 
station at a known location receives and processes its local GNSS observables to 
obtain the range and range rate corrections to each visible GNSS satellite, and then 
broadcasts these differential corrections and GNSS signal integrity information to 
near users. These users can utilise this correction information to correct their GNSS 
measurements. This differential GNSS technique can only cancel those common-
view error sources to both the reference station and the users, such as, satellite orbit 
and clock errors and atmospheric path delay errors. A pseudolite is a ground-based 
beacon at known location and transmits timing signals similar to GNSS satellites[105]. 
The pseudolite techniques can improve the availability of GNSS signals and the LOS 
geometry of user receivers within a specific region. Therefore, the local positioning 
accuracy and signal integrity are improved.  
There are three compatible versions of global augmentation system: the US 
wide area augmentation system (WAAS)[106], the European geostationary navigation 
overlay service (EGNOS) )[107] and the Japanese multifunctional transport satellite 
space-based augmentation system (MSAS) )[108]. All these systems are space-ground 
combined systems and broadcast the real-time clock, ephemeris and atmospheric 
correction parameters, augmented timing/ranging signals and integrity information of 
GNSS satellites signals. These correction parameters allow users to obtain accuracies 
approaching those of local-area differential GPS systems[108]. These spaced-based 
systems not only improve the accuracy of GNSS but also enhance the integrity, time 
availability and continuity of GNSS service[109][110].  
It should be noted that the local area augmentation systems are to mainly 
reduce the effects of the common-view error sources on the GNSS measurements. 
Therefore, the correction is local. However, the space-based augmentation systems 
directly reduce or remove the error sources. Their corrections are global because all 
GNSS users can use these corrections.  
In addition, the carrier phase measurements are generally used to smooth the 
pseudoranges to improve the accuracy of the pseudorange measurements.  
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4.6.2 GNSS Navigation Equations 
In order to develop GNSS navigation equations, assuming that the main error 
terms in Eqs. (4.47) and (4.49) have been properly corrected by use of the techniques 
mentioned as above. Therefore, the model equations of these GNSS measurements 
can be simplified in terms of range and range rate measurements, as follows: 
Range equivalent measurement: ik
i
k
i vdtctt r)()(r +∗+= ρ  (4.50) 
Range rate equivalent measurement: ik
i
k
i vtdctt r)()(r  +∗+= ρ  (4.51) 
where rv is the range equivalent measurement noise, covering the measurement noise 
and all residual errors after the propagation path delay corrections; rv  is the range 
rate equivalent measurement noise, including the receiver measurement noise and all 
residual rate errors after the propagation path delay corrections, and the superscript i  
represents an observed GNSS satellite. Hereafter, the subscript R  in the receiver 
clock error terms is omitted for simplifying representation.  
The true range iρ  in Eq. (4.50) is a nonlinear algebraic equation containing the 
unknown position of the receiver and the known position of the satellite i  as follows: 
2
S
2
S
2
S )](z)(z[)](y)(y[)](x)(x[)( kkikkikkiki ttttttt −+−+−=ρ  (4.52) 
where T]z,y,x[ iii is the position vector of the satellite i  in the ECEF frame at the 
signal transmission time ktS  and T]z,y,x[  is the position vector of GNSS receiver in 
ECEF coordinates at the signal reception time kt .  
The true range rate iρ  in Eq. (4.51) is a projection of the relative velocity 
between the satellite and the receiver onto the line of sight along the GPS satellite i  
to the receiver. The range rate can be represented as: 
)z-z(z)-z()y-y(y)-y()x-x(x)-x()(  ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
k
i t
ρρρ
ρ ++=  (4.53) 
where T]z,y,x[ iii  is the velocity vector of the satellite i  at time ktS  in terms of the 
ECEF coordinates and T]z,y,x[   is the true velocity vector of receiver at time kt  in 
terms of the ECEF coordinates. Hereafter, the time symbols in round brackets will be 
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omitted to simplify the forms of the GNSS measurement equations. 
Two forms of GNSS navigation algorithms are commonly used. One is based 
on the least-squares method whereas the other uses Kalman filtering techniques. 
Both needs to linearise the GNSS measurement models about nominal points, i.e. the 
approximate position and velocity of a GNSS receiver.  
From Appendix F, the GNSS navigation equations can be represented in vector 
form as follows: 
rpGNSS pHr += δδ  (4.54) 
rLOSVpGNSS  pHpHr ++= δδδ  (4.55) 
where 
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Eqs. (4.54) and (4.55) constitute the fundamental GNSS navigation algorithms. In the 
extended least-squares method, Eqs. (4.54) and (4.55) are directly solved to obtain 
the position and velocity states. In the Kalman filtering method, Eqs. (4.54) and 
(4.55) are used in the filter measurements and the aircraft motion or the inertial 
system error dynamics must be modelled. This thesis will investigate multisensor 
data fusion navigation systems using the Kalman filter approach and the dynamic 
models of inertial system errors developed in Section 4.4. 
From the least-squares estimation, the uncertainty of estimate of the GNSS-
based navigation state can be characterised by the inverse matrix [ ] 1GNSSTGNSS )( −HH , 
which represents the geometry of visible GNSS satellites in space. The squared-root 
of the trace of this inverse matrix is usually known as the geometric dilution of 
precision (GDOP) factor. Apparently, GDOP changes with the number of observed 
GNSS satellites and their configurations. Minimising GDOP is generally used as a 
criterion to select optimal visible satellites. The GDOP is formulated in the ECEF 
frame as  
 
[ ] ))((GDOP 1GNSSTGNSS −= HHtr  (4.56) 
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Transforming this inverse matrix from the ECEF frame to the NEU frame, the GDOP 
factor in the NEU frame can be formulated as 
[ ] [ ] ))(())((GDOP 1TTGNSSneTGNSSneen1GNSSTGNSSnen −− == HCHCCHHC trtr  (4.57) 
where neC  is the 4x4 transformation matrix from the ECEF frame to the NEU frame.  
Several other alternative DOP values used in evaluating satellite constellations are 
position dilution of precision (PDOP), horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP) and 
vertical dilution of precision (VDOP). The product of a DOP value and ranging error 
determines the corresponding position fix error[83]. 
Further investigations in GNSS applications[83][111-114] have shown that the use 
of differential carrier phase measurement techniques, based on three or four GNSS 
antennas, can obtain aircraft attitude information. This technique is usually known as 
GNSS-based attitude determination. The relative position vector between two GNSS 
antennas is referred to as the baseline. In the aircraft body frame, the orientation of 
this baseline is known very precisely. The phase difference between two antennas is 
an estimate of the projection of this baseline onto the line of sight to the observed 
satellite. This principle is illustrated in Figure 4.5 where the parallel carrier signals of 
the satellite i  arrive at the different antennas. Because the magnitude of this baseline 
is constant in any coordinate frames, taking the NEU navigation frame as a reference, 
the model for GNSS-based attitude determination can be represented as follows: 
i
jd
i
j
i
j
i
j Nd −++= ϕλλϕ n/bnTb )( sCb  (4.58) 
where 
i
jdλϕ  is the differential phase observation to 
the satellite i  from the baseline j , 
b
jb  is the known baseline j , represented 
in the body coordinates,  
i
jN  is the relative phase ambiguity of 
carrier frequency of the observed satellite 
i  with respective to the baseline j ,  
 
jb
in/s
i
jdλϕ
 
Figure 4.5 Baseline Measurements 
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ii e/n
e
n/ sCs = is the known LOS vector of the satellite i  coordinated in the NEU frame, 
b
nC  is the unknown attitude DCM and bnTbTn )()( Cbb jj = , and 
i
jd −ϕ is the differential carrier phase measurement noise relative to the satellite i  
along the baseline j . 
For three baselines (J, K, L), where more than three GNSS satellites are visible, 
the model equation of the GNSS-based attitude determination can be rearranged in 
matrix form as follows:  
Φ++= dd NSCB λnbnbl   (4.59) 
where 
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N  is the relative ambiguity matrix, 
[ ]Tbbbbl LKJ bbbB =  is the baseline matrix in terms of the body coordinates,  
[ ] TLOSnen/n/3n/21n/ HCssssSn == m  is the known LOS DCM 
coordinated in the NEU frame, and 
Φd  is the differential phase measurement noise matrix. 
Given that the relative ambiguity matrix N  has been resolved, two methods 
can be used to solve Eq. (4.59), depending on the configuration of the baseline 
vectors in the aircraft body frame. If these three baseline vectors are non-coplanar in 
the body frame, then an inverse of the baseline matrix blB  exists. By using least-
squares techniques, the attitude matrix can be computed as follows: 
[ ] 1TnnTn1blbn )()(~ −−= SSSBC d  (4.60) 
where d  includes the resolved relative ambiguity matrix N . The inverse matrix 
[ ] 1Tnn )( −SS  can be achieved by selecting appropriate GNSS satellites. GNSS attitude 
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algorithms based on this method are generally known as the direct attitude matrix 
determination algorithm.  
If the baseline vectors are coplanar, Eq. (4.59) is reduced to vector form as 
follows: 
jdjjjd −Φ++= NSCb λnbnTb )(  (4.61) 
where ),,( LKJjd j =  are the row vectors of the differential phase matrix d , jN  
is the row vector of N  and jd −Φ  is the row vector of Φd . 
By independently resolving Eq. (4.61) for each row vector of d , the baseline 
vectors can be obtained in terms of the navigation coordinates, as follows: 
[ ] bnbTn1Tnnn )()(~ jjj d bCSSSb ≡= −  (4.62) 
Combining any two baseline vectors given by Eq. (4.62) results in 
[ ] [ ]bbbbnbnnnn ~~~~ KJKJKJKJ bbbbCbbbb ×=×  (6.63) 
The attitude matrix is then given by 
[ ][ ] 1bbbbnnnnnb ~~~~~ −××= KJKJKJKJ bbbbbbbbC  (4.64) 
Obviously, this method requires only two baselines. These two baseline vectors 
(resolved in the navigation coordinates) must first be determined, and then the 
attitude angles or the attitude matrix can be computed by using the estimates of these 
baselines. GNSS attitude algorithms based on this method are referred to as indirect 
attitude matrix determination algorithm or relative positioning attitude determination 
algorithm. Using this relative technique, a single baseline can be used to determine 
the heading and pitch angles of an aircraft if this single baseline is orientated along 
the aircraft body x-axis.  
Existing many GNSS attitude determination algorithms are generally based on 
one of these two fundamental methods. These algorithms may be distinguished by 
the computing methods used to resolve Eq. (4.59) and Eq. (4.61).  
Different from kinematic positioning where the baseline length is usually long 
and unknown and the integer ambiguity is searched in a relatively large search space, 
the baseline length in aircraft attitude determination problem is precisely known and 
very short (typically 1.0-2.0 meters). Consequently, the integer ambiguity search in 
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GNSS-based aircraft attitude determination is based on the known baseline length or 
antenna geometry and the ambiguity search space is smaller. Several least squares-
based integer ambiguity resolution techniques have been suggested for the attitude 
determination[83][113][115-118]. For any integer ambiguity resolution algorithm, a very 
important factor to be considered is the resolution time of each ambiguity algorithm, 
which is used to characterise how fast an ambiguity algorithm can obtain the correct 
value of integer ambiguity. Although the angular accuracy of a GNSS-based attitude 
determination algorithm is inversely proportional to the baseline length[83], the 
angular accuracy of the attitude solutions better than 0.50 (root-mean-square) has 
been achieved[83][119].  
4.6.3 Normalised Measurement Models 
The INS navigation state error models developed in Section 4.4 are represented 
in the navigation frame whereas the GNSS-based navigation state error models are 
coordinated in the ECEF frame. In order to develop data fusion filter, it is necessary 
to represent the states in these two kinds of models in a unified coordinate system. 
For aircraft navigation, the navigation frame is preferred as the reference frame.  
A. Normalised Range Difference Equation 
Rewriting Eq. (4.50) as 
i
k
i
k
i vdtctt rGNSS )()(r +⋅+= ρ  (4.65) 
From the INS-derived aircraft position, the computed range between the satellite i  
and aircraft iINSr~ , corresponding to 
i
GNSSr , can be expressed as follows: 
2
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T
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INSINS
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i
kk
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k
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tttttt
tdtt
−+−+−=
+= ρ
 (4.66) 
where T)](z~),(y~),(x~[ kkk ttt  is the INS-derived aircraft position in terms of the ECEF 
coordinates and )(rINS ki td is the range error caused by uncertainty of the INS-derived 
position.  
Let the INS-derived position be expressed as follows: 
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zz)(z~  y,y)(y~  x,x)(x~ δδδ +=+=+= kkk ttt   
Linearising the squared-root term in Eq.(4.66) around this nominal point, id INSr  can 
be derived as follows: 
z
r~
)z~-(z-y
r
)y~-(y-
x
r~
)x~-(x-)(r
INSINSINS
INS δδδ i
i
i
i
i
i
k
i td ++≈  (4.67) 
Differencing Eqs.(4.66) and (4.65) and comparing Eqs. (4.67) and (4.54) where i0ρ  
and T000 ]z,y,x[ are approximated by iINSr~ and T]z~,y~,x~[ , respectively, the difference 
between the INS-derived and GNSS-measured ranges can be represented in vector 
form as follows: 
rLOSINSGNSS
~ 1pHrr ++−=− cdtδ  
In the NEU frame, this range difference equation is normalised as follows: 
r
ne
nLOSINSGNSS
~ 1pCHrr ++−=− cdtδ  (4.68) 
where [ ]TRRn hδδλδϕδ =p  is the linear position error coordinated in the NEU frame. 
B. Normalised Range Rate Difference Equation 
The GNSS range rate equation can be rewritten as 
 
i
k
i
k
i vtcdtt rGNSS )()(r  ++= ρ  (4.69) 
The INS-derived range rate can be expressed as  
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 (4.70) 
where id INSr  is the range rate error caused by uncertainty of the INS velocity solution 
and T]z~,y~,x~[  is the aircraft velocity derived by the INS in the ECEF frame. 
Let the INS derived aircraft velocity ]z~,y~,x~[   be expressed as follows: 
zz)(z~  ,yy)(y~  ,xx)(x~  δδδ +=+=+= kkk ttt   
Linearising Eq. (4.70) around this nominal point, id INSr  is approximated as 
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Differencing Eqs.(4.70) and (4.69) and comparing Eqs. (4.71) and (4.55) where i0ρ , 
T
000 ]z,y,x[  and T000 ]z,y,x[  are replaced by iINSr~ , T]z~,y~,x~[  and T]z~,y~,x~[  , 
respectively,  the range rate difference measurement equation is given in vector form 
as follows: 
r
we
wLOS
ne
nLOSVINSGNSS
~

 1vCHpCHrr ++−−=− tcdδδ  (4.72) 
where ewC  is the transformation from the wander frame to the ECEF frame and wvδ  
is the velocity error state in the wander frame. From Eq. (4.30a), wvδ  is represented 
as follows: 
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Therefore, the range rate difference equation can be normalised as follows: 
r
1e
wLOS
nv
p
e
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e
nLOSVINSGNSS )(
~

 1vCHpTCHCHrr ++−+−=− tcdδδ  (4.73) 
C. Normalised Relative Phase Difference Equation 
From (4.36), given the nominal matrix bn0C , Eq. (4.58) can be rewritten as 
follows:  
i
jd
i
j
i
j
i
j Nd −− ++×∂+= ϕλφλϕ n/bn0TbGNSS ][)( sICb  
or      i jd
i
j
i
j
i
j
i
j Nd −− ++×∂=− ϕλφλϕ n/bn0Tbn/bn0TbGNSS )()()( sCbsCb  
Defining ij
i
jd
n/b
n0
Tb
INS )( sCb=−λϕ , then ijd INS−λϕ  is the INS-derived magnitude of the 
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projection of the baseline bjb  onto the LOS in/s . 
i
jd
i
j
i
j
i
j
i
j Ndd −−− ++×∂=− ϕλφλϕλϕ n/bn0TbINSGNSS )()( sCb  (4.74) 
It is obvious that Eq. (4.74) can be used to determine the initial relative phase integer 
ambiguity ijN . Assume that the relative phase ambiguity is known, then the relative 
phase difference equation can be normalised as follows: 
i
jd
i
j
i
j
i
j dd −−− +∂×−=− ϕφλϕλϕ )()( n/TnINSGNSS sb  (4.75) 
or      i jdj
ii
j
i
j dd −−− +∂×=− ϕφλϕλϕ )()( nTn/INSGNSS bs  
where bn0
TbTn )()( Cbb jj =  is the baseline vector in the navigation frame. 
When multiple satellites are observed with respect to one baseline, from Eq. 
(4.61), the relative phase difference equation for GNSS attitude determination can be 
written in vector form as follows: 
[ ] TnTnTINSGNSS )()( jdjjj dd −Φ−− +∂×=− bS φ  (4.76) 
where GNSS−jd  and INS−jd  are the GNSS measured and the INS computed row 
vectors of jd  in Eq. (4.61), respectively.  
D. Normalised Position and Velocity Difference Equations 
If the GNSS-based navigation states are available, the normalised measurement 
equations for data fusion filter can be obtained as follows: 
The position difference equations are normalised as follows: 
GNSS-hGPSINS
GNSS-RaGNSSINS
GNSS-RaGNSSINS
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 (4.77) 
and the normalised velocity difference equation is  
GNSS-
1nv
p
n
GNSS
w
n
w
INS
~~
vvpTvCv ++=− δδ  (4.78) 
In addition, normalised Doppler radar navigation equations are given in Appendix G. 
E. Normalised Attitude Difference Equation 
When attitude information is available from the GNSS attitude determination 
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or other aircraft sensor systems, the attitude difference equation can be normalised as 
follows: 
Att
Euler_err
tiltAidedINS TEulerEuler +∂=− φ  (4.79) 
where AidedEuler are the Euler angles provided by GNSS-based attitude determination 
or other attitude measurement systems, INSEuler  are the Euler angles derived by the 
INS, Euler_errtiltT  is given by Eq. (4.42) and Att  is the attitude measurement noise. 
When a magnetic heading sensor is available, the corresponding measurement 
is as follows: 
MMzywxww ])sin())[cos(tan( b +−∂−∂+∂−= φφψφψθδψ  (4.80) 
where Mb  is the magnetic heading deviation and Mυ  is the measurement noise. Mb  
can be modelled as the combination of a random constant and the first-order Markov 
process.  
4.7 Summary 
The aim of this Chapter has been to develop the navigation equations and error 
dynamic models of inertial systems and normalised measurement models of navaid 
systems, which are required to develop and simulate fault-tolerant, multisensor-based 
aircraft navigation systems. The following activities have been described in this 
Chapter:  
1. Mechanisation of the wander-azimuth strapdown inertial navigation 
equations, which allow aircraft to fly in the high latitude regions. 
2. Development of the error dynamic models for strapdown inertial system. 
These models are used not only for analysis and evaluation of the error 
behaviour of inertial systems, but more importantly, in the design and 
development of the data fusion filter developed in Chapter 6. These models 
also provide the basis of dynamic calibration and in-flight correction of 
inertial sensor systems.  
3. Presentation of the normalised measurement and navigation equations of 
GNSS. These normalised measurement models are used in the design of 
 NAVIGATION EQUATIONS AND ERROR DYNAMICS 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
 104 
multisensor data fusion filters. It should be noted that the normalisation of 
the sensor measurement equations can simplify the design of multisensor 
navigation systems and development of sensor/system failure detection and 
isolation algorithms. In particular, these different forms of normalised 
GNSS equations further explain how GNSS measurements are used in 
multisensor data fusion for GNSS/inertial hybridised navigation systems. 
4. Derivation of the error correction and control equations for the inertial 
sensor systems and the navigation states. 
These achievements provide the necessary background and fundamental theory 
for the design and development of multisensor-based aircraft navigation systems and 
also for the simulation and evaluation of different-grade inertial sensor systems in 
this thesis. 
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Chapte r  5  
5 SENSOR NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND FAILURE 
DETECTION METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces sensor system network topologies and develops sensor-
level data fusion methods. The main purposes of the sensor-level data fusion are to 
provide highly reliable and accurate sensor data for subsequent data fusion modules 
and also reconfigure sensor network systems if some sensors failed. These create the 
fundamentals for the design of fault-tolerant navigation systems and the achievement 
of reliability and integrity of aircraft navigation systems.  
Section 5.2 presents a distributed inertial network architecture and develops 
optimal redundant inertial system configurations in terms of measurement accuracy, 
reliability and failure detection capability. The error models and calibrations of 
skewed redundant IMU (SRIMU) systems are considered in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
introduces the basic generalised likelihood ratio test (GLRT) method for the 
detection of sensor/system failures. SRIMU error compensation filters are developed 
to improve the performance of the basic GLRT methods in Section 5.5. Moving-
window detection methods are presented to enhance the capability of the GLRT 
methods for the detection of drift sensor failures in Section 5.6. A summary is given 
in Section 5.7. 
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5.2 Sensor System Network Topology 
Measurement information provided by various navigation sensor systems can 
be independent, redundant, complementary or cooperative. For example, gyroscope 
set and accelerometer set, each individually providing independent measurements, 
are integrated in an IMU to provide complementary and cooperative information that 
are used to derive the navigation states. Multiple IMUs then offer redundant inertial 
measurements. AHRS and Doppler radar together present cooperative information 
while GPS and IMU are complementary navigational sensor systems. By structuring 
different types (also known as dissimilar) of and redundant (also known as similar) 
navigation sensor systems in a rational sensor network topology, these various types 
of measurement information can be combined to achieve the required navigation 
performance and to provide the inertial vector state information required by other 
avionics systems. 
Sensor system network topology is a collection of various sensor systems and 
explains logical relationships and physical interconnections between these sensor 
systems. There are two typical avionics system architectures today widely used in 
civil and military aircraft of all types, known as the federated and integrated modular 
avionics (IMA) architectures[120-122]. The federated avionics systems have a topology 
architecture, as shown in Figure 5.1a where subsystems are encapsulated in various 
special-purpose hardware units, known as line replaceable units (LRU), to implement 
their individual avionic functions, such as navigation and flight control. These LRUs 
share the use of common data buses for data transmission between themselves. For 
example, ARINC 429 (single-transmitter multiple-receiver) and 629 (multiple access 
data bus) topology buses are usually used for the federated architecture. 
Although the federated architecture has its inherent fault tolerance, it does not 
efficiently make use of today’s powerful computer processing modules and needs to 
develop costly special-purpose hardware systems. With technology advancements in 
avionics integration and modularity designs of hardware and software systems, the 
concept of integrated modular avionics (IMA) has been presented for the purpose of 
developing more reliable and cost-effective, modular and highly integrated avionics 
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systems. Various IMA implementation architectures are described in ARINC 651, 
‘Design Guidance for Integrated Modular Avionics’. Instead of single-function black 
boxes (LRUs), an IMA cabinet contains several line replaceable modules (LRM) and 
avionics functions are implemented with common, programmable modules which are 
software-reconfigured to process many different LRU functions. Therefore, LRMs 
are shared resources for different avionics functions. Several IMA cabinets can be 
interconnected to sensor systems by high speed data buses to form a distributed 
system for performing all avionics functions on the aircraft. A typical IMA star 
topology is shown in Figure 5.1(b) where data transmission between IMAs is through 
switch units. Although ARINC 629 topology bus is used in some current IMA-based 
avionics systems, its main limitations are lower data rate and expensive components. 
Future IMA architecture will be based on faster commercial networking data buses, 
such as full duplex Ethernet (FDX). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Avionics topology Architectures 
With the introduction of high speed avionics data buses and integrated modular 
avionics systems and the advent of low-cost, small-size, low-mass navigation 
sensors, high-speed and embedded microprocessors, it is feasible to install redundant 
inertial sensors in a single IMU box using a non-orthogonal configuration in order to 
improve the system reliability and to reduce the cost, size and mass of aircraft 
navigation systems. In this thesis, two forms of sensor network topologies used in the 
design of aircraft multisensor navigation systems are discussed as follows: 
• A distributed sensor system architecture 
• A clustered sensor system architecture  
(a) Federated Topology (b) Distributed Star Topology 
LRU 
Coupler  
IMA 
Switch  
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In the distributed sensor system architecture topology, multiple sensor systems 
are spatially distributed at different locations in an aircraft for the implementation of 
different functions. This architecture topology is compatible with the new generation 
of avionics IMA and can enhance the fault tolerance and the survivability of aircraft 
navigation systems. 
In the clustered architecture topology, multiple inertial sensors are assembled 
into a single box to provide redundant inertial information. This architecture grants 
fault tolerance and is usually used to create redundant inertial measurement units. 
Multiple clustered sensor systems located at different locations in an aircraft form a 
distributed sensor network system.  
5.2.1 Distributed Sensor System Architecture 
Distributed sensor system architectures may have different topological forms 
dependent on the data flow control and communication between the nodes of sensor 
system networks. Individual data fusion filtering algorithms have to be developed to 
adapt to those diverse architectures, as identified in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
In this thesis, a distributed inertial network architecture is proposed, as shown 
in Figure 5.2 where each node represents an individual sensing place and consists of 
an IMU suite and an embedded microprocessor module. This architecture is a fully 
connected topology and allows multi-source sensor data to be fused at each network 
node. Each IMU suite can be integrated with other navaid systems. Each node is 
assumed to be in communication with others so that information from each node can 
be shared in the network architecture. The node located at the aircraft centre of 
gravity (cg) is a master node, also referred to as cg node, and others are local nodes, 
known as slave modes. The data fusion filter located at the cg (known as the cg filter) 
provides the navigation states and the cg inertial state vector while the data fusion 
filters located at slave nodes (known as the slave filters) provide the local inertial 
state vector information.  
Motivation to investigate this distributed inertial network architecture is based 
on two critical necessities; the inertial sensor system is an essential aircraft sensor 
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system that provides vital inertial information for all safety-critical avionic systems, 
including navigation system and flight control system. Additionally, fault tolerance 
of aircraft navigation system is primarily obtained from redundant inertial systems.  
 
 
 
 
(a) Fully Connected Topology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Physical Interconnections 
Figure 5.2 Distributed Inertial Network Architecture 
This distributed inertial system network affords the following advantages: 
• Fault tolerance and robustness to sensor/system failures. Data fusion 
algorithms are designed so that the failure of any node or element of the 
node will not lead to the degradation of the performance of aircraft 
navigation system. Moreover, the degradation of the performance of the 
slave filter located at the failed node will be gradual. 
• Flexibility. It is easy to add and/or remove one or more sensor systems in 
and from the distributed system network. 
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• Highly reliable cg state estimation. The cg data fusion filter combines all 
local estimates and its own estimate to obtain the aircraft cg motion states, 
which are used to support aircraft navigation, flight control and guidance, 
and other functions that require the cg referenced data 
• Accurate local state estimation. Local data fusion filter located at each 
mode fuses all measurements from all healthy sensor systems to afford 
optimal estimates of the local states that are used to support the stabilisation 
of various avionics system platforms and local motion compensation.  
• Automatic alignment. Because information is shared at all nodes, the 
distributed data fusion filters can autonomously use the local estimates at a 
node of high quality IMU to dynamically correct and align low quality 
IMUs at other nodes. Therefore, traditional inertial system alignment 
algorithms, for example, fine alignments and transfer alignments, are no 
longer necessary in distributed inertial network systems. In traditional 
alignment methods, aircraft is usually requested to perform some specified 
manoeuvres, which can increase risk especially to military aircraft and 
pilots. The elimination of the traditional alignment procedures allows 
aircraft to perform free flight and manoeuvres.  
Distributed data fusion algorithms and their significant advantages will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.2.2 Clustered Sensor Topology 
The clustered sensor topology has different configurations. Two approaches to 
the configuration of a redundant IMU system have been suggested in the past[71][72]. 
One is an orthogonal configuration shown in Figure 5.3(a) where the sensing axes of 
redundant inertial sensors are orthogonal or parallel with respect to the body axes. 
The other uses a non-orthogonal configuration relative to the body axes shown in 
Figure 5.3(b), referred to as skewed redundant IMU (SRIMU) configurations. In the 
orthogonal configuration, the inertial measurement sensed by one sensor mounted on 
one axis is independent of other measurements sensed by other sensors mounted on 
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other axes. Therefore, the orthogonal IMU measurements are decoupled along the 
orthogonal axes. 
In a non-orthogonal configuration, the measurement sensed by one sensor can 
be decomposed into three components along the orthogonal axes, red dash arrows 
shown in Figure 5.3(b). Therefore, the measured states are coupled with each other in 
the SRIMU measurements. This nature allows fewer sensors to be used in an SRIMU 
configuration in order to achieve system performance equivalent to the orthogonal 
IMU system. Although the orthogonal IMU system is a conventional configuration, it 
is not the most efficient way to exploit the benefits of redundant sensor systems in a 
fault-tolerant navigation system. The orthogonal configuration has been used in 
traditional fault-tolerant navigation systems and also appears in multisensor fusion 
navigation systems with distributed sensor network to simplify the system design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Sensor Installation Orientation 
SRIMU systems can most effectively make use of redundant measurements 
provided by multiple sensors and have various configuration geometries dependent 
on the number of sensors. The typical configuration geometries are based on regular 
polyhedrons in order to simplify the engineering implementation. Several geometries 
commonly used in redundant sensor configurations are summarised in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 Polyhedrons in Redundant Sensor Configurations 
Polyhedron Number of Faces Min Number of Sensors 
for Redundancy 
Cube 6 ≥ 4 
Cone (Pyramid) ≥ 4 ≥ 4 
Dodecahedron 12 6 
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5.2.3 Criteria for Optimal SRIMU Configurations 
In an SRIMU configuration, the orientation of each instrument axis is defined 
by its azimuth and elevation angles with respect to an orthogonal reference frame, 
such as the body frame. Let each axis of the instrument frame be presented by a unit 
vector is  along the sensing direction of sensor i , the unit vector can be defined in the 
orthogonal reference frame by 
kjis )(ElAzElAzEl iiiiii sin)sin()cos()cos()cos( ++=  (5.1) 
where the bold symbols kji  and , are three unit vectors along the corresponding axes 
of the reference frame )z ,y,x( bbb , the superscript i  denotes a sensor and its sensing 
axis, iEl  and iAz  are the elevation and azimuth angles of the instrument axis i  with 
respect to the reference frame, as shown in Figure 5.3(b).  
Provided that an SRIMU system encloses n  sensors, identified by n , ,3 ,2 ,1  , 
the failure-free measurement equations of the SRIMU system can be formulated as 
follows: 
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 (5.2a)  
or in vector form      Hm +=   (5.2b)  
where zyx  and , ωωω  are three measured quantities, such as accelerations or angular 
rates in the body frame, im  is the measurement of sensor i  and iv  is a Gaussian white 
noise with a zero-mean value and standard deviation iσ . The symbol presents the 
operation of dot product of two vectors. The matrix H  is known as the measurement 
or design matrix and describes the configuration of an SRIMU system. 
Applying a weighted least-squares estimator to Eq. (5.2b), the estimate of the 
measured state vector ˆ  is given by 
mCWmHWH)(H binstruT1Tˆ == −  (5.3) 
where W  is the weight matrix and binstruC  is referred to as the transformation matrix 
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from the inertial instrument frame to the body frame. 
Defining the estimate error vector  ˆ~ −= , then  
WHWH)(H
WHWH)(HWHHWH)(H
HWHWH)(H
WmHWH)(H
T1T
T1TT1T
T1T
T1T
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−−
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−−=
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ˆ
~
  (5.4) 
Therefore, the estimate error is the normal distribution and the covariance matrix of 
the estimate errors according to the covariance transfer law is given by 
1TT1TT )(])ˆ)(ˆ[(E)~(Var −−=−−= WHWRWH(HHWH)H  (5.5) 
where )(E TvvR =  is the noise covariance matrix. 
To simplify the analysis of performance of an SRIMU configuration, assume 
that all of sensor noises are independent and that the standard deviation of the noise 
for each sensor measurement is identical vσ , and if the weight matrix W  is taken as 
the inverse of R , then the covariance matrix of the estimate error becomes 
1T2 )(()~(Var −−− == HHH)RH 11T vσ   (5.6a) 
or is represented by the following normalised form 
1
2 )(
)~(Var
−
==Σ HH T
vσ
 (5.6b) 
The probability density function of the estimate error can be given by 
)
2
1
exp()2()( 12123~ xxx −Τ−− Σ−Σ= piωf  
Then, the locus of the point x is determined by 
K=Σ−Τ xx 1  
This represents an error ellipsoid with a surface of constant likelihood. For any K, the 
volume of this ellipsoid is given by[123] 
Σ= pi23
3
4 KV  
From the analysis above, the smaller the volume of this ellipsoid, the smaller the 
estimate errors, and the performance of navigation systems with various SRIMU 
configurations can be determined by Σ .  
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Defining a performance index (PI) as 
])[( 1T −=Σ= HHDetPI   (5.7) 
This equation can be used to determine the azimuth and elevation angles of each 
sensor to construct an optimal SRIMU configuration. If the square root of the trace of 
the normalised covariance matrix is selected as a criterion to optimise an SRIMU 
configuration, known as the geometric dilution of precision (GDOP), then  
])[( 1T −= HHtrGDOP   (5.8) 
On the basis of the criterion of minimum GDOP, Sturza[78] analyses the optimal 
installation angles for several cone configurations. However, this criterion cannot be 
applied to non-cone SRIMU configurations. To evaluate the optimal performance of 
non-cone SRIMU configurations, the estimate error variances of the measured states 
in the body frame from Eq. (5.4) can be formulated as follows. 
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Based on the assumption that all measurement noises have an identical variance 
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where ),(binstru jiC  is the corresponding element of binstruC . 
Accordingly, the criterion for determining the optimal SRIMU installation 
angles is based on the allocation of the uncertainty of SRIMU measurement to three 
orthogonal reference axes, usually the body axes. For example, to precisely sense 
aircraft motion along a specific body-axis direction, the criterion for minimising the 
corresponding )(iNσ  can be used to determine the SRIMU installation angles. To 
allocate the uncertainty of SRIMU measurement equally to three body axes, then the 
following criteria 
)z()y()x( NNN σσσ ==   (5.11) 
can be selected to determine the SRIMU installation angles. 
Based on these optimal criteria given in Eqs. (5.7) to (5.11), several SRIMU 
configurations shown in Figure 5.4 are evaluated and the results are summarised in 
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Tables 5-2 and 5-3. If one sensor in the 5-sensor cone configuration in Figure 5.4(c) 
is aligned with an orthogonal axis, Figure 5.4(c) will be degraded into the similar 
configuration shown in Figure 5.4(b). 
However, the above criteria cannot guarantee that sensor failure detection and 
isolation methods based on these optimal SRIMU configurations also have optimal 
performance. It will be revealed in the development of sensor failure detection and 
isolation methods that the initial installation azimuth angle of the first sensor in a 
symmetrical SRIMU configuration should not be zero. Accordingly, this requirement 
has to be considered as one restriction to construct a skewed redundant IMU system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Redundant Sensor Configurations 
Comparing the fourth and fifth columns of Tables 5-2 and 5-3, separately, if 
sensor failures occurred, optimal configurations many not obtain better measurement 
accuracy in comparison with a non-optimal configuration. Therefore, the selection of 
an SRIMU configuration is a tradeoff between failure detection performance and 
measurement accuracy under conditions of no sensor failures and sensor failures. 
bz
by
bx
No sensor aligned with the reference 
axis z 
One sensor aligned with the 
reference axis z 
bz
by
bx
by
bx
bz
by
bx
by
bx
1 
4 
3 
5 
2 
(a) 4-Sensor Cube (b) 4-Sensor Cone (c) 5-Sensor Cone 
2 
by
bx
3 
4 
1 
 SENSOR NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND FDI METHODS 
 
5.2 Sensor System Network Topology 
 116 
Table 5-2 Comparisons of Two 4-Sensor SRIMU Configurations 
Configuration  Accuracy of  
State Estimates 
Accuracy Degradation Az = El = 450 
 
Cube 
El = 35.26440 
Az = 450 
9129.0)( =iNσ  
z y, x,=i  
When any one on three 
orthogonal axes has failed, 
zy,x,  ,2361.2)( == iiNσ  
ijjN ≠=   ,0.1)(σ  
9354.0x)( =Nσ  
9354.0y)( =Nσ  
8660.0z)( =Nσ  
 
Cone 
El = 35.26440 
Az = any 
8660.0)( =iNσ  
z y, x,=i  
When any one has failed 
2247.1z)( =Nσ  
Dependent on which sensor,  
8660.0or  5.1x)( =Nσ  
5.1or  8660.0y)( =Nσ  
In the case of Az =450  
zy,x,  ,2247.1)( == iiNσ  
0.1x)( =Nσ  
0.1)y( =Nσ  
7071.0z)( =Nσ  
Table 5-3 Comparisons of Several 5-Sensor SRIMU Configurations 
Configuration Accuracy of State 
Estimates1 
Accuracy Degradation when 
any one has failed 
Azimuth =45° 
When any sensor on 
cone failed 
Cone 
El = 35.26440 
Az = any 
7746.0)( =iNσ  
z y, x,=i  
3416.1=DGOP  
Max 0954.1=Nσ  
Min 7746.0=Nσ  
6432.1=DGOP  
 
 
Cone + Spin2 
El = 24.09290 
Az = any 
7746.0)( =iNσ  
z y, x,=i  
3416.1z =DGOP  
Max 2248.1=Nσ  
Min 7746.0=Nσ  
6432.1=DGOP  
9874.0)x( =Nσ  
9874.0)y( =Nσ  
8660.0)z( =Nσ  
6432.1=DGOP  
 
Cone + x-Axis3 
El = 38.18760 
Az = any 
6688.0)x( =Nσ  
8996.0)y( =Nσ  
8087.0)z( =Nσ  
3823.1x =DGOP  
Dependent on the failed 
sensor 
Max 5582.1=Nσ  
Min 6688.0=Nσ  
Min 5076.1x =DGOP  
Max 0454.2x =DGOP  
7862.0)x( =Nσ  
1699.1)y( =Nσ  
0517.1)z( =Nσ  
7586.1x =DGOP  
 
Cone + y-Axis4 
El = 38.18760 
Az = any 
8996.0)x( =Nσ  
6688.0)y( =Nσ  
8087.0)z( =Nσ  
3823.1y =DGOP  
The same as above 1699.1)x( =Nσ  
7862.0)y( =Nσ  
0517.1)z( =Nσ  
7586.1y =DGOP  
                                                 
1
 GDOP is also used to describe the geometry of redundant inertial sensor configurations as in satellite 
constellations. 
2
 One of sensors is aligned with the spin axis of a cone configuration, or the z-axis of the body frame. 
3
 One of sensors is aligned with the x-axis of the body frame. 
4
 One of sensors is aligned with the y-axis of the body frame . 
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5.2.4 Reliability Analysis of SRIMU Configurations 
As stated in the above section, the use of SRIMU configurations can obtain the 
fault tolerance and reliability of aircraft navigation systems. To compare reliabilities 
of various configuration SRIMU systems, assume that all sensors are single degree-
of-freedom sensors and the failure rate λ  of each sensor is constant and identical for 
each type of inertial sensor. Then the reliability function of inertial sensor is given by 
R t e t( ) = −λ   (5.12) 
and the MTBF(mean time between failures) is defined as 
MTBF R t dt= =
∞
 ( )0
1
λ   (5.13) 
The reliability of the redundant sensor system is given by the following equation 
R t R t C R t R t C R t R tsensor
n
n
n n
n
n m n m m( ) [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] ... [ ( )] [ ( )]= + − + + −− − − −1 1 1 1   (5.14) 
where  
C n
n m m
n
m
=
−
!
( )! !  
n is the number of sensors in the redundant configuration and m is the number of 
allowable failure sensors in the redundant system.  
Therefore, the reliability of an SRIMU system is given by 
)()()( tRtRtR AccelGyroSRIMU ⋅=  (5.15) 
For the orthogonal configuration in a conventional IMU, the reliability and MTBF 
are given by 
t
Gyro etR
λ3
3 )( −− =  
λ3
1
3 =−GyroMTBF  
For the configurations shown in Figure 5.5, the reliability figures and MTBF values 
are computed and normalised with respect to the GyroMTBF −3  value. The results are 
summarised in Table 5-4 where the reliability increases with the ratio. From 
inspection of Table 5-4, the reliability of an SRIMU configuration depends on the 
number of redundant sensors and the failure rate of sensor. The accuracy of SRIMU 
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measurements relies on the sensor installation configurations. 
In the dodecahedron configuration shown in Figure 5.5(g), each of six sensors 
is separately mounted along the axis of each pair of parallel faces. The configuration 
in Figure 5.5(h) is a combination of 3-sensor cone and 3-sensor cube configurations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (a) 4-Sensor Cone     (b) 5-Sensor Cone  (c) 6-Sensor Cone 
Cone Configurations without One Cone Axis Sensor 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) 4-Sensor Cone  (e) 5-Sensor Cone  (f) 6-Sensor Cone  
Cone Configurations with One Cone Axis Sensor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(g) Dodecahedron   (h) 3-Sensor Cone + 3-Sensor Cube 
Figure 5.5 SRIMU Configurations 
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Table 5-4 Reliabilities of Several SRIMU Configurations 
Sensor 
Configuration 
Elevation 
(deg) 
Azimuth 
(deg) 
MTBF Ratio PI Fault Tolerance5 
3-sensor orthogonal   
λ3
1
 
1   
4-Sensor Cube as in 
Figure 5.4(a) 
35.264 45 
λ12
7
 
1.75 0.7071 Fail Safe 
4-Sensor Cone as in 
Figure 5.5(a) 
35.264 45 
90 λ12
7
 
1.75 0.6495 
0.6495 
Fail Safe 
4-Sensor Cone as in 
Figure 5.5(d) 
19.472 120 
λ12
7
 
1.75 0.6495 Fail Safe 
5-Sensor Cone as in 
Figure 5.5(b) 
35.264 72 
λ60
47
 
2.35 0.4648 Fail Op/Fail Safe 
5-Sensor Cone as in 
Figure 5.5(e) 
24.092 90 
λ60
47
 
2.35 0.4648 Fail Op/Fail Safe 
6-Sensor Cone as in 
Figures 5.5(c), 
Anyone sensor failed, 
2 adjacent sensors failed, 
2 skipping sensors failed 
35.264 60 
λ60
57
 
2.86 0.3536 
 
0.5000 
0.9487 
0.7071 
Fail Op/Fail Op/Fail Safe 
 
Fail Op/Fail Safe 
Fail Safe 
Fail Safe 
6-Sensor Cone as in 
Figures 5.5(f), 
Anyone sensor failed, 
Any two sensors failed, 
26.564 72 
λ60
57
 
2.86 0.3536 
 
0.5000 
0.7906 
Fail Op/Fail Op/Fail Safe 
 
Fail Op/Fail Safe 
Fail Safe 
Dodecahedron as in 
Figures 5.5(g), 
One sensor failed, 
Any two sensors failed 
31.717 90 
λ60
57
 
2.86 0.3536 
 
0.5000 
0.7906 
Fail Op/Fail Op/Fail Safe 
 
Fail Op/Fail Safe 
Fail Safe 
6-Sensor Cube as in 
Figure 5.5(h), 
Anyone sensor failed, 
Any two sensors (in the 
same set) failed, 
Two sensors (in 
different sets) failed 
35.264 120 
λ60
57
 
2.86 0.3536 
 
0.5000- 
0.7071 
 
0.7071- 
1.2247 
Fail Op/Fail Op/Fail Safe 
 
Fail Op/Fail Safe 
Fail Safe 
 
Fail Safe 
5.3 SRIMU Calibration 
Consider the main sensor errors, including drifts, sensor misalignments and 
scalar factor errors, the compensated SRIMU measurement model corresponding to 
Eq. (5.2b) becomes  
GmmSHm ++++= SFD  (5.16) 
                                                 
5
 Fault tolerance in this table is characterised by Fail safe and Fail Operational. Fail safe means that 
the sensor system can issue alarm information and interrupts its work if one sensor has failed. Fail 
operational means that the sensor system continues its work even if one sensor has failed.  
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where D  is an n -dimensional sensor drift vector, SFS  is an nn× -dimensional 
diagonal matrix, defining scale factor errors and G  is an nn× -dimensional matrix, 
containing sensor misalignments. These errors can be estimated and corrected by 
using external aiding measurements in a multisensor navigation system to improve 
the accuracy of the navigation system and also the performance of sensor failure 
detection and isolation functions. The misalignment matrix G , which has a well-
known formulation for the orthogonal sensor configuration, has to be redefined for 
an SRIMU configuration. 
The misalignments between the designed installation axis and the actual sensor 
sensing axis can be represented by two small disturbances of azimuth and elevation 
angles iAzδ and iElδ , as shown in Figure 5.6 where 
is  and is~  are unit vectors along 
the designed and actual instrument axes. The practical installation angles are defined 
as follows: 
iEl
ii ElEl δ+= 0   (5.17) 
iAz
ii AzAz δ−= 0  (5.18)  
where iAz0 and 
iEl0  are the designed installation azimuth and elevation angles of the 
instrument axis i , respectively, as shown in Figure 5.3(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Definitions of Sensor Misalignments 
Furthermore, the perturbation form of Eq. (5.2b), caused by sensor misalignments, 
can be expressed as  
by  
bx  
bz  
iAzδ  
iElδ  
is  
is~  
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HHmm +∆+=∆+ )(  (5.19) 
Therefore, 
Hm ∆=∆  (5.20) 
From Appendix H, the total SRIMU measurement error in the instrument frame is  
ElAzSFD
instru )(Diag)(Diag)Diag( m Σ+Π++=∆
 (5.21) 
mCbinstru=Π , m	Cbinstru=Σ  
where )  ,( ElAzxx =  are the misalignment angle vectors, SF  is an n -dimensional 
scale factor error vector, )(mDiag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the SRIMU 
measurement vector m , )(ΠDiag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the vector Π  , 
()Diag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of its element, the elements of the matrix 	  
correspond to the coefficients of the elevation misalignments in 
∆  and the elements 
of   are the coefficients of the azimuth misalignments in 
∆ . 
These SRIMU error terms are normally estimated by means of appropriate data 
fusion filters in multisensor navigation systems. As analysed in Section 4.3, however, 
the sensor error states are formulated in the navigation frame to simplify the system 
error models. For example, w∇  appearing in the velocity error model of Eq. (4.31) 
and w∆  in the tilt error model of Eq. (4.40) are described in the navigation frame. 
Accordingly, instru∆  has to be transferred into  n∆  as follows: 
ElAz diagCCDiagCC
mCCCC
)()(             
)Diag(
b
instru
n
b
b
instru
n
b
SF
b
instru
n
bD
b
instru
n
b
n
Σ+Π+
+=∆
 (5.22) 
This equation can be used to determine the sub-matrixes of the system state transition 
matrix in data fusion filter, which are related to the SRIMU sensor error terms. Once 
the SRIMU sensor errors are estimated, Eq. (5.16) can also be used as the calibration 
equation to correct the SRIMU measurements. 
The main advantage of SRIMU configurations is that the minimum redundant 
sensors are needed in order to form a fault-tolerant navigation system, decreasing the 
size and weight of the SRIMU system. Fault tolerance can be achieved by the design 
of reliable failure detection isolation algorithms. FDI problems will be discussed in 
the following sections 
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5.4 Basic GLRT Method 
The generalised likelihood ratio test (GLRT) approach to the detection of jump 
change in linear systems is proposed by Willsky and Jones[85]. Since that, various 
improved versions of GLRT algorithms have been developed to detect measurement 
failures in GPS and SRIMU systems[75-80]. Basic GLRT method for SRIMU FDI is 
introduced as follows.  
From the SRIMU measurement model given by Eq. (5.2b) and the GNSS 
measurement model given by Eq. (4.54), these measurement equations, in normal 
operating conditions, can be unified into a normalised form as follows: 
Hm +=  (5.23) 
where m  is an −n dimensional measurement vector,   is a measured state vector 
and its dimension depends on the GNSS and SRIMU systems. For example,   is a 
3-demensional vector for an SRIMU system and is a 4-dimensional vector for the 
GNSS, H  is an measurement matrix of proper dimensions,   is an −n dimensional 
measurement noise with zero mean and covariance R . The variances of all sensor 
measurement noises are hereafter assumed to be identical, that nn×= R 
2
υσ . 
Because the number of measurements in an n-sensor SRIMU configuration is 
larger than the dimension of the measured state vector, these n measurements are 
linearly dependent. Without consideration of the measurement errors, there exists a 
set of scalars, at least one of which is non-zero, such that  
0P =	 i
n
i
i m    (5.24) 
Eq. (5.24) is generally known as a parity equation. There are )!3(!3
!
−n
n
 different 
parity equations although not all the parity equations are independent. The number of 
independent parity equations is equal to the number of redundant measurements. The 
matrix, consisting of the coefficients of n-3 linearly independent parity equations, is 
known as a parity matrix P . Therefore, Eq. (5.24) can be rewritten in matrix form as 
follows: 
0Pm =  (5.25) 
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The left-hand side of Eq. (5.25) is referred to as a parity vector and can be used to 
examine the consistency of the SRIMU measurements. 
From Eqs. (5.23) and (5.25), a parity matrix P  can be constructed to satisfy the 
following constraints: 
• 0PH =  
• P  has 3−n  linearly independent row vector. Therefore, the parity space is 
an orthogonal space. 
• IPP =T  to simplify the detection and isolation functions. This condition 
normalises each row of the parity matrix. 
• 
T1TT )( HHHHPP −−= . The relationship is proved in Appendix I. 
Considering the normal measurement noise, the parity vector is 
PPPHxPmp =+==0  (5.26) 
This failure-free parity vector is a Gaussian white noise of zero mean and covariance 
as follows: 
T2T
p
T
00
0
][
0][
PPPPRRpp
p
 υσ===
==
E
E
 (5.27) 
5.4.1 Detection Procedure 
Assume that sensor failure mode is a jump change with unknown sign and 
amplitude; the faulty SRIMU measurement equation can be modelled as follows:  
bHm ++=  (5.28) 
where b  is an n -dimensional failure vector and ib  is a nonzero element if the
  i th 
sensor has failed, otherwise 0b =i . 
Therefore, the parity vector under failure conditions becomes 
0pPbPPbp +=+=f   (5.29) 
This failure parity vector is a Gaussian white noise of nonzero mean and the same 
covariance as the failure-free parity vector. Therefore,  
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T2T
p
T ][
][
PPPPRRpp
Pbp
 υσ===
==
ff
f
E
E
 (5.30) 
From Eqs. (5.27) and (5.30),  the statistics of the parity vector p  is summarised as 
follows 



=
failure   :        ,
failure no:         ,0][
1
0
H
H
E

p      
The probability density functions of the Gaussian distributed parity vector under 
these two hypotheses are given by  
])(
2
1
exp[)2()( 1T2T2
1
T22
3
0 pPPpPPp
−
−
−
−
−= υυ σσpi
n
Hf  
)]()()(
2
1
exp[)2()( 1T2T2
1
T22
3
1 pPPpPPp −−−=
−
−
−
−
υυ σσpi
n
Hf  
The log likelihood ratio for the two hypotheses is given by 
)]()()()([
2
1
)(
)(
ln)( 1T2T1T2T
0
1
pPPppPPp
p
p
p −−−== −− υυ σσλ Hf
Hf
 (5.31) 
The maximum likelihood estimate ˆ  of   is the value, which maximises )(pλ . 
Because two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (5.31) are positive, the maximum 
value of )(pλ  occurs if and only if p =ˆ . 
2
T
1T2T
max 2
)(
2
1)(
υσ
σλ pppPPpp == −v  (5.32) 
Therefore, the decision function for detection is defined as  
ppT=DFD  (5.33) 
Given a pre-specified detection threshold η , the detection decision can be stated as 
follows: 
• If  η>DFD , then sensor failures have occurred. 
• If  η≤DFD , then no sensor failures have occurred. 
However, when two or more sensor failures occur simultaneously, the failure parity 
vector can be represented as 
jjii bPbP ,, +=p  
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where i,P  and j,P  are the i
th
 and jth  columns of the parity matrix P , respectively. The 
detection function takes the following form. 
ji,jijj,jiii
jiijii
DFD
bbPP2bPPbPP         
)bPbP()bPbP(         
T
,
2
,
T2
,
T
,
j,,
T
j,,
T
++=
++=
= pp
 
The first two items on the right-hand side of the above equation are positive. But the 
sign of the last item is uncertain because the signs and amplitudes of the failures are 
arbitrary. If the last item is positive, the test statistic generated through this detection 
function will increase and the detection decision may give a false alarm because of 
the accumulation of small biases in individual sensors. On the other hand, if the last 
item is negative, the inverse situation may lead to a missed detection. Therefore, this 
detection function cannot guarantee a reliable detection decision on sensor failures 
when two sensor failures happened simultaneously. In addition, if the noise level is 
close to the parity residual level, a sensor failure may also become undetectable from 
Eq. (5.32). These shortcomings have to be overcome in order to improve the 
performance of the GLRT algorithms. 
5.4.2 Isolation Procedure 
Failure isolation is to identify those failed sensors after the detection procedure 
has declared that sensor failures have occurred. As assumed in the above section, the 
failure parity vector is a nonzero mean Gaussian random variable and a unique 
nonzero element ib  is contained in the failure vector b  in Eq. (5.29). The associated 
likelihood function for the failure hypothesis is given by 
)]bP()()bP(
2
1)(ln)b(
,
1T2T
1 iivi,ii KHf −−−== − pPPpp σλ  (5.34) 
Because the matrix TPP  is symmetric, the maximum likelihood estimate ibˆ  of the 
failure magnitude ib  is 
ni
ii
i
i ,,2,1   ,P)(P
))(P(
bˆ
,
1TT
,
1TT
,
==
−
−
PP
pPP
 (5.35) 
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Substituting ibˆ  into Eq. (5.34), the maximum likelihood value is given by 
ii
i
i Kb
,
1TT
,
21TT
,
2
1TT
2max P)(P
))((
2
1)(
2
1)(
−
−
−
Ρ
+−=
PP
pPP
pPPp
υυ σσ
λ   (5.36) 
The first two terms in the left-hand side of Eq.(5.36) are constant for all sensors but 
the third term depends on the orientation of sensors. Therefore, the decision function 
for isolation is defined by  
niDFI
ii
i
ii
i
i ,,2,1   ,PP
)P(
P)(P
))(P(
,
T
,
2T
,
,
1TT
,
21TT
,
===
−
− p
PP
pPP
 (5.37) 
The isolation decision is made as follows: 
• If the i th  sensor has the maximum value of iDFI , then it is declared failed. 
From Eq. (5.35), this isolation procedure can also be used to estimate the failed 
sensor signals. The basic GLRT algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
In summary, the GLRT detection function given by Eq. (5.33) is only used to 
detect a single sensor failure of a jump change and it cannot simultaneously detect 
two or more sensor failures. This detection function cannot unambitiously detect 
sensor failures when the measurement noise level is close to the parity residual level. 
In addition, the basic GLRT method cannot detect time-varying failures. 
From Eq. (5.16), when aircraft is experiencing a high dynamic or manoeuvring 
motion, the measurement errors caused by scale factor and sensor misalignments will 
contribute the sensor failures. Consequently, the product of the parity matrix and the 
measurement matrix is not zero but depends on the measured states. If these 
measurement errors are not compensated or corrected, false decisions may be made 
by the decision functions. 
Therefore, to improve the sensor FDI performance in terms of the probabilities 
of false alarm and missed alarm, it is necessary to develop innovative methods to 
compensate for normal sensor measurement errors and to obtain a sufficiently large 
failure signal-to-noise ratio before the detection procedure is performed. 
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Figure 5.7 Basic GLRT Algorithm Structure 
5.5 SRIMU Error Compensation Filter 
This section develops and designs SRIMU error compensation filters, which 
can be used to compensate for the measurement errors caused by normal sensor error 
sources. As a result, the performance of the basic GLRT algorithms and the accuracy 
of the SRIMU measurements can be improved. 
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5.5.1 SRIMU Error Dynamics 
The generalised SRIMU measurement equation is rewritten as follows:  
GmmSHm ++++= SFD  (5.38) 
In theory, the dynamics of these error sources given in the above equation can be 
modelled by a combination of random constant, random walk and exponentially 
correlated random processes[124]. The random constant process is used to model the 
SRIMU measurement errors caused by sensor long-term bias and misalignments. The 
first-order discrete Gauss-Markov process models the measurement errors caused by 
combination of the scale factor error and time-dependent sensor drifts. The random 
walk process models those short-term time-dependent errors. 
Therefore, for each sensor, the error terms given in Eq. (5.38) are modelled as 
follows:   
iiii
WTBD δδδδ ++=         
0B =
iδ           
ii
WW υδ =          
iiii
TTTT υδβδ +−=  
iiii
SFSFSFSF υδβδ +−=        
0
Az
=iδ   
0El =iδ   
where the sensor drift Dδ  is decomposed into a constant bias error Bδ , a time-
dependent drift error Tδ  and a random walk process Wδ .  
From Eq. (5.22), three additional states are needed to relate the above sensor 
error states to the resultant navigation state errors. The three additional states are 
modeled as follows: 
n
x ∆=  (5.39) 
An SRIMU consists of two types of sensor set, accelerometer set and gyroscope set. 
Therefore, two SRIMU compensation filters are needed to separately compensate for 
the accelerometer and gyro sets. Combining the above sensor error dynamic models 
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and considering (5.22), the dynamic model of each SRIMU compensation filter can 
be formulated as follows: 
)()()1()1( kkkk wxx ++Φ=+   (5.40) 
where x  is a 36 +n -dimensional SRIMU error state vector, as explained above, )(kΦ  
is a state-transition matrix and it elements are determined by the coefficients of the 
above sensor error dynamic models, and )(kw is a white noise sequence of zero mean 
and variance )(kQ . 
Through combination of the SRIMU measurements, three forms of the SRIMU 
measurement residual equations can be developed as the observables of the SRIMU 
compensation filters, separately known as the least-squares measurement, the state-
free measurement and the parity vector residual equation. In addition, the aircraft 
velocity and attitude information can also be obtained from navaid systems, for 
example a multifunctional GNSS receiver or other IMUs located at other nodes in the 
distributed inertial network system. Therefore, two additional observable equations 
can be generated, known as the velocity and attitude residual equations, respectively. 
5.5.2 Least-Squares Residual Equation 
This method is based on the estimate of the measured state vector. Using a 
least-squares (LS) estimate given by Eq. (5.3), the LS residual vector is given by 
WGmmSHmmmm +++=−=−=∆ SFDˆˆLS  (5.41) 
where T1T )( HHHHIW −−=  is a weighted matrix for the measurement noises and is 
introduced by the least-squares estimator. 
From Eqs. (5.21) and (5.41), the LS-based measurement residual equation is 
formulated as follows:  
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From Eq. (5.41), it should be noted that if the state estimates are based on failed 
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sensors, the estimate errors will contribute to the measurement residuals and may 
decrease the sensitivity of the detection function to actual sensor failures. 
5.5.3 State-Free Measurement Equation 
This method is based on the linear transformation to the SRIMU measurement 
equation given by Eq. (5.38).  
Defining T1TT )( HHHHPPU −−==   
then U  is an nn× -dimensional symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix because the 
rank of PPT  is the same as the rank of P . Premultiplying the two sides of Eq. (5.38) 
by U , the state-free measurement equation is 
UUGmmUSUUmm +++==∆ SFDSF   (5.43) 
From Eq. (5.21), the above equation can be formulated as follows: 
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This formulation of the measurement equation eliminates errors caused by estimating 
the measured state vector. 
5.5.4 Parity Residual Equation 
The parity residual equation is derived by directly using the parity vector as the 
filter measurement. Performing a linear transformation to the SRIMU measurement 
vector from the measurement space to the parity space, then 
PPGmmPSPPmp +++== SFD  (5.45) 
From Eq. (5.21), the above equation can be normalised as follows: 
[ ] P




DiagDiagmDiagPp +












ΣΠΙ=
El
Az
SF
B
)()()(
 (5.46) 
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5.5.5 Velocity Residual Equation 
For the accelerometer error compensation filter, the velocity residual equation 
is driven on the basis of the difference between the SRIMU-driven velocity SRIMUv  
and the navaid-driven velocity or other SRIMU-driven velocity NAVAIDv . 
SRIMUNAVAIDv vvTv −≡δ  (5.47) 
where vT  is a velocity transformation matrix from other SRIMU node frame to the 
detected SRIMU frame.  
From Eqs. (5.22) and (5.39), the velocity residual equation is given by  
noise-v-NAVAIDv xv +=δ  (5.48) 
where noise-v-NAVAID  is the navaid-driven velocity solution noise. 
5.5.6 Attitude Residual Equation 
For the gyroscope error compensation filter, the attitude residual equation is 
generated by differencing the SRIMU-based attitude solution SRIMU  and the navaid-
based attitude solution or other IMU-driven attitude solution NAVAID . For example, a 
multifunctional GNSS receiver can output all of the navigation states. 
SRIMUNAVAID T  −≡δ  (5.49) 
where T  is an attitude transformation matrix from other SRIMU node frame to the 
detected SRIMU frame. 
From Eqs. (5.22) and (5.39), the attitude residual equation is given by  
noise-NAVAID −+= θθδ x  (5.50) 
where noise--GNSS θ  is the navaid-driven attitude solution noise. 
It should be noted that relationships created in Eqs. (5.47) and (5.49) enable 
the inertial and navigation state information in a distributed sensor network system 
be shared at all network nodes. This information sharing technique enhances both the 
performance of local sensor FDI functions and the fault tolerance of the distributed 
multisensor navigation system. The transformations in Eq (5.47) and (5.49) can be a 
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unit matrix when the SRIMU error compensation filters are located at the cg node 
and the velocity and attitude residual equations are based on the GNSS navigation 
solutions. 
5.5.7 SRIMU Error Compensated FDI Algorithm Structure 
In the case of normal SRIMU operation, the compensation filters estimate the 
SRIMU errors, including gyro and accelerometer errors, and these error estimates are 
used to correct raw SRIMU measurements. The corrected SRIMU measurements are 
then fed into a sequential moving-window GLRT to detect sensor failures. A 
modular architecture for the improved FDI algorithms is shown in Figure 5.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Modular Architecture of Improved FDI Algorithm 
5.6 Moving-Window GLRT Methods 
Traditionally, sequential FDI methods are based on the sequential probability 
ratio test (SPRT) developed by Wald, which use all the residual samples from the 
initial time to the current time. This detection method decreases the sensitivity to the 
detection of actual sensor failures as time progresses. A sequential moving-window 
GLRT (MW-GLRT) method is presented for detecting both jump and drift failures, 
which may degrade the performance of an SRIMU system. The structure of this 
moving-window GLRT is depicted in Figure 5.9. The parity residual vector or the 
measurement residual vector sequentially passes a first-in-first-out buffer of a length 
L , which generates a sequential test statistic. Failure detection is then performed by 
comparing this test statistic with a pre-specified threshold. 
 
SRIMU 
Outputs 
Residual 
Measurement 
Equations 
A Bank of SRIMU Error 
Compensation Filters 
SRIMU 
Compensator 
Sequential MW-
GLRT Algorithm 
SRIMU Error 
Model 
Compensated SRIMU 
Measurements 
 SENSOR NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND FDI METHODS 
 
5.6 Moving-Window GLRT Methods 
 133 
 
 
Figure 5.9 MW-GLRT Structure 
5.6.1 Sequential MW-GLRT Detection Procedure 
Consider that the normal SRIMU sensor errors have been largely corrected by 
means of the error compensation filters, the failed SRIMU measurement is modelled 
as follows: 
dbHm +++= )( kt  (5.51) 
where b  is a jump bias failure and )( ktd  is a random drift failure with unknown 
statistical characteristics. 
In this case, the failure detection is to check the maximum allowable jump bias 
failure and the maximum allowable drift rate failure. Considering the constraints on 
the parity matrix, and the statistical character of the parity vector, the parity vectors 
are a sequence of independent Gaussian random variables. A moving-window joint 
likelihood ratio function is given as follows: 
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Furthermore, 
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Two methods are used to define the sequential decision function for detection. 
One assumes a constant design value bˆ of the parity vector average i  within the L-
length window, which depends on the accuracy requirement to an SRIMU navigation 
system. The sequential detection function is then defined by  
)(kp         )1( +− Lkp  
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For each type of inertial sensors, the constant design value bˆ  is determined on 
the basis of the sensor statistics and allowable error, and has the sign of the moving 
window average value and an amplitude value as follows: 
])([)ˆ(
1
b 	
+−=
=
k
Lki
isignsign p  
tL ∆×=
=
Interval Time
errorangular  allowable maximum
ˆ b  
where t∆  is the sample interval of SRIMU outputs.  
Therefore, the change trend of )(Lkλ  is illustrated in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Detection Function for A Constant Design Value of i  
The detection rules are stated as follows: 
• If η≥)(kDFDL , then sensor failures have occurred.  
• If η<)(kDFDL , then no sensor failure has occurred. 
The other method defines the detection function on the basis of the maximum 
likelihood estimates of average of the sequential parity vectors. Assume the average 
value is an unknown constant   within the L-length window; from Eq. (5.52), the 
estimate of  , ˆ , is given by 
)(Lkλ  
k  
η  
bb
L
 ˆˆ
2
T
 
 SENSOR NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND FDI METHODS 
 
5.6 Moving-Window GLRT Methods 
 135 
	
+−=
=
k
Lki
i
L 1
)(1ˆ p  (5.55) 
The maximum likelihood ratio is 
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and the detection function is defined as 
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Therefore, the detection rules are stated as follows: 
• If η≥)(kDFDL , then failures occurred; 
• If η<)(kDFDL , then no failures occurred. 
The change trend of this detection function is illustrated in Figure 5.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Detection Function based on Estimate of Window Average 
From Eqs. (5.54) and (5.56), this sequential detection is easily affected by the 
measurement noise and the detection performance may be degraded with the increase 
of the noise variance, especially in less accurate, low-cost SRIMU system. Improved 
sequential MW GLRT methods will be introduced to overcome the above problem in 
the following sections. 
5.6.2 Sequential-Averaged Method 
In order to reduce the effects of measurement noise on the sequential residual 
signals, it is necessary to pre-process the original parity vector sequences to generate 
a new parity vector. This new parity vector or residual signal is then used to detect 
DFD 
k 
η  
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failures. A sequential averaged detection method is introduced in this section. This 
method sequentially averages the parity vector or residual signal sequences within a 
moving window. The sequential average value can be computed as follows:  
)]()([1)1(         
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Lkk
L
k
L
Lkkkk
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=
ppp
pppp 
 (5.58) 
)1()1( pp =  
This sequential average is also a Gaussian distributed random variable. Its mean is 
the same as the original parity vector, that is,  
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Assuming the parity vector sequences are independent, 0)]()([ T =jiE pp  )( ji ≠ , so 
that the above equation can be simplified as follows: 
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 (5.59) 
Therefore, this sequential-averaged method reduces the variance of the measurement 
noise and can remove high-frequency noise and wild-values. It can also identify the 
feature of the drift failures. The size of window should be chosen so that the 
influence of the measurement noise on the failure detection procedure can be largely 
decreased. As a result, it enhances the sensitivity of the detection algorithm to true 
drift failures. 
The detection of allowable maximum rate of the drift failure is usually needed 
in order to afford highly reliable angular rate data for flight control systems and other 
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avionics systems. To detect the drift rate of the drift failure )( ktd  in Eq. (5.51), the 
averaged parity vector is sequentially differenced and the results are averaged within 
the moving-window of a length L as a decision function for the detection of drift rate 
failures as follows: 
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where )(kLs  represents an average rate of the drift failure within the window. 
The norm of )(kLs  is defined as the decision function for detection of drift rate 
failure )()( kkDFD LL s= .  Given a drift rate threshold Dη , then the detection rules 
are described as follows:  
1. If DL kDFD η≥)( , then drift rate failures have occurred, 
2. Otherwise, no drift rate failure happened. 
5.6.3 Sequential-Averaged MW-GLRT Methods 
This improved method is a combination of the sequential MW-GLRT method 
and the sequential-averaged detection. To simplify the mathematical equations, the 
sequential average value is computed by the following equation, 
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Combining Eqs.(5.52) and (5.61), the normalised sequential likelihood ratio of 
the sequential moving-window average can be formulated by  
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where b is a constant design value dependent of the accuracy requirement for the 
SRIMU system. 
db Pb =  
))(())(( ksignksign b p =  
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where db  is a minimum SRIMU drift error, determined according to the accuracy 
requirement of an SRIMU system, and the sign of the elements of db  depends on the 
sign of the estimated measurement residuals. 
)]([)]([ d ksignksign mb ∆=  
Eq.(5.62) can be rewritten as follows 
)()1()( kkk piλλ +−=  (5.63) 
where 
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Because b  has the sign of )(kp , the above equation can also be expressed as 
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jNk , specifying 0)( ≡kpi . Therefore, )(kλ  is 
monotonously incremental function. This makes the sensor drift be rapidly detected.  
Accordingly, the sequential decision rule is  
• If p)( ηλ ≥n , then sensor failures have occurred at the time tNLt ∆∗= * . 
• Otherwise, no sensor failure happened. 
where pη  is a sequential detection threshold which is based on the probabilities of 
missed detection and false alarm and 2pp
1ln ση
FA
MD
P
P−
= .  
5.7 Summary 
This chapter introduced the topology architectures of sensor network systems, 
and developed methodologies for evaluation of various configurations of the skewed 
redundant inertial measurement units (SRIMUs) and for detection and isolation of 
sensor failures appearing in the SRIMUs. The main deliveries cover: 
1. Description of two forms of sensor system architectures: the distributed 
sensor system architecture and the clustered sensor system architecture. 
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2. Development of three criteria to evaluate optimal configurations of skewed 
redundant inertial systems in the clustered sensor system architecture, 
including minimum GDOP factor, identical variance errors along the three 
orthogonal body axes and optimal SRIMU FDI performance. Based on 
these criteria, coplanar sensor installations in SRIMUs should be avoided in 
order to obtain the maximum SRIMU FDI capability.  
3. Comparison of the performance of several SRIMU configurations, 
including their measurement accuracy and reliability. 
4. Development of the SRIMU error calibration algorithms for design of local 
Kalman filter and dynamic SRIMU error controls. 
5. Design of the SRIMU error compensation Kalman filters to improve the 
performance of the FDI algorithms and the accuracy of SRIMU systems.  
6. Development and improvement of the moving-window GLRT methods to 
detect three kinds of inertial sensor failure modes, including jump, time-
drift and drift rate failures.   
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Chapte r  6  
6 DISTRIBUTED DATA FUSION ALGORITHMS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops data fusion methodologies for distributed sensor network 
systems, including data fusion filter algorithms and integrity monitoring algorithms. 
Section 6.2 introduces general distributed fusion algorithms for several distributed 
sensor systems. Section 6.3 develops inertial network measurement models and also 
establishes dynamic relationships among inertial network nodes. Inertial network 
data fusion algorithms are developed in Section 6.4. Inertial network integrity 
monitoring algorithms are presented in Section 6.5. Finally, a summary is given in 
Section 6.6. 
6.2 Distributed Sensor Systems and Fusion Algorithms 
This section develops several forms of distributed fusion filter algorithms for 
differently distributed sensor systems. The dynamics of a distributed sensor network 
system can be described by one global dynamic model and N  local dynamic models 
where N  is the number of the nodes or the local sensor systems in a distributed 
sensor network system. Let the global system model be formulated as follows: 
)()()()()( 1111 −−−− += kkkkkk ttt,ttt wGxx  (6.1) 
)()()()( kkkk tttt xHz +=  (6.2) 
and the local system models be represented by   
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Nittt,ttt kikikikkiki ,,1     )()()()()( 1111 =+= −−−− wBxx  (6.3) 
Nitttt kikikiki ,,1                              )()()()( =+= xCz  (6.4) 
Because all the sensor systems are independent and their measurement noise is also 
independent of the measured quantities, the global measurement model given in Eq. 
(6.2) can be partitioned into the following block matrices or vectors.   
[ ]TTT2T1 )()()()( kNkkk tttt zzzz =  (6.5) 
[ ]TTT2T1 )()()()( kNkkk tttt  =  (6.6) 
[ ]TTT2T1 )()()()( kNkkk tttt 



 =  (6.7) 
[ ])()()()( 21 kNkkk tttblockdiagt RRRR =  (6.8) 
where iR  is the covariance matrix of the measurement noise i . 
The local system model is a practical dynamic model of a node or a local 
system in a distributed network system. The global system model can be either a true 
model of a practical distributed system or a virtual model, which is established in 
order to develop distributed data fusion algorithms. For example, in many target-
tracking systems, the global system models normally describe the dynamic motion of 
the tracked targets. In distributed control systems, a global system model may not 
exist although global optimisation is usually required. In an integrated aircraft 
navigation system with distributed sensor systems, the aircraft centre of gravity (cg) 
is a special location with respect to which many parameters or states used in aircraft 
navigation and flight control systems are defined. Therefore, the global system model 
of aircraft navigation system usually describes the dynamic motion of the aircraft 
centre of gravity and is approximated by the error dynamic model of an inertial 
system located at the cg. However, this is not necessarily true in a distributed inertial 
network system where each node has its own local dynamic model and a global 
model is not needed.  
In this thesis, the development of distributed data fusion filter algorithms is 
based on two principles. One is known as the global-to-local optimisation method 
and the other is referred to as the local-to-global optimisation method. In the global-
to-local optimisation method, the distributed local filters are designed on the basis of 
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optimisation of the global system model whereas in the local-to-global optimisation 
method, global optimisation is obtained by the optimisation of the local systems. 
Depending on the network communication modes and the characteristics of the 
node dynamic models, two classes of distributed fusion algorithms, referred to as 
state-identical distributed fusion algorithms and state-associated distributed fusion 
algorithms, are discussed in the following subsections. For each class of distributed 
fusion algorithm, several distributed fusion filters are developed for different sensor 
network systems. 
6.2.1 State-Identical Distributed Fusion Algorithms 
State-identical distributed fusion algorithms are developed for distributed 
sensor network systems where all the sensor systems are distributed but the observed 
object is identical. Depending on data communication modes among the network 
nodes, two types of distributed filter algorithms are analysed. The Type I algorithm is 
used for distributed systems using one-way communication, as shown in Figure 6.1 
where the arrows indicate the directions of data flow. The Type II algorithm applies 
to distributed systems using two-way communication, as shown in Figure 6.2. In 
both these distributed systems, all the sensor systems observe the same dynamic 
system. Therefore, all the local system models and the global system model are 
identical.  
The distributed network system model given by from Eqs. (6.1) to (6.4) can be 
simplified where the following assumptions apply: 
)()()( kkjki ttt xxx ≡=  
 ≡= ji  
)()()( kkjki ttt GBB ≡=  
)()()( kkjki ttt www ≡=  
)()( kiki tt HC =  
By following Hashemipour’s work[62], the distributed filter algorithms are derived as 
follows.  
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Figure 6.1 State-Identical One-Way Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 State-Identical Two-Way Model 
From the information form of the Kalman filter algorithm given in Chapter 3, 
the local estimates can be obtained and represented by the following forms: 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ 11 +−−− = kikkiki t,ttt xx  (6.9) 
)()()(),()(),()( 1T111T11 −−−−+−−− += kikikikkikikkiki ttttttttt BQBPP  (6.10) 
)()()()()( 111T −−+−− −= kikikikiki ttttt PPHRH  (6.11) 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ)()()()( 111T −−−++−− −= kikikikikikiki ttttttt xPxPzRH  (6.12) 
and the global time-update and measurement-update equations are as follows: 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ 11 +−−− = kkkk t,ttt xx  (6.13) 
)()()(),()(),()( 1T111T11 −−−−+−−− += kkkkkkkkk ttttttttt GQGPP  (6.14) 
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Substituting Eq. (6.11) into Eq. (6.15) and Eq. (6.12) into Eq. (6.16) generates 
the following global update equations 
)]()([)()( 1
1
1-11 −−
=
+−−+−
−+= 	 ki
N
i
kikk tttt PPPP  (6.17) 
	
=
−−−++−−−−++−
−+=
N
i
kikikikikkkk tttttttt
1
1111 )](ˆ)()(ˆ)([)(ˆ)()(ˆ)( xPxPxPxP  (6.18) 
Eqs. (6.9) to (6.14), and (6.17) and (6.18) describe the Type I algorithm. In this 
algorithm, each parallel local filter only processes its own measurements in order to 
generate its local estimates. The global fusion filter assimilates all the local estimates 
to update the global estimate. Obviously, this algorithm has a simple structure. The 
main disadvantage of this algorithm is that the degradation of the local filter 
performance may critically affect the performance of the global fusion filter because 
the global estimate cannot be used to refresh the local estimates.  
For the two-way model shown in Figure 6.2, the time-update equations are 
given by Eqs. (6.13) and (6.14). Placing the global update equations (6.17) and (6.18) 
at each node yields  
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Eqs. (6.9) and (6.12), and (6.19) to (6.20) constitute the Type II algorithm. In 
this algorithm, each local fusion filter updates its global estimate by assimilating the 
local estimates from the other local fusion filters. Accordingly, all the local estimates 
can be dynamically corrected by their global estimate updates. The Type II algorithm 
overcomes the disadvantage of the Type I algorithm and provides the redundant 
global state estimates. Therefore, this algorithm is a fault-tolerant fusion algorithm.  
In many practical examples of state-identical distributed sensor network 
systems, not all the sensor systems can observe the complete states of the same 
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dynamic system. Therefore, the local state is a subset of the global system state and 
the local filters are generally designed to be reduced-order. In such cases, the Type I 
and Type II algorithms given above must be modified.  
Let the local system states be abstracted from the global state as follows:  
)()( kiki tt xDx =  (6.21) 
where iD  is a one-way state abstraction matrix consisting of ones or zeros and each 
row of iD  has at most one non-zero element. 
From Eq. (6.4), a sub-matrix of the global measurement matrix is associated 
with a local measurement matrix by 
ikiki tt DCH )()( =  (6.22) 
From Eqs. (6.15) and (6.16), the global update equations are given by 
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and the local estimates can be obtained as follows:   
)()()(),()(),( )( T1T1 kikikikkikikkiki ttttttttt BQBPP += −+−−  (6.25) 
)()()()()( 1T11 kikikikiki ttttt CRCPP −−−+− −=  (6.26) 
)(ˆ),()(ˆ 11 +−−− = kikkiki tttt xx  (6.27) 
)()()()(ˆ)()(ˆ)( 1T11 kikikikikikiki ttttttt zRCxPxP −−−−++− −=  (6.28) 
Eqs. (6.23) to (6.28) constitute the modified Type I algorithm. 
To deduce the modified Type II algorithm, from Eq. (6.21), the relationship 
between the covariances of the local states and the covariance of the global state can 
be obtained as follows:  
T)()( ikiki tt DPDP =  (6.29) 
*1*T1 ])[(][)( ikiki tt DPDP −− =  (6.30) 
ikiik tt DPDP )()( 1T1 −− =  (6.31)  
where *iD  is a Moore-Penrose inverse of iD  and ii DD =
∗][ * . As the row dimension 
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of iD  is less than its column, 
1TT* )( −= iiii DDDD .  
It should be noted that iD  is a one-way abstraction matrix and Eq. (6.31) cannot 
be used to restore the global covariance from a local covariance. However, if the 
purpose of the local fusion filter at each node is to update the local estimates, Eq. 
(6.31) will be valid.  
From Eqs. (6.21) and (6.31), the global system state at each network node can 
be represented by the following equation 
)(ˆ)()(ˆ)()(ˆ)( 1T1T1 kikiikikiikk tttttt xPDxDPDxP −−− ==  (6.32) 
Eq. (6.32) implies restoring the global version of the local estimate rather than the 
global estimate from the local estimate. 
Substituting Eq. (6.31) into Eq. (6.23) and Eq. (6.32) into Eq. (6.24) yields  
∗
=
−−+−∗−−+− 	 −−= ]}[)]()([{][)( )(
1
11TT11
ji
N
i
kiiiijkjkj tttt DDPDDPP  (6.33) 
Substituting Eq. (6.32) into Eq. (6.24) yields 
	
=
−−−++−∗
−−−++−
−−
=
N
i
kikikikiij
kjkjkjkj
tttt
tttt
1
11TT
11
)](ˆ)()(ˆ)([][                          
)(ˆ)()(ˆ)(
xPxPDD
xPxP
 (6.34) 
Eqs. (6.33) and (6.34) create the modified Type II algorithm. It must be noted that 
the modified Type II algorithm has no global fusion model and all the local fusion 
filters have their own fusion models. This is different from the Type II algorithm 
where a global fusion model can be used in all the local fusion filters. A constraint on 
the choice of the local fusion model is that the dimension of the states in the local 
fusion model must be equal to that of the states in the corresponding local state filter 
model. The modified Type II algorithm is suitable for applications where the local 
state estimate is more important than the global state estimate. 
The Type I and II algorithms and their modifications are widely used in target 
tracking and identification applications and can also be used to design and develop 
conventional aircraft integrated navigation systems where the main requirement is to 
determine the motion states of the aircraft centre of gravity. The traditional cascaded 
and federated filters are special examples of these distributed algorithms. However, a 
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common constraint applied to both algorithms is that all the local filters must have 
the same dynamic model. This limits the application of the Type I and II algorithms. 
6.2.2 State-Associated Distributed Fusion Algorithms 
State-associated distributed fusion algorithms are presented for distributed 
sensor network systems, as illustrated in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 where all the sensor 
systems are distributed and observe their local dynamic motion states. Therefore, all 
the local dynamic models may be different from each other and the global dynamic 
model. Similar to the analysis in Section 6.2.1, this subsection describes two kinds of 
sensor fusion algorithms. The Type IA algorithm is used for the distributed system 
shown in Figure 6.3 while the Type IIA algorithm applies to the distributed system in 
Figure 6.4. In Figure 6.3, all the local estimates are transferred to the global fusion 
filter whereas in Figure 6.4, each local fusion filter assimilates all the local filter 
outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 State-Associated One-Way Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 State-Associated Two-Way Model 
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In these distributed systems, the following assumptions apply. 
)()()( kkjki ttt xxx ≠≠  
)()()( kkjki ttt www ≠≠  
 ≠≠ ji  
 )()()( kkjki ttt GBB ≠≠  
)()()( kikjki ttt HCC ≠≠  
However, some relationships must exist between the local states and the global 
state. Assuming the local states are restored from the combination of the elements of 
the global state, then Eq. (6.21) can be rewritten as follows 
)()( kiiki tt xDTx =  (6.35) 
where iT  is an invertible square matrix having the dimension consistent with the 
dimension  of the local state ix .  
Therefore, from Eq. (6.4), the local measurement matrix is given by 
iikiki tt DTCH )()( =  (6.36) 
From Eqs. (6.23), (6.24), (6.35) and (6.36), the global update equations of the global 
fusion filter are as follows: 
})]()([{)()( 1
1
1TT11
iiki
N
i
kiiikk tttt DTPPTDPP
−−
=
+−−−+−
−+= 	  (6.37) 
)](ˆ)()(ˆ)([)(ˆ)()(ˆ)( 1
1
1TT11 −−−−+
=
−−−−++−
−+= 	 kikikik
N
i
iiikkkk tttttttt xPxPTDxPxP  (6.38) 
The global time-update equations and the local time-update equations are based on 
the standard information filter. The fusion algorithm based on Eqs. (6.37) and (6.38) 
is known as the Type IA algorithm. 
For the distributed system shown in Figure 6.4, from Eqs. (6.33), (6.34), (6.35), 
and (3.36), the Type IIA algorithm can be implemented as follows: 
1T
1
11TT1TT
11
][]}[)]()([{][][               
)( )(
−∗
=
−−+−−∗
−−+−
	 −−
=
iijj
N
j
kjkjjjii
kiki
tt
tt
TDDTPTDTD
PP
 (6.39)   
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=
−−−−+−−∗
−−−++−
−−
=
N
j
kjkjkjkjjjii
kikikiki
tttt
tttt
1
11TT1TT
11
)](ˆ)()(ˆ)([][][                          
)(ˆ)()(ˆ)(
xPxPTDTD
xPxP
 (6.40)  
At each network node, the local filter estimate equations are given by the standard 
information filter algorithms. If the number of the local states is the same as the 
global state, then ii ID =  and iT  represents a transformation between the local states 
and the global state. 
In comparison with the Type I and Type II algorithms, the Type IA and Type 
IIA algorithms are applicable to a wider range of distributed sensor systems. But they 
need to establish the transformation relationships between the local states and the 
global state. In many practical distributed sensor systems, this transformation iT  may 
be time varying )( ki tT . Therefore, it is very important to develop this dynamic 
transformation in applications of the Type IA and Type IIA algorithms.  
Comparing the Type I and Type IA algorithms with the Type II and Type IIA 
algorithms, the former needs to establish the global system model of the distributed 
sensor network system whereas the latter does not. From the viewpoint of fusion 
filter distributions, the Type I and Type IA algorithms can be also referred to as the 
centralised fusion filter algorithm and the Type II and Type IIA algorithms are 
known as the fully distributed fusion filter algorithm. 
The Type IA and Type IIA algorithms can be used to resolve the problems of 
distributed controls and estimations where the local state information is particularly 
needed for local system controls and stabilisations and also for estimation of the local 
motion states.  
In the following sections, a distributed inertial network system is presented as 
an example to explain the development of fully distributed fusion algorithms.  
6.3 Distributed Inertial Sensing Models 
A simplified version of the distributed inertial network system architecture 
shown in Figure 5.3 is illustrated in Figure 6.5 where three IMUs are located at 
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different positions in an aircraft. These IMUs independently measure individual local 
qualities, but the measured or estimated states are not completely independent due to 
the rigid structure of the aircraft and are dynamically associated with each other. The 
development of this dynamic relationship between the local states and the measured 
qualities can drastically utilise the inertial information provided by the inertial 
network to detect and isolate sensor/system failures, and to particularly implement 
dynamic calibration and transfer alignments between the various inertial systems. 
Consequently, this dynamic relationship can be used to improve the required 
navigation performance in terms of the RNP parameters and to greatly increase the 
fault tolerance of an aircraft navigation system. This dynamic relationship can be 
established by the development of the rotational and translational transformations 
between the node frames.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Relationships among IMU Nodes 
In Figure 6.5, the IMU frames and the corresponding local reference frames are 
indicated. Let I  be the inertial reference frame cg is the master IMU node located at 
the aircraft centre of gravity and its local body frame; i  and j  represent the slave 
IMU nodes and their individual local body frames(in this thesis, the IMU frames are 
assumed to be aligned with the local body frames, otherwise, fixed transformations 
are needed to align these two frames). ⊥  denotes a translational transformation, for 
j/I  
I 
T  Rotation transformation 
The black arrows represent 
the local reference frames 
and the red arrows are the 
local IMU frames. 
cg 
i 
 
j 
 
⊥  Translation transformation 
Local reference frame 
Local IMU (body) frame 
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example, ji⊥  is the translation vector from nodes i  to j  T  represents a rotational 
transformation, for example, the transformation from i  to j  is denoted by jiT . 
Exchanging the superscript and the subscript of a transformation represents the 
inverse of the transformation, for example ij
j
i TT =
−1)( . Let the local reference 
frames at the nodes of i , j  and cg  be denoted by iL , jL  and cgL , then the 
transformations from the local reference frames to the local body frames are given by 
i
LiT , 
j
L jT  and 
cg
LcgT . If the local level frames are used as the local reference frames, 
these rotation matrices indicate the orientations of the local body axes relative to the 
local reference frames. If one local reference frame is not the local-level frame, then 
its orientation should be known relative to the local-level frame. Because the local-
level frames are defined by the geographic locations of IMU nodes, their orientation 
differences caused by the translation vectors between these nodes can be ignored. 
Consequently, in this thesis it is assumed that the local-level frames located at all 
inertial network nodes are identical, that is cgij LLL == . 
Let the relative rotation of one IMU frame i  with respect to another frame j  
be ij /  and its inverse rotation be ijji //  −= . From the theory of multi-body 
rotation[100], the absolute angular velocity of each IMU frame in the inertial network 
system is the sum of the absolute angular velocity of the other IMU frame and the 
relative angular velocity between these two frames, and is generally written in the 
following form: 
icgcgi //I/I  +=  (6.41) 
jcgcgj //I/I  +=  (6.42) 
cgjjcg //I/I  +=  (6.43) 
The terms on the left side of the above equations are measured by the corresponding 
local IMUs. The rotational transformations among the local IMU (local body) frames 
depend on the relative angular velocities between these frames.   
Determination of the stationary and dynamic relationships among the network 
nodes is discussed in the following subsections. 
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6.3.1 Stationary Inertial Sensing Model 
In this method, the aircraft is assumed to be a completely rigid body to simplify 
the analysis. Based on this assumption, there is no relative rotation motion between 
the local node body frames. Therefore, the dynamic relationships between different 
IMU frames can be described by stationary rotation and translation transformations 
from one node frame to the other node frame. These transformations can be 
measured precisely and determined after the IMUs have been installed in an aircraft.  
When the local state x  is a rate vector, such as acceleration, velocity or angular 
velocity, a rotation matrix is used to complete the rotation transformation from one 
node frame to the other node frame as follows:  
j
i
ji xx =  (6.44) 
If the local state is a displacement vector, a rotation matrix can be combined 
with a translation vector together to complete the transformation from one frame to 
the other frame as follows:   
i
jj
i
ji ⊥+= xTx  (6.45) 
When the local states are the Euler angles, the attitude matrix transformation 
from one frame to the other frame has the following form: 
j
L
i
j
i
L ji TTT =  (6.46) 
where the states ix  and jx  are expressed in their individual local frames and 
i
jT  and 
i
j⊥  are known as the rotation matrix and the translation vector, respectively. 
At an IMU node, the measured inertial states, accelerations and angular rates, 
are expressed in terms of the local body frames and the IMU outputs are represented 
in the inertial instrument frames. The transformation between the inertial instrument 
frame and the local body frame, for example, at the cg  node, is given by cgimu cgH where 
the subscript cgimu  denotes the IMU instrument frame at the cg  node. The matrix 
cg
imu cgH  depends on the IMU configuration and can be dynamically reconfigured if the 
IMU is an SRIMU. From Eq. (5.2b), the measurement of the cg  IMU can be 
rewritten as  
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cg
imu
cgimu
cg
cg xHm =  (6.47) 
By the rotational transformations, the measurements provided by IMUs i  and j  can 
be represented in terms of the local body frame at the node cg  as follows: 
cg
i
cg
imu
ii
imu
iimu
ii
i xTHx
m ==  (6.48) 
cg
j
cg
imu
jj
imu
jimu
jj
j xTHxHm ==  (6.49) 
Eqs. (6.48) and (6.49) mean that the node cg  assimilates the inertial measurement 
information from the slave nodes i  and j . Therefore, the inertial measurement at the 
node cg  can be represented as 
cgcgcg
j
cg
imu
j
i
cg
imu
i
imu
cg
imu
imu
imu
cg
j
i
cg
j
i
cg
xHx
TH
TH
H
m
m
m
m =












=










≡  (6.50) 
Similarly, the inertial measurements at the nodes i  and j  are as follows: 
iii
j
i
imu
j
imu
i
cg
i
imu
cg
imu
imu
imu
i
j
i
cg
j
i
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xHx
TH
H
TH
m
m
m
m =



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

=


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
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

≡  (6.51) 
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=
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
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≡  (6.52) 
Eqs. (6.50), (6.51) and (6.52) imply that each node shares the same redundant inertial 
measurements even if all the IMUs are traditionally orthogonal systems. Therefore, 
the SRIMU FDI algorithms developed in Chapter 5 can be used directly to detect and 
isolate inertial sensor failures in an inertial network system. Various weighted least-
squares estimators can be used to estimate the inertial state. This procedure of data 
assimilation and least-squares estimation is referred to as inertial data fusion. The 
inertial data fusion procedure increases the measurement accuracy of each IMU and 
consequently improves the performance of the navigation system and the accuracy of 
the local state estimation.  
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One node estimates its local attitude matrix from the assimilated inertial 
measurements. From Eq. (6.46), it can also assimilate the attitude information from 
the other nodes using the following attitude matrices. 
At node i ,  
i
LiT  (6.53) 
j
L
i
j
i
L jj TTT =  (6.54) 
cg
L
i
cg
i
L cgcg TTT =  (6.55) 
At node j , 
j
L jT  (6.56) 
i
L
j
i
j
L ii TTT =  (6.57) 
cg
L
j
cg
j
L cgcg TTT =  (6.58) 
At node cg , 
cg
LcgT  (6.59) 
i
L
cg
i
cg
L ii TTT =  (6.60) 
j
L
cg
j
cg
L jj TTT =  (6.61) 
Therefore, the redundant attitude information at each node can be fused to increase 
the accuracy of the local attitude estimates. 
6.3.2 Dynamic Transformation Model 
Although the assumption of a rigid body aircraft can apply to a wide range of 
applications in aircraft navigation and control systems, this assumption may be 
invalid in many military aircraft navigation and control systems because high-speed 
flight and high dynamic manoeuvres can cause the aircraft body to flex with flight 
conditions. The rotational transformations given in the above section are no longer 
stationary but are time-varying dynamic matrices. If the flexible structure character 
of an aircraft is ignored, the above assimilation equations will introduce errors in the 
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rotation transformation ∆ , leading to larger errors in the estimates of the local 
states. Therefore, it is necessary to develop the dynamic relationships between the 
network nodes and to estimate these dynamic transformation matrices in flight. Two 
methods are presented in this thesis to determine these rotational transformations. 
One method establishes analytical models of the rotation matrices while the other 
method is an iterative processing method. In both methods, it is assumed that all 
initial transformation matrices are known. This assumption is reasonable because an 
initial transformation matrix can be approximated by a stationary transformation 
matrix, as given in Section 6.3.1. 
The iterative processing method for the determination of the transformation 
matrices is based on Eq. (6.46) where the local attitude matrices at the IMU nodes 
are obtained by invoking the inertial attitude determination algorithms. The dynamic 
transformation matrices are then estimated from the computed local attitude matrices. 
The architecture of this iterative algorithm is illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
 Because the dynamic change of a rotation matrix relative to its initial matrix 
occurs over a small dynamic range, the estimated transformation matrix kjiTˆ  can be 
expressed by the combination of the previous estimated rotation matrix and a small 
angle displacement vector kji . Therefore, the estimated rotation matrix at the 
current time can be equivalently rewritten as  
)(ˆˆˆˆ 1 ×+== − kjikjiLijLkji
i
j ITTTT  (6.62) 
This process is repeated until the norm of kji  is less than a specified value; the 
current transformation matrix can then be determined. 
From Figure 6.6, this iterative process is a time-consuming computation 
because each iteration must perform the inertial attitude determination algorithms for 
all the IMU nodes. The main advantage of this method is that the errors of the 
transformation matrix estimates are independent of the dynamic models of the 
transformation matrices. In addition, the inertial attitude determination algorithms 
play the role of a noise filter, which can reduce the effect of the IMU measurement 
noise on the rotation matrix estimates. However, uncertainties in the local attitude 
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matrix estimates will contribute to errors in the rotation matrix estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Iterative Computation of Rotation Matrices  
 To deduce the analytical dynamic models of the transformation matrices, the 
cg body frame is used as a reference frame for the relative rotation motion of all the 
other local frames and the measured angular velocities. Therefore, Eqs. (6.41) to 
(6.43) can be rewritten in the matrix form of the angular velocity vectors as follows: 
cg
icgcg
cg
i /
cg
/I/I  +=  (6.63) 
cg
jcgcg
cg
j /
cg
/I/I  +=  (6.64) 
cg
ij
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j
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i ///I  I +=  (6.65) 
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where   is the skew-symmetric matrix of the corresponding angular velocity vector 
 . The superscript cg  denotes that the angular velocity vectors are expressed in 
terms of the local cg body coordinates. 
From the attitude matrix differential equation given in Eq. (4.22), Eq. (6.63) 
can be written as 
cg
i
i
cgcg
cg
i TT −=
cg
/I/I  (6.66) 
Therefore 
i
cgi
cg
cg
i
cg TT )( cg/I/I −=  (6.67) 
i
cg
i
i
cg
i
cg
i TT /I/I =  (6.68) 
Similarly, the differential equation of the rotation matrix jcgT  is as follows: 
j
cgj
cg
cg
j
cg TT )( cg/I/I −=  (6.69) 
j
cg
j
j
cg
j
cg
j TT /I/I =  (6.70) 
where cgcg/I , 
i
i/I  and 
j
j/I  are estimated from the IMU measurements at the nodes 
cg , i  and j , as given in Eq. (5.3). 
The rotation transformation matrix between j  and i  is then computed by the 
following equation. 
cg
j
i
cg
i
j TTT =  (6.71) 
Obviously, the dynamic models of the rotation transformations are non-linear 
matrix differential equations. The initial values of the matrix differential equations 
are given by the stationary transformations. These differential equations have to be 
iteratively resolved at the measurement time until the solutions become stable.  
In comparison with the iterative processing method, the main advantage of the 
analytical method is that the time-consuming iterative computation of complex 
inertial attitude determination algorithms at all the IMU nodes is avoided. However, 
because the IMU outputs are directly used to drive the rotation matrix differential 
equations, the IMU measurement errors and noise may affect the accuracy of the 
solution of the rotation matrices. As a result, data pre-processing filters are needed to 
eliminate abnormal IMU measurement noise. 
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6.4 Distributed Inertial Network Fusion Algorithms 
From Section 6.3, each node in the inertial network system can assimilate both 
the local measurements and the local estimates. Therefore, a two-stage data fusion 
strategy is presented to develop distributed data fusion filter algorithms. The first-
stage fusion processes the inertial network measurement at all the nodes to obtain the 
more accurate local inertial state vectors, known as distributed inertial measurement 
fusion. The second-stage fusion is to increase the accuracy of the local system state 
estimates at all the network nodes and to enhance the fault tolerance of the inertial 
network system, referred to as distributed state fusion. 
6.4.1 Distributed Inertial Data Fusion Algorithm 
Assume that all the local IMUs are independent of each other and their 
measurements have a Gaussian probability distribution. Then the errors of the local 
inertial state estimates are also a Gaussian distributed random vector from Eq. (5.4). 
Therefore, the probability density function of the local inertial state is 
)]ˆ()ˆ(
2
1
exp[
det)2(
1)( 1xT
x
3
xxPxx
P
x −−−= −
pi
p  (6.72) 
where x  is an 3-dimensional local inertial state vector, for example, the acceleration 
or angular rate vector, and xP is the covariance matrix of the error of the local inertial 
state estimate. From Eq. (5.5) 
T**1TT1T
x ][)( HRHHRH(HHH)HP == −−  (6.73) 
The objective of the inertial measurement fusion is to generate optimal estimates of 
all the local inertial states. Defining an optimisation criterion that maximises the 
following conditional probability  
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( cgjiP xxxx  
From the assumption that all the IMU measurements are independent, the 
conditional probability density function of the true local inertial state at each IMU 
node can be represented as follows:  
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)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()()ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( cgjicgji ppppp xxxxxxxxxxx ==  (6.74) 
Applying the maximum likelihood estimator to Eq. (6.74) and considering Eqs. 
(6.50) to (6.52),  the inertial measurement fusion equations at each IMU node can be 
derived as follows:  
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cgjiJ
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l
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lJ ,,               
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1
x,
1
x, == 	
=
−− TPTP  (6.77) 
Eqs. (6.75) or (6.76) and (6.77) are the inertial measurement fusion algorithm at each 
IMU node. Any other methods, for example various weighted least-squares methods, 
which are used to resolve Eqs. (6.50) to (6.52), can be classified as the inertial 
measurement fusion. It should be noted that the inertial measurement fusion is 
mainly used to provide highly reliable local inertial state estimates. However, its 
outputs can also aid FDI systems to detect and isolate inertial sensor failures. The 
inertial measurement fusion can be considered as a pre-processing procedure for the 
second-stage fusion. 
6.4.2 Distributed State Fusion Filter Algorithm 
The architecture of the state fusion filter algorithm at each node is illustrated in 
Figure 6.7 where the local Kalman filter uses the assimilated sensor measurements to 
estimate the local states. The local fusion filter combines the local estimate and the 
assimilated estimates from the nodes to update the local estimates. 
At each node of the inertial network system, the local Kalman filter model can 
be described as follows: 
)()()()()( 1111 −−−− += kJkJkJkkJkJ ttt,ttt wGxx  (6.78) 
)()()()( kJkJkJkJ tttt x
z +=  (6.79) 
where cgjiJ ,,=  denote the IMU nodes.  
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Figure 6.7 State Fusion Algorithm Architecture 
The navigation algorithms and the SRIMU error dynamic models developed in 
Chapter 4 can be applied to all the IMU nodes once the corresponding coordinate 
frames are specified. But, each local dynamic model describes its local state, which 
is different from the local states described by the other dynamic models. The local 
state Jx  can be decomposed into the local system state Jo,x  and the local sensor 
error state Js,x , that is 
[ ]TT
,
T
, JsJoJ xxx =  (6.80) 
All the local system states at the network nodes are referred to as the similar states. 
The dynamic matrices established in Section 6.3 provide the transformations among 
the similar states. 
Jz  can be decomposed into three sub-vectors as follows: 
[ ]TT
,
T
,
T
, JAJSJLJ zzzz =  (6.81) 
where JL,z  is the measurement vector provided by local navaid sensor systems, JS ,z  
is the measurement vector given by the commonly-shared navaid systems and JA,z  is 
the combination of all the inertial measurements assimilated from the IMU nodes. 
The normalised measurement models of several navaid systems have been developed 
in Section 4.6 and the normalised measurement models of redundant inertial sensor 
systems have been given in Section 5.5.  
Because these three forms of measurements are independent of each other, the 
terms in Eq. (6.79) can be decomposed into the following forms: 
Assimilated 
local estimates 
Local 
estimates  
Local 
estimate 
update 
Local 
Kalman 
Filter 
Local Fusion 
Filter 
Assimilate the shared 
navaid system outputs and 
the inertial measurements 
from the other nodes 
Assimilate the similar local 
state estimates from the 
other nodes 
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[ ]TT
,
T
,
T
, JAJSJLJ HHHH =  (6.82) 
[ ]TT
,
T
,
T
, JAJSJLJ  =  (6.83) 
),,(
,,, JAJSJLJ blockdiag RRRR =  (6.84) 
All the local Kalman filters process these three forms of the measurements to 
obtain the local estimates, including the local states and covariances, as follows:   
)()()(ˆ 11 −−− = kJkkJkJ t,ttt xx  (6.85) 
)()()(),()(),()( 1T111T11 −−−−+−−− += kJkJkJkkJkJkkJkJ ttttttttt GQGPP  (6.86) 
)()()()(              
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 (6.88) 
where Jxˆ  and JP  are the local estimates given by the local Kalman filter and Jx  and 
JP  are the estimate updates given by the local fusion filter. 
To update the locally estimated system states at each node using the similar 
state estimates assimilated from the other nodes, a state fusion filter is needed in each 
node. Defining a quadratic cost function at the node i  as follows: 
	
=
+−+
−−=
cgjiJ
ioJo
i
J
J
iJo
i
JioJo
i
JiJ
,,
,,
1
,
T
,,
)ˆ()ˆ( xxTTPTxxT  (6.89) 
where + Jo,xˆ  is the local system state estimate given by the local Kalman filter, io,x  is 
the true local system state at i , Jo,P  is a sub-matrix of JP  and is associated with the 
local system state  and iJ  is a measure of the displacement of the local state from its 
true value.   
The state fusion filter is designed to minimise iJ . This is referred to as the 
minimum weighted mean square error criterion.   
Differentiating iJ  and setting the result to zero yields  
)ˆˆˆ(
,
1
,,
1
,,
1
,
1
,,
+−+−+−− ++= cgocgo
i
cgjojo
i
jioioioio xPTxPTxPPx  (6.90) 
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−−−− ++=  (6.91) 
In a similar fashion, the similar state update equations at the nodes j  and cg  can are 
given as follows: 
)ˆˆˆ(
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,,
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,,
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cgioio
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ijojojojo xPTxPTxPPx  (6.92) 
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−−−− ++=  (6.95) 
Eqs. (6.90) to (6.95) form the distributed state fusion filter algorithm. By examining 
the above analysis, this distributed state fusion algorithm actually consists of two 
fusion procedures, the measurement fusion given by Eqs. (6.87) and (6.88) and the 
state fusion given by Eqs. (6.90) to (6.95).  The state fusion provides the redundancy 
of the similar system states. Therefore, this fusion method can greatly improve the 
fault tolerance of an inertial network system. 
From Eqs. (6.85) and (6.86), the outputs of each fusion filter are fed back to its 
corresponding local Kalman filter. This feedback operation implements the dynamic 
transfer alignments between the node IMUs and also allows the local Kalman filter to 
accurately estimate and calibrate its sensor error state. Consequently, this distributed 
state fusion algorithm provides the capability to perform the dynamic alignment and 
calibration of the inertial systems in an inertial network system. Therefore, traditional 
inertial system alignment algorithms, for example, fine and transfer alignments, are 
no longer necessary in inertial network systems. The traditional in-flight alignments 
generally require an aircraft to perform some specified manoeuvres, which may lead 
to enormous risk especially to military aircraft and pilots. The elimination of the 
traditional alignment procedures allows aircraft to execute free flight and arbitrary 
manoeuvres. 
6.5 Inertial Network Integrity Monitoring 
From the inertial network dynamic models given by Eqs (6.78) and (6.79), the 
failures in the inertial network system can be classified as sensor system failures and 
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local system state failures. From Eq. (6.81), the sensor system failures may result 
from the inertial sensor systems, the local navaid sensors and the commonly-shared 
navaid systems. Therefore, the purpose of inertial network integrity monitoring is to 
ensure all the local filters are able to provide the very reliable local system state 
estimates and to detect and isolate various sensor failures and the abnormal local 
system states from the inertial network system in a short time.  
In this thesis, two integrity monitoring strategies have been suggested to 
guarantee the integrity of the inertial network system, including the sensor-level FDI 
and the system-level integrity monitoring, as shown in Figure 2.9 of the generalised 
MSDF model. The sensor-level FDI methods have been developed in Chapter 5 and 
are initially used to detect and isolate the inertial sensor failures in skewed redundant 
configurations or the GNSS signal failures in the redundant GNSS measurements. 
These methods can be directly applied to the inertial assimilation equations given by 
Eqs. (5.50) to (5.52) to detect and isolate the distributed inertial sensor failures in the 
inertial network system. In addition, many other methods have been suggested in the 
recent years for detecting and isolating the GNSS signal failures, for example, 
receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) methods and aircraft autonomous 
integrity monitoring (AAIM) methods[83]. However, these methods cannot guarantee 
that the system state estimates computed by the local Kalman filters are reliable.  
To verify the integrity of Kalman filters, several Kalman filter-based detection 
methods have been developed in the past. For example, a method, called multiple 
model adaptive filters, has been suggested where a bank of Kalman filters is used, 
each with a different model. The innovations of these filters are monitored and the 
conditional probability that each system model is correct is computed. This technique 
has the advantage of being able to provide reliable filter outputs and to isolate failed 
sensors and improper filter models. However, with the number of the filter states, the 
computations required by all the node processors may be time-consuming.  
Several failure detection filter methods[125-128] have also been suggested for the 
detection of actuator, plant and sensor failures in control systems. A detection filter is 
a full-order linear state-space observer. In detection filter design, the gain matrix 
must be chosen so that the residual vectors generated by certain actuator or sensor 
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failures can be projected to lines and planes in the measurement space and each 
potential failure has a different fixed direction. Accordingly, the detection filter gain 
is adjusted in order to identify the feature of failure signals, but not to minimise the 
mean square error of estimation, as is done in a Kalman estimator. In addition, many 
detection filters assume that dynamic systems are noise free. Application of detection 
filters to inertial network integrity monitoring noticeably increases the complexity of 
data fusion algorithms in the network system. Other model-following approaches 
require that one Kalman filter performs the usual tracking and estimation, and the 
other filters are used to detect the presence of specified (or previously characterised) 
failure modes. Based on the above analysis, all of these three methods of Kalman 
filter-based failure detection are inappropriate for inertial network systems because 
they significantly increase the computation load at each node.  
Therefore, in this section, easily implemented and real-time detection methods 
are developed not only to monitor the integrity of inertial network systems but also to 
reduce the computation load at the inertial network nodes. 
6.5.1 Inertial Network Failure Model  
As shown in the previous section, the local node system models in the inertial 
network system are described by the local IMU error dynamics. From the analysis in 
Chapter 4, if the inertial sensor failures occur, the local inertial navigation algorithms 
may produce abnormal similar system states, which further cause uncertainties of the 
state transition matrices of the local system models. If the navaid system failures 
occur, the local and commonly shared measurements may contain errors. Therefore, 
it can be assumed that the effect of the inertial sensor failures are considered as 
additional system state failures in the dynamic models whereas the navaid system 
failures are modelled as additional measurement failures in the measurement models 
of the local Kalman filters. Accordingly, a failure model of the Kalman filter at each 
node is established as follows:  
)()(),()()()( 1,1,,,1,1,, −−−− ++= kJokJoJJkkJokkJokJo tttt,ttt o wGfxx xxτ  (6.96) 
)(),()()()(
,,,,,, kJAidJAidJAidkkJokJAidkJAid ttttt fxHz ++= τ  (6.97) 
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where Jo,x  and JAid ,z  are the local system state and the navaid system measurement 
vectors at the node J ,   is a diagonal matrix of Kronecker functions, Jo ,xf  is a time-
variable local system state failure vector and JAid ,f  is a time-variable navaid system 
failure vector. This is a reduced-order filter model compared with the corresponding 
local filter. 
Because the effects of the inertial sensor failures have been considered in the 
system dynamic model, the inertial data assimilation equations are not contained in 
the measurement model. Furthermore, the coefficient matrices of this failure model 
are the sub-matrices of the coefficient matrices of the corresponding local Kalman 
filter. Therefore, the outputs of the local Kalman filters are directly used to generate 
failure detection functions without additional computations. 
Two efficient system-level methods are presented in this section to monitor the 
integrity of the inertial network system. One method is based on directly examining 
the consistency of the distributed state estimates whereas the other is to monitor the 
distributed filter innovations for detecting and even isolating the local navaid sensor 
failures and the commonly shared navaid systems failures.  
6.5.2 Distributed State Consistency Monitoring 
Assuming no sensor failures occur at any network node, then all the local 
similar system states must be consistent through the transformations among the local 
similar states. In the presence of any sensor system failures at one network node, this 
assumption will no longer be valid. Accordingly, the distributed state consistency 
monitoring method can employ combinations of the similar system state estimates 
computed by all the local filters to check the consistency of all the similar system 
states. Figure 6.8 shows the architecture of this integrity monitoring method. 
At each node, the redundant local similar state estimate Jo,xˆ ( kjiJ ,,= ) can be 
represented as follows: 
o,iJo
i
Jo,i xxTx += ,ˆˆ  
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where x  is the error of the local similar state estimate with the known covariance 
o,JP , as computed by the local Kalman filter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Architecture of State Consistency Monitoring 
To check the consistency of the distributed attitude states, the quaternion form 
q  of the local attitude matrix is used. Therefore, the redundant quaternion equations 
are derived as follows: 
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where iJT  is the quaternion transformation matrix corresponding to
j
JT .  
By structuring the redundant equations given in Eqs. (6.98) and (6.99), the 
problem of the distributed state consistency checking is similar to the sensor FDI 
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problem described in Chapter 5. Therefore, applying the FDI methods developed in 
Chapter 5 to the redundant state equations, the state failures of the local Kalman 
filters can be detected and isolated. This is a simple and efficient method to monitor 
the integrity of all the local Kalman filters in real time without considering the 
sources of failures. From Figure 6.8, this state consistency checking can be combined 
with the local state fusion algorithm. If one local Kalman filter is diagnosed to be 
invalid, its outputs will be isolated from its related local fusion filter and the local 
fusion filter will use assimilated estimates to reconfigure the local similar system 
states according to Eqs. (6.90) to (6.95). This method is mainly used to monitor the 
integrity of the similar system states in the inertial network system and detect local 
Kalman filter failures. It should be noted that this method of integrity monitoring is 
based on the assumption that all the transformation matrices among the similar states 
are correct.  
6.5.3 Distributed Filter Innovation Monitoring 
The navaid system failure JAid ,f  appearing in the failure measurement model of 
Eq. (6.97) contains the local navaid sensor failures and the commonly-shared navaid 
system failures. Any failures resulting from the commonly-shared navaid systems are 
common-mode to all the local Kalman filters because such failures influence all the 
local systems. A common-mode failure causes the estimates of all the local Kalman 
filters to diverge from their anticipated values. The distributed state consistency 
monitoring method above cannot faithfully detect the local system state failures 
caused by common-mode failures. However, from the analysis given in Section 
3.2.6, the Kalman filter innovation is independent of the actual measurements of the 
navaid systems. By monitoring the innovation generated by all the local Kalman 
filters, any failure caused by the local navaid sensors or the commonly shared navaid 
systems can be correctly detected.  
From Eqs. (6.96) and (6.97), the failure filter innovation at J can be derived as 
follows:  
JAidJAidkJJkkJokJkJf ttttt o ,,,,,, ),(),()()()( ffHrr xx ττ ++=   (6.100)  
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where the normal Kalman filter innovation )( ktr  is 
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













=
−
−
−
nJnJkn
JJk
JJk
JJk
o
o
o
o
t
t
t
t
-,x,
2-,x2,2
1-,x1,1
,,
f),(
f),(
f),(
),(
x
x
x
xx f
τδ
τδ
τδ
τδ  (6.102) 












=
−
−
−
mJAidmJAidkm
JAidJAidk
JAidJAidk
JAidJAidk
t
t
t
t
-,,
2-,2,2
1-,1,1
,,
f),.(
f),(
f),(
),(
τδ
τδ
τδ
τδ f  (6.103) 
Exploiting Eq. (6.100) for detection and isolation of the navaid system failures 
and monitoring the integrity of the local Kalman filters, two assumptions are made: 
• J,xτ ≠ JAid ,τ . That is, the time J,xτ  of the occurrence of system state failure 
is different from the time JAid ,τ  of the occurrence of the navaid system 
failure, or 
• Inertial sensor failures have been detected at the sensor-level FDI stage or 
by the inertial measurement fusion procedure. 
Based on the above assumptions, a normalised quadratic innovation function of 
fr  can be used as a test statistic to test the filter integrity, as given in Eq. (3.32).  
)()()()(
,
1T
, kJfkJkJfkJ ttttNQI rSr −=  (6.104) 
If JNQIk TtNQI ,)( ≥ , then failures have occurred. 
If NQIk TtNQI <)( , then no failure has taken place. 
An advantage of this NQI  testing is that its degree of freedom is equal to the 
number of the filter measurements. This means that the NQI  testing can verify each 
measurement of the navaid systems one by one. Therefore, it can isolate each failure 
occurring in the navaid system measurements, for example, GNSS signal failures or 
Doppler radar signal failures. The sequential moving-window methods introduced in 
Chapter 5 can be used to pre-process the filter innovation in order to increase the 
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reliability of NQI  testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Architecture of Distributed Filter Innovation Monitoring  
Without considering the above assumptions, from Eq. (6.100), the NQI  testing 
examines the combined effect of the navaid system failures and the system state 
failure on the filter performance. When both the system state failures and the navaid 
system failures simultaneously occur, NQI  testing only provides alarm information 
but cannot isolate the failed states or measurements. Therefore, the filter integrity 
monitoring should cooperate with sensor-level FDI procedures to ensure the integrity 
of an inertial network system. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has developed several distributed fusion algorithms for distributed 
multiple sensor navigation systems. The main activities covered include: 
1. Introduction of four forms of the distributed sensor systems for navigation 
applications and the corresponding fusion filter algorithms, including the 
state-identical and state-associated distributed sensor systems, both with 
one-way and two-way data communication modes. Four fusion algorithms 
cover Type I, Type II, Type A and Type IIA, respectively corresponding to 
the above four distributed sensor systems.  
2. Development of inertial network sensing models, including the stationary 
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inertial sensing model and the dynamic transformation model. 
3. Study of two distributed inertial network fusion algorithms, including the 
distributed inertial data fusion algorithm and the distributed state fusion 
filter algorithm. 
4. Introduction of two inertial network integrity monitoring algorithms, 
including the distributed state consistency monitoring algorithm and the 
distributed filter innovation monitoring algorithm. 
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Chapte r  7  
7 SIMULATION SYSTEM AND RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a simulation system environment to test and evaluate the 
failure detection and isolation and integrity monitoring algorithms and the distributed 
data fusion algorithms developed in this thesis. Section 7.2 introduces the overall 
architecture of this software simulation system, the architectures of the SRIMU 
simulation system and the GPS simulation system, as well software development and 
evaluation strategies. The test results of MW-GLRT algorithms are given in Section 
7.3. Several case studies of distributed data fusion algorithms are presented in 
Section 7.4. The results of the simulation studies are summarised in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Simulation System Architecture 
The software simulation system is of a modular system architecture consisting 
of the sub-modules, as shown in Figure 7.1 where the shadowed modules represent 
the functions to be implemented at different nodes of the inertial network. The 
functions of several main sub-modules are summarised below: 
Trajectory Generator 
The Trajectory Generator module generates the true 6 DOF parameters (three 
cg accelerations and three cg angular rates expressed in aircraft body frame), known 
as the inertial state, and the true aircraft cg-referenced navigation state, including 
aircraft position, velocity and attitude. These true parameters are used as reference 
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values to evaluate the performance of the FDI and integrity monitoring algorithms, 
and the distributed data fusion algorithms. The aircraft dynamics is modelled by a set 
of ideal mathematical equations of the translational and angular motions without the 
consideration of the effects of any external disturbances on the aircraft motion. This 
assumption is rational because the outputs of this module, in this simulation system, 
are used only to drive other sensor system simulation modules rather than to design 
the aircraft control systems. In addition, because the specific force triad and the 
angular rate triad measured by the inertial sensors represent the driving forces of the 
translational and angular momentum equations of the aircraft, various disturbed 
aircraft motions can be equivalent to the inertial sensor system errors that are 
simulated in the inertial simulation system.  
SRIMU Evaluator 
This module evaluates the performance of individual redundant inertial system 
configurations in terms of the number of inertial sensors and specific criteria. Several 
criteria have been introduced in Chapter 5. This evaluator can evaluate up to 12 
SRIMU configurations consisting of 3 to 6 inertial sensors, respectively. The outputs 
of this evaluator are specified configurations, represented by design matrices, which 
are then used in the SRIMU simulator to simulate realistic SRIMU measurements 
together with an inertial sensor error simulation module. 
SRIMU Simulator 
This module simulates the realistic SRIMU measurements. The dimension of 
the simulated SRIMU measurement vector depends on the design matrices set up in 
the SRIMU Evaluator. The inertial sensor errors mainly result from five error 
sources: bias, time-dependent drift, misalignment, scale factor errors and noise. 
These error sources are modelled by the random constant process, the first-order 
Markov process, the random walk process and Gaussian white noise. Inertial sensor 
failure modes are also simulated in this module. Sensor failures are classified as hard 
failures and time-drift soft failures for the evaluation of the performance of FDI 
algorithms.  
To simulate an inertial network system, other local inertial states are derived 
from the inertial state at the aircraft cg node but take into account the dynamic 
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transformations between the local node frames and the cg node frame. The dynamic 
transformations are modelled by the sinusoidal functions of different cycles plus the 
transformation noise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Simulation System Architecture 
SRIMU Navigator 
This module implements the inertial navigation computation and the dynamic 
SRIMU calibrations. At each inertial network node, this module completes similar 
computations but provides the local navigation states. The inertial navigation and 
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SRIMU calibration algorithms have been described in Chapter 4. The SRIMU FDI 
algorithms have been introduced in Chapter 5.  
GPS Simulation System 
The GPS simulation system consists of three sub-modules: GPS Measurement 
Simulator, GPS Navigator and GPS-based attitude simulator. The GPS Measurement 
Simulator generates the realistic GPS pseudorange and Doppler measurements. The 
dimension of the simulated GPS measurement vector depends on the true position of 
aircraft given by the Trajectory Generator. The GPS measurement errors come from 
several errors sources, including ionospheric and tropospheric delay errors, GPS 
satellite and receiver clock errors, selective availability (SA) errors (the SA has been 
turned off), satellite ephemeris errors and receiver measurement noise. The GPS 
navigator implements the GPS navigation computations.  
If a multifunctional GPS receiving system is available in the inertial network 
system, it can provide the GPS-based attitude information. The GPS-based attitude 
simulator (not shown in Figure 7.1) simulates the aircraft cg-referenced attitude 
solutions derived by the GPS-based attitude determination algorithm. Although the 
GPS-based attitude determination algorithms have been developed by the author, this 
simulator does not simulate the GPS carrier phase measurements or perform the 
GPS-based attitude computations.  
The multifunctional GPS receiver is a commonly-shared navaid sensor in the 
inertial network system. 
Other navaid sensor systems simulated in this thesis include an air data system, 
a magnetic heading sensor and a Doppler radar. These sensor systems are considered 
as the local sensors located at the cg node and are omitted from in Figure 7.1.  
7.2.1 Inertial Simulation System Architecture 
The inertial simulation system performs two main functions: generation of 
SRIMU measurements and computation of the navigation states. These two functions 
are performed by the SRIMU simulator and the SRIMU navigator.  
The architecture of the SRIMU simulator is illustrated in Figure 7.2 where the 
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modules framed by the dash-lines on the right and left sides are the inputs and the 
outputs to other modules. The SRIMU simulator also produces the true navigation 
state in addition to the generation of the realistic SRIMU measurements. The true 
state is used to test and evaluate the performance of the distributed data fusion 
algorithms. The test results can further determine what grades of inertial sensors 
should be used in the inertial network system to achieve the required navigation 
performance. The inertial sensor error sources and simulation parameters are given in 
Table J-1 of Appendix J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 SRIMU Simulator Architecture 
The architecture of the SRIMU navigator located at the cg node is illustrated in 
Figure 7.3 where the modules framed by the dash-lines are the conventional coarse 
and fine alignment functions, and the vertical channel compensation of the inertial 
navigator, as described in Chapter 4. However, the other SRIMU navigators located 
at the other inertial network nodes do not have these three modules. The dynamic and 
transfer alignments of the SRIMUs in the inertial network system are completed by 
the distributed Kalman and fusion filters, as described in Chapter 6.  
From Figure 7.3, each SRIMU navigator consists of an inertial state estimator 
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and an inertial navigator. The inertial state estimator computes the measured local 
inertial state by using local SRIMU measurements and assimilating the other SRIMU 
measurements. The redundancy management reconfigures the design matrix based 
on the inertial sensor failure report from the FDI system. The accelerometer and gyro 
compensation modules dynamically correct the local SRIMU measurements by using 
the inertial sensor error estimates obtained from the local Kalman filter, as described 
in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 SRIMU Navigator Architecture 
The inertial navigator computes the local navigation state. The local state is 
also used to establish the local Kalman filter model. The inertial navigation algorithm 
has been introduced in Chapter 4, the SRIMU compensation algorithms have been 
developed in Chapter 5 and the inertial state estimator algorithm has been described 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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7.2.2 GPS Simulation System Architecture 
The architecture of the GPS simulation system is shown in Figure 7.4 where 
the GPS navigator outputs the GPS-derived aircraft position and velocity. The GPS 
navigator outputs are used to test and evaluate the distributed Kalman and fusion 
filters and to compare different GPS/INS integration mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 GPS Simulator Architecture 
The GPS Measurement Simulator provides realistic GPS measurements, 
including pseudorange and Doppler (range rate) measurements, rather than deriving 
the actual GPS signals provided by an engineering GPS simulator. The simulated 
pseudoranges are obtained by a combination of the true geometric distances from the 
aircraft to visible satellites and the error terms of various error sources. The true 
geometric distances are computed from the true position of the aircraft and the 
positions of the visible GPS satellites. The visibility of GPS satellites is determined 
by the true position of the aircraft and the minimum elevation of the GPS satellites 
relative to the aircraft local level frame. In this simulation study, the minimum 
elevation for signal acquisition is defined as five degrees. 
The simulated Doppler measurements are the aircraft to GPS satellites LOS 
range rates, which are the LOS projects of the velocity differences between the true 
velocity of the aircraft and the velocity of the visible satellites plus the range rate 
errors caused by various error sources.  
The architecture of the GPS measurement simulation algorithm is illustrated in 
Figure J.1 of Appendix J where the GPS measurement error models were taken from 
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory[3]. Main error sources and 
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simulation parameters are summarised in Table J-2 of Appendix J[3][83]. The ADS and 
the magnetic heading sensor are simulated according to the parameters shown in 
Table J-3 of Appendix J. 
7.2.3 Multisensor Fusion Simulation at Node cg  
The cg node local system is a vital subsystem in an inertial network system and 
provides the aircraft systems with the navigation states. The purpose of this 
simulation study is to evaluate the FDI and data fusion algorithms developed in this 
thesis. The Kalman filter located at the cg node has multiple operating modes. The 
architecture of the multi-mode filter algorithm is illustrated in Figure 7.6 where the 
inputs to the Inertial Navigation module include the SRIMU measurements, pressure 
altitude and the positions of visible GPS satellites. This module outputs the coarse 
estimates of the navigation states and the estimated GPS measurements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Multi-Mode Kalman Filter Architecture at the cg Node 
The Multifunctional GPS module outputs the GPS-based attitude information 
and navigation states, and the GPS measurements. The SRIMU/FDI module provides 
the FDI test results to reconfigure the inertial system and the Kalman filter; it also 
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outputs the raw SRIMU measurements for the inertial navigation computation and 
the SRIMU measurement residuals as the measurements of the multi-mode Kalman 
filter. The ADS and Heading Sensor System module provides pressure altitude 
compensation needed for the stabilisation of the vertical channel of the inertial 
system, and the heading and air speed measurements of the multi-mode Kalman 
filter. The Data Fusion module completes the following tasks: 
• Processes the raw sensor measurements to generate the normalised data for 
the multi-mode navigation filter,  
• Determines the operating mode according to the sensor health status reports 
from the SRIMU/FDI and GPS/RAIM modules, 
• Reconfigures the dynamic model and measurement model of the cg node 
local system, 
• Performs the local Kalman filter and the fusion filter algorithms to update 
the coarse estimates of the aircraft navigation states, 
• Corrects the cg node SRIMU errors in flight, 
• Monitors the abnormality of estimates of the local navigation states. 
The filter state vector is subdivided into two sub-vectors, known as the basic 
state error vector and the sensor error vector as follows: 
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The basic state error vector has a fixed dimension but the size of the sensor 
error vector changes with the numbers of SRIMU sensors and the number of aiding 
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sensors available. 
The filter measurement vector is formulated as follows and its size depends on 
available sensor systems. 
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From the error analysis of GNSS and inertial systems given in Chapter 4, the 
system noise covariance Q  and measurement noise covariance R  may change with 
each time or measurement update, however here they are assumed to be constant in 
order to avoid the real-time computation of these two matrices. The determination of 
R  is based on a prior statistical characteristics of the sensor measurement noises, 
which can be obtained by practically testing sensor systems. Rational selection of R  
should guarantee the robustness of the Kalman filter to the change of measurement 
noise. The standard deviations of the measurement noises of several navaid systems 
are summarised in Tables J-2 and J-3 in Appendix J, which are used to determine R  
in this simulation study. 
The determination of the system noise covariance Q  is generally more difficult 
as it cannot be determined by practically testing or directly observing the dynamic 
system. However, the uncertainties of the initial filter states, including the basic state 
error and sensor error, can be used as reference values for the selection of Q . Tables 
J-1 and J-4 in Appendix J give the initial uncertainties of the basic state errors and 
sensor errors.  
The dynamic reconfiguration of the cg node filter includes the filter state vector 
reconfiguration and the measurement vector reconfiguration. The cg node system 
compensation consists of the navigation state compensation and the SRIMU error 
compensation, as shown in Figure J.2 of Appendix.  
The operating modes of the multi-mode Kalman filter and the sensor systems 
used the cg node are listed in Table 7-1. The initial values of the navigation states are 
given in Table J-4 of Appendix J.   
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Table 7-1 Kalman Filter Operating Modes 
IMU ADS Heading 
Sensor 
GNSS 
Range 
GNSS 
Attitude 
KF Mode 
X X X X X All measurement available 
X X  X X Lost heading sensor 
X  X X X Lost ADS 
X   X X Lost ADS & heading sensor 
X X X X  Lost GPS attitude function 
X X X   No GPS signals 
7.2.4 Software Development and Evaluation 
This software simulation system is implemented by use of Matlab. Software 
development is based on the top-down design and bottom-up realisation strategies. In 
the top-down software design, all the software modules described in the previous 
sections are decomposed into several sub-modules according to the functions to be 
completed. In each sub-module, the main function is further decomposed into many 
sub-functions, each realising one or more relatively independent tasks. Accordingly, 
the top-down design generates software function trees (see in Figure 7.6). In contrast, 
the programming is based on the bottom-up strategy. The lowest-level sub-functions 
are first programmed, tested and integrated into the higher-level sub-functions. 
Higher-level sub-functions are then integrated and tested to form a sub-module. Data 
transfer between modules and functions uses actual parameters. Furthermore, all the 
navigation states and kinematic parameters are defined as the global variables which 
can be directly invoked in all modules and functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Top-Down Software System Design 
The evaluation of the software system consists of the static and dynamic testing 
procedures. The static evaluation is also based on the bottom-up method. The lowest-
Top level software module 
Sub-module 1 Sub-module n 
Subfunction 1 Subfunction n 
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level subroutines are first tested and then sub-modules are tested. The bottom-up 
testing procedures verify if the subroutines or sub-modules can produce the expected 
outputs using pre-known static data as their inputs. For example, in order to test the 
SRIMU attitude determination module, an IMU is assumed to be fixed on a static 
platform with known orientation. The SRIMU then measures the components of the 
Earth’s rotation rate and gravity vectors. The use of these components as the input 
data of the attitude module can examine the correctness of the attitude computation. 
All the sub-modules and functions were tested using similar methods before they 
were integrated into the software simulation system.  
The dynamic evaluation is a system test procedure and is generally based on 
the predictability of the behaviour of the software simulation systems. For example, 
an inertial system shows the Schuler period of 84.4890 minutes. This feature can be 
used to test the correctness of the inertial simulation subsystem. If the Schuler period 
of the navigation states given by the inertial simulation software system differs from 
the theoretical Schuler value, then the sub-module and functions in the inertial 
software system must be re-evaluated using the static testing procedures. The GNSS 
positioning solutions normally have the maximum error thresholds if no GNSS signal 
failures occur. In order to evaluate the GNSS software simulation subsystem, the 
maximum error thresholds for the GNSS-derived position and velocity are assumed 
to be 200 m and 1 m/s. If the outputs of the GNSS software simulation subsystem 
exceed the specified thresholds, then all the sub-modules and functions in the GNSS 
software system will be re-evaluated by using the static testing procedures. 
The evaluation of the distributed data fusion filter software systems is a more 
complex procedure. Although the static testing procedures can assure the correctness 
of subroutines, the dynamic testing procedure cannot completely check the suitability 
of the fusion filter software systems because there are many uncertainties of sensor 
measurements. Therefore, the dynamic evaluation is mainly to examine the abnormal 
behaviours of the filter software systems from the perspective of the filter states. In 
normal operation, the filter states will change smoothly over time if the sensor signal 
failures have not been injected into its measurements. The designed true trajectory is 
used as a reference to test the correctness of the software simulation system. 
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7.3 MW-GLRT Algorithm Test Results 
This simulation study considers two cases for the evaluation of the MW-GLRT 
algorithms developed in Chapter 5, that is, SRIMU configurations consisting of four 
sensors and five sensors. The test procedure is illustrated in Figure 7.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Two-Step FDI Test Procedure  
In the 4-sensor configurations, the MW-GLRT algorithms are tested by 
detecting mid-value and drift failures. In the 5-sensor configurations, the MW-GLRT 
algorithms are evaluated by detecting, identifying and estimating large jump failures. 
The parameters for the design of the MW-GLRT algorithms are listed in Table J-6 of 
Appendix J. 
The simulation test results of the SRIMU error compensation filters are shown 
in Figures 7.8 and 7.9 where the SRIMU is based on a 4-sensor cube configuration. 
These simulation results show that the use of the SRIMU error compensation filters 
can slow down the degradation of the accuracy of the free SRIMU navigation 
system. As a result, this error compensation filter can be used to compensate for the 
absence of the navaid systems, for example, for interruptions and unavailability of 
GPS signals. 
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Figure 7.8 Attitude Errors without the SRIMU Filter 
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Figure 7.9 Attitude Errors with the SRIMU Filter 
In the following simulations, it will further be shown that combination of the 
local node fusion filters and the SRIMU error compensation filters in the inertial 
network system can greatly increase the integrity and accuracy of the navigation state 
estimates. 
The simulation test results of the MW-GLRT algorithms are shown in Figures 
7.10 to 7.14 for the 4-sensor-cube configuration where sensor drift failures and a 
mid-value failure occur. The results given in Figure 7.10 show the attitude errors 
caused by the effects of a mid-value gyro failure on the inertial attitude determination 
function. Although the gyro mid-value failure may not be detected by the short time 
MW-GLRT method, as shown in Figure 7.11, it can be detected by the sequential 
MW-GLRT method, as illustrated in Figure 7.12.  
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Figure 7.10 Attitude Errors in Present of a Mid-Value Gyro Failure 
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Figure 7.11 Gyro Detection Function Using Short Time MW-GLRT in 4-Sensor 
Cube6 
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Figure 7.12 Gyro Detection Function Using Sequential MW-GLRT in 4-Sensor 
Cube 
                                                 
6
 In all figures, DF represents Detection Function and Td means detection Threshold. 
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The simulation test results of SRIMU drift failures are shown in Figures 7.13 
and 7.14 where the drift failure is undetectable using the MW-GLRT algorithm, but 
can be detected by the sequential MW-GLRT algorithm.  
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Figure 7.13 Gyro Drift Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 4-
Sensor Cube 
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Figure 7.14 Gyro Drift Detection Function Using Sequential MW-GLRT in 4-
Sensor Cube 
For the 5-sensor cone configuration, the simulation test results are shown in 
Figures 7.15 to 7.23 where the SRIMU system may experience jump failures, mid-
value failures and drift failures.  
Figures 7.15 to 7.17 show the case where one gyro has a mid-value failure and 
one accelerometer has a jump-step failure. The accelerometer jump failure is 
detected and identified by the MW-GLRT algorithm. Furthermore, the accelerometer 
failure signal is estimated and compensated in the SRIMU measurements, as shown 
in Figure 7.16, where the failure signal of the fault accelerometer is 0.02g and its 
estimate is 0.1928 m/s2.  
The mid-value gyro failure is detected by the sequential MW-GLRT, as shown 
ST MW-GLRT Detection Function for Gyro Drift Failure 
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in Figure 7.17 in comparison with Figure 7.15. 
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Figure 7.15 Gyro Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
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Figure 7.16 Accelerometer Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 
5-Sensor Cone  
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Figure 7.17 Gyro Detection Function Using Sequential MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
Figures 7.18 to 7.20 show the case where two accelerometers (sensors 1 and 4 
ST MW-GLRT Detection Function for Gyro Mid-Value Failure 
ST MW-GLRT Detection Function for Accelerometer Jump Failure 
Sequential MW-GLRT Detection Function for Gyro Mid-Value Failure 
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shown in Figure 5.4(c)) have jump failures sequentially and one gyro has a mid-
value failure.  
From Figure 7.18, the mid-value gyro failure cannot be detected by the short-
time MW-GLRT algorithm, but can be detected by the sequential MW-GLRT 
algorithm, as shown in Figure 7.19. 
In Figure 7.20, the failure signal of accelerometer 1 is 0.006g and its estimate 
is 0.0711 m/s2. The failure signal of accelerometer 4 is 0.02g and the corresponding 
estimate is 0.1928 m/s2. 
ST MW-GLRT Detection Function for Gyro Mid-Value Failure
0.E+00
1.E-06
2.E-06
3.E-06
4.E-06
5.E-06
6.E-06
7.E-06
8.E-06
9.E-06
1.E-05
1 3 6 8 11 13 16 18 21 23 26 28 31 33 36 38 41 43 46 48 51 53 56 58 61 63 66 68 71 73 76
Time(second)
Va
lu
e
DF
Td
 
Figure 7.18 Gyro Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
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Figure 7.19 Gyro Detection Function Using Sequential MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
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Figure 7.20 Accelerometer Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT 
Figures 7.21 to 7.23 show the test results where both two accelerometers and 
two gyroscopes have jump failures. In Figure 7.21, gyro 2 has a failure signal of 0.04 
rad/s and the corresponding estimate is 0.040 rad/s.  
Gyro 4 has a failure signal of 0.002 rad/s and the estimate is 0.006 rad/s. 
Clearly, the estimate of the failure signal for gyro 4 is far from the true value. 
However, the error caused by the estimation can be detected by the sequential MW-
GLRT, as shown in Figure 7.22.  
In Figure 7.23, the failure signal of accelerometer 1 is 0.006g and its estimate 
is 0.0711 m/s2. Accelerometer 4 has a failure signal of 0.02g and its estimate is 
0.1928 m/s2. 
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Figure 7.21 Gyro Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
 SIMULATION SYSTEM AND RESULTS 
 
7.3 MW-GLRT Algorithm Test Results 
 190 
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Figure 7.22 Gyro Detection Function Using Sequential MW-GLRT in 5-Sensor 
Cone 
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Figure 7.23 Accelerometer Detection Function Using Short-Time MW-GLRT in 
5-Sensor Cone 
Further simulations were performed for different SRIMU configurations 
consisting of 4 and 5 sensors. The simulation research results are summarised below: 
• Optimal SRIMU configurations are determined on the basis of a trade-off 
of the minimum GDOP factor, allocation of normalised variances of 
SRIMU measurement errors in orthogonal body axes and SRIMU FDI 
capability. Coplanar sensor installation should be avoided in order to obtain 
maximum FDI capability in terms of sensor configuration. 
• Two 4-sensor and four 5-sensor SRIMU configurations were also simulated 
in the occurrence of one sensor failure and their estimate accuracy and 
degradation performance were compared. The simulation results show that 
cone configurations in 4-sensor or 5-sensor SRIMUs can provide a better 
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estimate of the measured state and minimum degradation of performance 
for various SRIMU configurations for one sensor failure. 
• The simulation results have shown that SRIMU error compensation filters 
can improve the accuracy of an SRIMU system and the performance of FDI 
algorithms developed in this thesis. The degradation of an SRIMU system 
is reduced so that the navaid systems (for example, GNSS) have sufficient 
time and access to satellite signals to correct the SRIMU systems. 
• The short-time MW-GLRT algorithms can remove abnormal measurement 
noise and detect (and estimate) sensor hard failures. In the simulation, the 
detection threshold values were determined on the basis of the probability 
of a false alarm of 10-6 and the probability of a missed alarm of 10-5.  
• The sequential MW-GLRT algorithms can efficiently detect mid-value and 
drift failures, which degrade the accuracy of an SRIMU system without 
alarm.  
7.4 Distributed Data Fusion Filter Test Results 
The aim of this simulation study is to test and evaluate the node filters and the 
node state integrity monitoring algorithms that have been developed in Chapters 4 
and 6. In this simulation, the GNSS simulation module is assumed to provide the raw 
measurements and navigation state information at the rate of 1Hz, the inertial 
navigation module outputs attitude information at the rate of 50 Hz and the position 
and velocity at the rate of 1Hz and other navaid systems output at the rate of 1Hz. 
Several cases in Table 7-2 were simulated and the results are given in the following 
subsections.  
Table 7-2 Simulation Cases 
Simulation 
 Case 
SRIMU 
(Gyro Drift Rate) 
GNSS Information 
(PR, PRR & Attitudes) 
1A 1 0/h No interruption Case 1 
1B 1 0/h GNSS attitude available for maximum 6 minutes 
2A 10 0/h No interruption Case 2 
2B 10 0/h GNSS attitude interruption for maximum 6 minutes 
Case 3  40 0/h Slave node simulation 
Case 4  gyro failures GPS signal failures 
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The aircraft can perform arbitrary manoeuvres with a maximum acceleration of 
3.0g. In order to compare the simulation results, however, an identical true trajectory 
is designed for all the simulation cases. A typical true flight trajectory is shown from 
Figures 7.24 to 7.26. The true flight path is depicted in Figure 7.24 where the arrow 
represents the flight direction. Figures 7.25 is the true horizontal manoeuvres and 
Figure 7.26 is the true vertical manoeuvres. To evaluate the performance of the data 
fusion algorithms developed in this PhD study, the true trajectory is used as reference 
values to compare with the estimated states of the aircraft motion. Therefore, all the 
state errors are the differences between the true and estimated aircraft motion states. 
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Figure 7.24 True Flight Trajectory 
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Figure 7.25 True Aircraft Horizontal Manoeuvres 
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Figure 7.26 True Aircraft Vertical Manoeuvres 
7.4.1 Simulation Results at cg Node  
In this simulation, the GNSS information available is summarised as follows: 
• GNSS pseudorange (PR) and pseudorange rate (PRR) measurements, 
• GNSS-based attitude information. 
For a gyro bias of 10/h, the simulation test results at the cg node are shown in 
Figures 7.27 to 7.35 where there is no GNSS signal interruption. In the following 
figures, the absolute errors, which are the differences between the true and estimated 
states, are used to describe the realistic state estimate errors whereas the standard 
deviations of the state estimate errors represent the accuracy of the state estimates.  
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Figure 7.27 The cg Node Attitude Errors in Case 1A  
Attitude Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
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Figure 7.28 The cg Node Attitude Error Standard Deviations in Case 1A  
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Figure 7.29 the cg Node Velocity Errors in Case 1A  
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Figure 7.30 The cg Node Velocity Error Standard Deviations in Case 1A 
Attitude Errors Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
Velocity Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
Velocity Error Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
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Figure 7.31 The cg Node Position Errors in Case 1A 
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Figure 7.32 The cg Node Position Error Standard Deviations in Case 1A 
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Figure 7.33 DOP Factors in Case 1A 
Position Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
Position Error Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 10/h 
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Figure 7.34 Velocity Error Distribution, Figure 7.35 Position Error Distribution 
It should be noted that the changes of DOP factors are referenced to the GPS 
week time. However, the time scale lines in Figure 7.33 are completely corresponded 
to the time scale lines given in other figures. 
From Figures 7.29 to 7.33, and the parallel simulation results in Case 1B, it is 
observed that during the different simulation time intervals, the changes of the DOP 
factors significantly affect the error standard deviations of the navigation state 
estimates but have less effect on the realistic state estimates. The following suggestion 
may explain why abnormal changes of the visible satellite geometries have different 
effects on the state estimates than on their error covariances. These simulations show 
that the fusion filter acts as a low-pass filter that can remove the effects of poor 
GNSS geometries on the navigation state estimates. However, because the fusion 
filter does not select the optimal geometry of visible satellites but instead uses all the 
available GNSS measurements in order to monitor the fusion filter integrity, the poor 
GNSS geometry may raise the uncertainty of the error covariance estimates through 
the measurement matrix H. As a result, the covariance matrix could not be used as a 
sole means of monitoring the integrity of the fusion filter. It is necessary to further 
study the effects of the GNSS geometry on both the estimate accuracy and integrity 
of the fusion filter in the future research.  
The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.36 to 7.44 for the case where the 
GNSS attitude information is only available for a short time, for example from 100 to 
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350 seconds, 3500 to 3650 second and 5500 to 5650 seconds. 
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Figure 7.36 The cg Node Attitude Errors in Case 1B  
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Figure 7.37 The cg Node Attitude Error Standard Deviations in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.38 The cg Node Velocity Errors in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.39 The cg Node Velocity Error Standard Deviations in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.40 The cg Node Position Errors in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.41 The cg Node Position Error Standard Deviations in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.42 DOP Factors in Case 1B 
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Figure 7.43 Velocity Error Distribution, Figure 7.44 Position Error Distribution 
For a gyro bias of 100/h, the simulation results are given in Figures 7.45 to 7.53 
where the GNSS information is not interrupted. 
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Figure 7.45 The cg Node Attitude Errors in Case 2A 
Attitude Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 100/h 
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Figure 7.46 The cg Node Attitude Error Standard Deviations in Case 2A 
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Figure 7.47 The cg Node Velocity Errors in Case 2A 
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Figure 7.48 The cg Node Velocity Error Standard Deviations in Case 2A   
Attitude Error Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 100/h 
Velocity Errors (compared with the true valu s) with Gyro Drift Rate of 100/h 
Velocity Error Std Deviations with Gyro Dr f  Rate of 100/h 
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Figure 7.49 The cg Node Position Errors in Case 2A 
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Figure 7.50 The cg Node Position Error Standard Deviations in Case 2A 
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Figure 7.51 DOP Factors in Case 2A 
Position Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 100/h 
Position Error Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 100/h 
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Figure 7.52 Velocity Error Distribution, Figure 7.53 Position Error Distribution 
The simulation results are given in Figures 7.54 to 7.62 for the case where 
GNSS attitude information is interrupted from 600 to 950 second, 3500 to 3650 
seconds and 5500 to 5650 seconds,  
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Figure 7.54 The cg Node Attitude Errors in Case 2B 
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Figure 7.55 The cg Node Attitude Error Standard Deviations in Case 2B 
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Figure 7.56 The cg Node Velocity Errors in Case 2B  
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Figure 7.57 The cg Node Velocity Error Standard Deviations in Case 2B 
0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 5 0 0
- 1 5 0
- 1 0 0
- 5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
P o s i t i o n  E r r o rs ( c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  t r u e  va l u e s )
T im e ( s e c o n d )
Er
ro
r(m
)
N - p o s i t i o n
E - p o s i t i o n
H e i g h t
 
Figure 7.58 The cg Node Position Errors in Case 2B 
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Figure 7.59 The cg Node Position Error Standard Deviations in Case 2B 
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Figure 7.60 DOP Factors in Case 2B 
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Figure 7.61 Velocity Error Distribution, Figure 7.62 Position Error Distribution 
Further simulation studies were performed for other SRIMU configurations, 
low quality inertial sensors and GNSS-based position and velocity information. The 
simulation results are summarised in Table 7-2. These simulation results have shown 
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that by fusion of low quality SRIMUs with raw GNSS measurements and GNSS-
based attitude information, the distributed data fusion filters algorithms developed in 
this thesis can determine satisfactory navigation states although GNSS attitude 
information is only available for a short time, typically 1-2 minutes. It has also 
shown that the requirement for the drift or bias performance of gyro sensors of up to 
400/h can be accommodated in a distributed inertial network systems. However, it 
should be noted that GNSS-based attitude information can significantly improve the 
accuracy of estimates of the attitude and velocity states. It is clear from these 
simulation results that the DOP factor has a significant effect on the accuracy of the 
estimates of aircraft position and velocity errors.  
Although use of GNSS-based position and velocity information may produce 
better estimates of the navigation states, these fusion methods have a significant 
disadvantage. If the number of visible satellites is less than four, then GNSS-based 
position and velocity is unavailable. GNSS attitude information alone cannot reduce 
the degradation of the navigation velocity state.   
Table 7-3 Summary of Simulation Results (gyro bias is 400/h) 
Error State 4-Cone (1σ) 
PR+PRR 
 
4-Cone (1σ) 
PR+PRR  
GNSS Att. 
Interruption  
4-Cone (1σ) 
PR 
 
4-Cone (1σ) 
PR,GNSS Att. 
Interruption 
 
4-Cube (1σ) 
PR+PRR  
5-Cone (1σ) 
PR+PRR 
 
φ, θ 
ψ 
<0.20 
<0.20 
0.20  - 0.40 
0.30 
<0.30 
<0.30 
0.250 - 0.70 
0.30 
<0.20 
<0.20 
<0.20 
<0.20 
Vn, Ve 
Vd 
0.25 – 0.4 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.25 - 0.4 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.6 m/s 
0.8 – 1.0 m/s 
0.6 – 0.7 m/s 
0.8 – 1.0 m/s 
0.25 - 0.4 m/s 
0.5 m/s 
0.2 – 0.4 m/s 
<0.5 m/s 
Horizontal 
Vertical 
1.5 - 2.5 m 
2 – 5 m 
1.5 – 2.5 m 
2 - 5 m 
2.5 - 3.0 m 
5 m 
2.5 - 3.0 m 
5 –8 m 
1.5 - 2.5 m 
2 – 5 m 
1.5 - 2.5 m 
2 – 5 m 
7.4.2 Simulation Results at Slave Nodes 
For the simulation of the data fusion filters at all slave modes, position velocity 
and attitude information is available from the cg node or multifunctional GNSS 
sensor. Figures 7.63 to 7.67 show the simulation results without aiding attitude 
information interruptions and with a gyro bias of up to 400/h.  
Although the accuracy of the velocity and attitude estimates at the slave node is 
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less than the estimates at the cg node, the accuracy of the navigation state estimates 
still satisfies the requirements of the navigation states and local motion compensation 
and other airborne avionics systems. 
0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 5 0 0
- 1 . 5
-1
- 0 . 5
0
0 . 5
1
1 . 5
A t t i t u d e  E r ro r s (c o m p a re d  w i t h  t h e  t ru e  va lu e s )
T im e (s e c o n d )
Er
ro
r(d
eg
)
R o l l
P i t c h
Y a w
 
Figure 7.63 The Slave Node Attitude Errors in Case 3 
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Figure 7.64 The Slave Node Attitude Error Standard Deviations in Case 3 
Attitude Errors (compared with the true values) with Gyro Drift Rate of 400/h 
Attitude Error Std Deviations with Gyro Drift Rate of 400/h 
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Figure 7.65 The Slave Node Velocity Errors in Case 3 
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Figure 7.66 The Slave Node Velocity Error Standard Deviations in Case 3 
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Figure 7.67 Velocity Error Distribution at the Slave Node in Case 3 
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7.4.3 Data Fusion Filter Integrity Testing Results  
This simulation study tests the integrity of the distributed data fusion filters. 
Sensor failures have been inserted in the SRIMU and GNSS measurements. The 
statistical characteristics of two testing methods described in Sections 3.2 and 6.5 are 
examined and the simulation results are shown in Figures 7.68 to 7.76.  
Figures 7.68 to 7.70 shown the test results for the case where one gyro has a 
jump failure signal after 6000 seconds for 100 seconds and one accelerometer has a 
jump failure signal after 2000 seconds in a 4-gyro cone configuration. 
 
Figure 7.68 Attitude Errors at the cg Node in Case 4 
 
Figure 7.69 NQI for Attitude Innovation at the cg Node in Case 4 
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Figure 7.70 NQR for Attitude Residual at the cg Node in Case 4 
Figures 7.71 to 7.76 show the test results for the case where one of visible GPS 
satellites has a jump failure signal after 4000 seconds for 100 seconds. 
 
Figure 7.71 Velocity Errors at the cg Node in Case 4 
 
Figure 7.72 NQI for Range Rate Innovation at the cg Node in Case 4 
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Figure 7.73 NQR for Range Rate Residual at the cg Node in Case 4 
 
Figure 7.74 Position Errors at the cg Node in Case 4 
 
 
Figure 7.75 NQI for Range Innovation at the cg Node in Case 4 
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Figure 7.76 NQR for Range Residual at the cg Node in Case 4 
These simulation results show that the normalised quadratic innovation (NQI) 
function can successfully detect the measurement bias signals caused by GPS signal 
failures and the normalised error quadratic (NEQ) function can monitor the abnormal 
shifts of the navigation states, caused by large sensor drifts or uncertainties of the 
model parameters. 
The results obtained from these simulation researches are summarised below: 
• The DOP factor affects the accuracy of estimates of navigation state errors. 
Large DOP factors result in large error variances of the navigation states. 
When the GNSS pseudorange measurements are only used as the 
observables of the data fusion filter, the jump of GDOP will cause large 
estimate errors of the position and velocity, even abnormal velocity errors 
if the GDOP has a step jump exceeding one unit. These simulations have 
shown that the effect of GDOP factors on the estimate accuracy can be 
significantly reduced if GNSS pseudorange and Doppler measurements are 
used as the filter measurements. 
• Use of the GNSS PR or PR and PRR measurements with GNSS-based 
attitude information as the observables of the distributed data fusion filters 
can obtain similar attitude estimate accuracy but use of the GNSS PR and 
PRR information has the significant advantage in terms of control of 
velocity errors. Therefore, GNSS PRR information should be used to 
control system velocity errors. 
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• Up to 30-minute GNSS attitude interruption can be tolerated after the 
distributed data fusion filter has run for 10 minutes, depending on the 
performance of the gyro sensors. Maximum attitude error generally occurs 
in roll angle whereas errors in the pitch and yaw angles can be controlled 
by the velocity information. 
• The navigation performance of a 4-sensor cube configuration is similar to a 
4-sensor cone configuration. The 5-sensor cone has better attitude accuracy 
than 4-sensor configurations. The accuracy of attitude estimates in inertial 
network systems depend on the accuracy of the GNSS-based attitudes. The 
accuracy of the navigation velocity state largely depends on the accuracy of 
GNSS Doppler measurements. 
• The NQI and NQR methods can be used to monitor the distributed data 
fusion filter integrity. It is recommended that the distributed inertial 
network system should combine three failure detection functions: the short 
time MW GLRT, the sequential MW-GLT FDI and the distributed data 
fusion filter integrity monitoring to achieve adequate safety requirements. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter described the software simulation system and a number of 
simulation studies. The main activities included: 
1. Development of a modularised multisensor software simulation system and 
description of its architecture and associated functions.  
2. Introduction of inertial simulation and GPS simulation systems and the 
architecture of multi-mode data fusion filters at network nodes. 
3. Performance analysis of numerous simulation studies to test and evaluate 
the methods and algorithms developed in this thesis. 
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Chapte r  8  
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research undertaken in this thesis. Section 8.2 
highlights the major contributions of the thesis. The main conclusions obtained from 
the simulation studies are summarised in Section 8.3. Further research studies are 
discussed in Section 8.4.  
8.2 Contributions  
This thesis covers the development of multisensor data fusion methodologies 
for the design, development, analysis, and simulation of reliable fault-tolerant aircraft 
navigation systems. The use of the methods developed in this thesis and their 
applications to low-cost (low-quality) inertial network systems integrated with 
multifunctional GNSS sensors can afford benefits in the cost, size, weight, accuracy, 
reliability and integrity of aircraft navigation systems. These methods can also be 
used for the design of navigation and attitude determination systems for marine 
vessels and space vehicles. The major contributions made during this PhD study are 
summarised in the following sections.  
8.2.1 Multisensor Data Fusion Model 
The application of the recent RNP concept to the design of multisensor 
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navigation systems leads to a problem: how can multiple sensor systems and their 
measurements be combined to achieve the RNP requirements for aircraft navigation 
systems? The solution to this problem is based on multisensor data fusion 
technologies. 
1. An original generalised multisensor data fusion model was presented for 
the design of aircraft navigation systems. This model consists of four 
modules, each addressing specific aspects of the RNP requirements and 
implementing different functions to ensure that the RNP requirements of 
aircraft navigation systems can be satisfied. This model can be used to 
assist and guide navigation system engineers to develop reliable and 
accurate aircraft navigation systems and to reduce the development cycle 
and costs. 
2. The navigation and attitude determination equations of inertial systems and 
GNSS were normalised. It is shown in the development of the simulation 
software system that the normalised equations provide a convenient method 
for the design of data fusion filters for distributed inertial network systems. 
This normalisation can be used to provide a standardised development 
procedure for inertial/GNSS integrated systems.  
8.2.2 Sensor FDI and Network Integrity Methods 
Two important modifications to the traditional GLRT FDI methods are the 
MW-GLRT methods and sensor error compensation filters. A combination of sensor-
level and system-level FDI procedures can achieve high levels of reliability and 
integrity for distributed sensor network systems.  
1. In comparison with traditional GLRT methods, the sequential MW-GLRT 
methods exceed the performance of the previous methods in the detection 
of various sensor failures. The simulation studies show that the sequential 
methods provide improved detection performance and efficiency, for 
example, detection of drift sensor failures in a short time and compensation 
for normal SRIMU measurement errors.  
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2. These improved algorithms are further extended by using the outputs of the 
distributed fusion filters to monitor the integrity of an inertial network 
system, including the inertial vector states and the similar node states in the 
inertial network system. The simulation studies also show that any jump 
and drift failures in distributed sensor systems can be successfully detected 
by the use of the inertial network integrity monitoring algorithms.  
3. In comparison with current integrity monitoring methods, which generally 
detect failure at the system level, the simulation studies have shown that the 
combination of sensor-level FDI and system-level integrity monitoring 
procedures greatly improves the integrity and fault tolerance of distributed 
sensor network systems. 
8.2.3 Distributed Data Fusion Algorithms 
Two forms of distributed sensor systems have been examined, focusing on 
distributed inertial network fusion algorithms. 
1. Two data fusion algorithms were developed for state-identical distributed 
sensor systems, known as the Type I and Type IA algorithms. This form of 
distributed systems covers the majority of current designs of integrated 
navigation systems. It is significant that these two algorithms can be used 
for the design of integrated navigation systems for space, air and land 
vehicles and also marine vessels. This method was used in the SHINE 
programme to develop a multi-mode hybridised navigation filter. 
2. Two data fusion algorithms were developed for state-associated distributed 
sensor network systems, known as the Type II and Type IIA algorithms. It 
is expected that this method can be used in the design of the next 
generations of aircraft navigation systems, particularly inertial network 
navigation systems for military aircraft. 
3. An inertial network sensing model was developed and two algorithms were 
described to determine the dynamic transformation matrices.  
4. Innovative distributed inertial network fusion algorithms were presented; 
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including distributed inertial data fusion algorithms and distributed state 
fusion algorithms. The simulation studies show that the inertial network 
fusion algorithms can significantly improve the accuracy of the estimations 
of the inertial vector states and similar node states in an inertial network 
system. Moreover, these algorithms are capable of performing dynamic 
alignment and calibration of inertial sensor systems in an inertial network 
system.  
8.2.4 Multisensor Simulation Environment 
A multisensor simulation system environment was developed to simulate GPS, 
skewed redundant inertial systems and other sensor systems. This simulation system 
has been used to test and evaluate the range of data fusion algorithms developed in 
this thesis for distributed sensor network systems. It was also used to evaluate the 
FDI algorithms and the multi-mode hybridised Kalman filter developed for the 
SHINE programme. This simulation system provided an extremely convenient tool 
for the design and development of multisensor navigation systems. 
8.3 Conclusions 
A wide range of simulation studies was performed during the course of this 
research study. The main simulation results are summarised below.   
8.3.1 SRIMU Configurations 
Several SRIMU configurations were evaluated and the following results were 
obtained: 
1. Optimal SRIMU configurations were determined on the basis of trade-off 
of the minimum GDOP factor, the allocation of normalised variances of 
measurement errors along orthogonal body axes and the FDI capability. 
Coplanar sensor installation should be avoided in order to obtain the 
maximum FDI capability. 
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2. Accuracies of measured state estimates and degradation of performance of 
two 4-sensor SRIMU configurations and four 5-sensor configurations were 
compared in the presence of several sensor failures. The full cone SRIMU 
configurations in 4-sensor or 5-sensor SRIMU systems are recommended 
because degradation of SRIMU performance for the cone configuration is 
minimised for the various configurations simulated in this thesis.  
8.3.2 FDI and Integrity Monitoring Algorithms 
The MW-GLRT FDI algorithms and the inertial network integrity monitoring 
algorithms were tested in the simulation environment and the main test results are 
summarised below. 
1. The short-time MW-GLRT method can eliminate abnormal measurement 
noise and detect sensor hard failures. Furthermore, the sequential MW-
GLRT algorithms can efficiently detect mid-value and drift failures (which 
may degrade the accuracy of the SRIMU systems) without generating an 
alarm.  
2. SRIMU error compensation filters can improve the accuracy of SRIMU 
systems and the performance of the MW-GLRT algorithms.  
3. A combination of inertial data assimilation algorithms with the MW-GLRT 
algorithms can detect various sensor failures in an inertial network system. 
The filter-based integrity monitoring algorithms can effectively monitor the 
integrity of the distributed data fusion filters. 
8.3.3 Distributed Inertial Network Fusion Algorithms 
The distributed inertial network fusion algorithms were tested during this study 
and the significant conclusions are summarised below.  
1. By applying distributed inertial network fusion algorithms to a low-cost 
inertial network system (low-cost inertial sensors are characterised by a 
gyro bias ranging from 100/h to 400/h in this thesis), the attitude states at 
the cg node were estimated at 0.2 degrees (one sigma) even though GNSS-
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based attitude information was unavailable for thirty minutes. The attitude 
states at slave nodes were estimated at 0.26 degrees (one sigma) even 
though gyros at the node have a bias of 400/h. These simulation studies 
imply that low-cost inertial network systems would be used in future 
avionics systems to replace high-quality inertial sensors and that SRIMU 
configurations would replace orthogonal configurations. 
2. Distributed inertial network fusion filters can dynamically correct and align 
SRIMU systems in an inertial network system. Therefore, the traditional 
inertial system alignment algorithms are no longer necessary in distributed 
inertial network systems, for example, the transfer and fine alignments that 
have been used to correct inertial system errors at initialisation and to in 
flight align low-accurate slave inertial systems to a high-accurate master 
inertial system. Traditional transfer alignments need an aircraft to perform 
specified manoeuvres, typically covering horizontal straight flight followed 
by an ‘S’ flight for up to ten minutes. The elimination of traditional 
alignment procedures allows an aircraft to perform manoeuvres without the 
consideration of the above constraints. This is particularly important for 
military aircraft where these constraints can increase the risk to aircraft and 
pilots.  
8.4 Future Work 
Although the main solutions to the problem of data fusion methodologies in the 
development of aircraft multisensor navigation systems have been addressed in this 
thesis, the author feels that further research is necessary in several areas. 
8.4.1 SRIMU Calibration and Error Dynamic Models 
In SRIMU configurations, inertial sensors are installed along skewed axes with 
respect to the orthogonal instrument frame axes. Such configurations results in gyros 
and accelerometers which are more sensitive to translational and rotational motion of 
an aircraft in comparison with an orthogonal IMU configuration. These coupling 
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relationships should be modelled in SRIMU error models. This thesis has mainly 
identified the misalignment angles in SRIMU configurations as sources of error. For 
that reason, one area of the future research should be directed to develop more 
comprehensive SRIMU error dynamic models. The author believes that this 
research will improve the performance of distributed inertial network fusion filters in 
terms of estimate accuracy and network integrity. 
From review of the literature, current research is rarely concerned with SRIMU 
calibration although the calibration of orthogonal IMUs has been standardised. It is 
recommended that another area of the future research should be development of 
SRIMU calibration algorithms. It is particularly important to SRIMU manufacturers 
and companies developing SRIMU-based integrated navigation systems. 
8.4.2 Distributed Data Fusion Problems 
Normalised GNSS attitude determination equations were developed during this 
study programme. If the author had had sufficient time, the normalised GNSS 
attitude determination equation would have been integrated into the measurement 
models of distributed fusion filters to evaluate the performance of real-time (on-the-
fly) kinematic GNSS/inertial network systems. In comparison with direct resolution 
of the GNSS attitude algorithm, the combination of the normalised GNSS attitude 
determination equation with inertial network dynamic models can provide benefits in 
terms of real-time carrier phase ambiguity resolution and GNSS attitude estimate 
accuracy. However, many current kinematic GPS/inertial integrated systems use a 
two-step estimation procedure. First, the GPS attitude determination equation is 
resolved to obtain the GPS-based attitude solution. Then, the GPS-based attitude 
solution is used as the observable of the integrated navigation filter. Therefore, 
further research should be directed to real-time kinematic GNSS/ inertial network 
systems. It is not necessary to seek for an integer solution of carrier phase ambiguity 
in such studies. Nevertheless certain criteria have to be developed to minimise a cost 
function of attitude errors.  
 Recent research shows that the fusion of imaging sensors and navigational 
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sensors can detect and locate obstacles in specific phases of flight. Fusion of real-
time images, navigation states and GIS database information can provide a vision 
capability that allows an aircraft to operate in harsh weather environments and may 
reduce controlled flight into terrain and approach-and-landing accidents. Therefore, 
further research in multisensor data fusion methodologies should be directed to 
develop comprehensive sensor fusion algorithms for flight safety, enhancement of 
synthetic vision systems, terrain obstacle avoidance and guidance and proximity 
ground warning systems, as well as aircraft navigation systems.  
8.4.3 Inertial Network Failure Detection 
Detection filter techniques have been used in many control systems for failure 
detection. It is likely that these methods could be used in distributed inertial network 
systems. Further research should be pointed to evaluate the usability and detection 
performance of failure detection filters in inertial network systems.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A-1 WGS-84 Parameters 
Parameters Notation Value 
Semi-major axis 
aR  m 6378137  
Normalized C20 61016685.484 −×−  
Flattening (ellipticity) f  257223563.298/.1  
Semi-minor axis Rb  
m
fRR ab
 3142.6356752     
)1(
=
−=
 
Eccentricity squared 2e  
3
2
1036943799901.6    
)2(
−×=
−= ffe
 
Angular velocity of the Earth Ω  rad/s10292115.7 5−×  
The Earth’s gravitational constant GM 238 /sm 10418.3986004 ×  
Gravity at the equator 
0g  2s/m 780373.9  
Gravity formula constant 
1g  0.00193185138639 
Velocity of light C  sm / 299792458  
Table A-2 Inertial Sensor Performance Parameters 
Performance Requirements 
 
Performance 
Parameters 
Unit 
Aided IRS 
(Control) 
AHRS 
(Tactical Grade) 
INS 
(Navigation Grade) 
Bias uncertainty h/0  10-40 1-10 0.005-0.01 
Scale factor 
stability 
ppm 100-500 100-500 5-50 
Misalignment arcsec 200 200 10 
G
y
ro
scop
e
 Random noise Hzh //0  1-5 0.2-0.5 0.002-0.005 
Bias uncertainty gµ  2000 200-500 10-50 
Scale factor 
stability 
ppm 500-1000 500-1000 200 
Misalignment arcsec 200 200 10 
A
ccelero
m
eter
 
Random noise Hzg /µ  200-400 200-400 5-10 
Table A-3 Performance and Trends for MEMS-based Inertial Sensors 
Sensor/Performance Current State Trends 
Bias ( h/0 ) 100-200 1-10 
Scale factor (ppm)  500 100-200 
 
Gyros  
Noise floor ( Hzh //0 ) 10-60 1-10 
Bias ( gµ ) 500-1000 100-300 
 Scale factor (ppm) 50-100 10-30 
 
Accelerometers 
Random noise ( Hzg /µ ) 100-200 10-100 
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APPENDIX B 
The magnitude of the gravity at the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid can be 
approximated by the following equation[105]: 








−
+
=
)sin(1
)sin(g1gg
2
1
084-WGS ϕ
ϕ
e
 (B.1) 
and the variation of the gravity with aircraft altitude can be approximated by 
2
a
a
84-WGS hR
Rgg 
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In the wander frame, the direction of the gravity points downward along the axis wz . 
Therefore, the gravity vector can be represented as 










=
g
0
0
wg  (B.3) 
Given an initial velocity, Eq. (4.16) can be integrated to obtain the current 
aircraft velocity in terms of the wander coordinates, which can be transformed into 
the NED frame by.  
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In the wander angle mechanization, the vertical component of the transport rate 
w
ze/w,  is defined as zero 0
w
ze/w, ≡ , and the horizontal components are computed as 
follows: 
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where nR  and eR  are the radius of curvature along the lines of constant longitude 
and latitude, respectively.  
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Quaternion Differential Equation 
Given an initial attitude DCM, the integration of Eq. (4.19) gives the current 
attitude DCM wbC . From Eq. (4.5), the Euler angles can be computed as follows: 
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CC ψφθ   (C.1) 
From Figure 4.2, the true heading angle is computed as 
αψψ −= w      (C.2) 
To simplify the computation of the attitude DCM differential equation, the 
quaternion form of the attitude matrix differential equation is generally used and 
given as follows: 
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The relationship between the quaternion and the attitude matrix is represented as: 
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The attitude angles can be computed from the following identities: 
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Linear Position Error Equations 
The angular position error θ∂  is defined in terms of the computed position 
DCM we
~C  and the true position DCM weC as follows: 
w
e
w
e )]([
~ CIC ×∂−= θ  (D.1) 
It can be rewritten as  
w
e
w
e
w
e
~ CCC −=δ  (D.2) 
w
e
w
e )( CC ×∂−= θδ  (D.3) 
Differentiating Eqs. (D.2) and (D.3) yields 
w
e
w
e
w
e )()( CCC  ×∂−×∂−= θθδ  (D.4) 
w
e
w
e/w
w
e
w
e/w
w
e
w
e
w
e )(
~)~(~ CCCCC ×+×−=−= δ  (D.5) 
Substituting Eq. (4.29) into Eq. (D.4), and Eq. (D.1) into Eq. (D.5) yields 
w
e
w
e/w
w
e )])(()[( CC ××∂−×∂−= θθδ   (D.6) 
w
e
w
e/w
w
e/w
w
e/w
w
e )]())(~()~[( CC ×−×∂×−×−= θδ   (D.7) 
Equating Eqs. (D.6) and (D.7)  
))(~())(()()~()( we/wwe/wwe/wwe/w ×∂×−××∂+×−×=×∂ θθθ    
))(~())(()()( we/wwe/wwe/w ×∂×−××∂+×=×∂ θθδθ   (D.8) 
Assuming we/w
w
e/w
~ ≈ , the vector form equivalent of Eq. (D.8) can be written as 
θδθ ∂×−=∂ )( e/wwe/w w  (D.9) 
Eq.(D.9) is known as the angular position error equation. 
In order to correct the errors of the geodetic location (latitude and longitude), it 
is necessary to determine the relationship between the angular position error θ∂  and 
the location errors. Let the latitude, longitude and wander angles be expressed in 
terms of their true values plus error terms as follows: 
δαααδϕϕϕδλλλ +=+=+=          ,~       ,~  (D.10) 
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Substituting Eq.(D.10) into Eq. (4.4) and expanding elements of the resultant 
position DCM matrix we
~C produces 
δϕϕ
δϕϕϕ
δϕϕϕ
)cos()3,3(             
)cos()sin(             
)sin()~sin()3,3(~
w
e
w
e
−=
−−≈
+−=−=
C
C
 (D.11a) 
δλλϕδϕλϕ
δλλϕδϕλϕλϕ
δλλδϕϕλϕ
)cos()cos())sin(sin()2,3(              
)cos()cos())sin(sin())sin(cos(              
)sin()cos()~sin()~cos()2,3(~
w
e
w
e
−+=
−+−≈
++−=−=
C
C
 (D.11b) 
δαϕαδϕϕα
δαϕαδϕϕαϕα
δϕϕδααϕα
)cos()sin()sin()cos()3,1(             
)cos()sin()sin()cos()cos()cos(             
)cos()cos()~cos()~cos()3,1(~
w
e
w
e
−−=
−−≈
++==
C
C
 (D.11c) 
Expanding the right side of Eq. (D.1), the elements corresponding to the DCM can be 
obtained as follows: 
xy
w
e
w
e )cos()sin()cos()cos()3,3()3,3(
~ θϕαθϕα ∂−∂+= CC  (D.12a) 
x
y
w
e
w
e
)]sin()sin()sin()cos()[cos(                              
)]sin()sin()cos()cos()[sin()2,3()2,3(~
θλϕαλα
θλϕαλα
∂−−
∂+−= CC
 (D.12b) 
yz
w
e
w
e )sin()cos()sin()3,1()3,1(
~ θϕθϕα ∂+∂+= CC  (D.12c) 
Equating Eqs. (D.11a) and (D.12a), Eqs. (D.11b) and (D.12b), and Eqs.(D.11c) 
and (D.12c), respectively, the following equations relate the angular position errors 
to the latitude, longitude and wander angle errors. 
z)sin( θδλϕδα ∂−−=  (D.13a) 
yx )cos()sin( θαθαδϕ ∂−∂=  (D.13b) 
])sin()[cos()cos(
1
yx θαθαϕ
δλ ∂+∂=  (D.13c) 
In vector form, these equations can be written as   










∂
∂
∂
=










z
y
x
geo_err
ang_err
θ
θ
θ
δα
δλ
δϕ
T  (D.14) 
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where geo_errang_errT  is the transformation matrix from the angular position errors to the 
geodetic location errors. 











 −
≡
1-))sin(tan(-))cos(tan(-
0)cos(
)sin(
)cos(
)cos(
0)cos()sin(
geo_err
ang_err
αϕαϕ
ϕ
α
ϕ
α
αα
T  (D.15) 
In the wander mechanisation, the vertical component of angular position error zθ∂  
can be assumed to be zero. 
However, many aiding navigation systems use the linear position errors as the 
error states to develop the measurement equations. It is necessary to derive the linear 
position error equations of inertial system. 
The linear position errors are defined as 
δϕδϕδϕ h)R(h)(R anR +≈+=  (D.16) 
δλϕδλϕδλ )cos()hR()cos()hR( aeR +≈+=  (D.17) 
and the relationship between the angular position errors and the linear position errors 
is given by 
R
a
R
e hR
)tan(
hR
)tan( δλϕδλϕδα
+
−≈
+
−=  (D.18a) 
R
a
R
a
R
e
R
n
x hR
)cos(
hR
)sin(
hR
)cos(
hR
)sin( δλαδϕαδλαδϕαθ
+
+
+
≈
+
+
+
=∂  (D.18b) 
R
a
R
a
R
e
R
n
y hR
)sin(
hR
)cos(
hR
)sin(
hR
)cos( δλαδϕαδλαδϕαθ
+
+
+
−≈
+
+
+
−=∂  (D.18c) 
Expanding both sides of Eq. (4.29) and assuming 0w ze/w, = , the geodetic location 
differential equations are derived as follows: 
w
e/w
w
e/w )cos()sin( ααϕ −=  (D.19) 
])sin()[cos()cos(
1 w
e/w
w
e/w ααϕ
λ +=  (D.20) 
Replacing h)(R n + and h)(R e +  in Eq. (4.21) by h)(R a + and then substituting the 
resultant Eq. (4.21) into Eqs. (D.19) and (D.20), the differential equations of the 
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linear position errors can be derived as follows:  
1
y
1
xyx
a
R
a
z
R
v)sin(v)cos(h]v)sin(v)[cos(
hR
1
          
hR
v
δαδαδαα
δϕϕδ
+++
+
−
+
=
 (D.21) 
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y
1
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a
Ryx
a
R
a
z
R
v)cos(v)(sinh ]v)cos(v)sin([
hR
1
         
]v)cos(v)sin([
hR
)tan(
hR
v
δαδαδαα
δϕααϕδλλδ
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+
−
+−
+
+
+
=

 (D.22) 
From Eq. (4.39a), the rate of change of height is defined as 
1
zyxxyzz vvv)vv~(h δθθδ −∂+−∂=−−≡   
Substituting Eqs. (D.18b, c) into the above equation yields 
1
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e
yx
R
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v
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1)v)cos(v)sin((      
hR
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−
+
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+
+=
 (D.23) 
In vector form, the linear position error differential equation can be written as 
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0)sin()cos(
h
R
R
a
yx
a
yx
a
yx
a
z
a
yx
a
yx
a
z
1
z
1
y
1
x
R
R
δ
δλ
δϕ
αααα
αα
ϕ
αα
αα
δ
δ
δ
αα
αα
δ
λδ
ϕδ



 (D.24)
 
From Eqs. (4.30c), (B.2) and (B.3) 
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

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−
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0
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and from Eqs.(D.18b, c) 
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APPENDIX E 
Tilt Error Differential Equations  
This computed attitude DCM wb
~C  can be represented in terms of the true 
attitude DCM wbC  as follows:  
w
b
w
b )]([
~ CIC ×∂−= φ  (E.1) 
where φ∂  is known as the tilt error vector. 
Let    wb
w
b
w
b
~ CCC −=δ  (E.2a) 
then wb
w
b )( CC ×∂−= φδ  (E.2b) 
Differentiating Eqs. (E.2a) and (E.2b) yields 
w
b
w
b
w
b )()( CCC  ×∂−×∂−= φφδ  (E.3a) 
w
b
w
b/w
w
b
w
b/w
w
b
w
b
w
b )(
~)~(~ CCCCC ×+×−=−= δ  (E.3b) 
Substituting Eq. (4.17) into Eq. (E.3a) results in  
w
b
w
b/w
w
b )])(()[( CC ××∂−×∂−= φφδ   (E.4a) 
and substituting Eq. (E.1) into Eq. (E.3b) yields 
w
b
w
b/w
w
b
w
b/w
w
b )()]()[~( CCIC ×+×∂−×−= φδ   (E.4b) 
From Eqs. (E.4a) and (E.4b)  
))(~))(()()~()( wb/wwb/wwb/wwb/w ×∂×−××∂+×−×=×∂ φφφ (  (E.5) 
In vector form, the above matrix equation can be equivalently represented as  
)~()( wb/wb/wwb/w  −+×∂=∂ wφφ  (E.6) 
Expanding the second term of the right side of Eq. (E.6) 
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I/bI/e
w
e/w
wb
I/b
w
b
w
I/e
w
I/e
w
e/w
w
e/w
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I/b
w
b
w
b
w
I/w
w
I/w
b
I/b
w
b
w
I/w
bw
b
b
I/b
w
bI/w
b
I/b
w
b
w
I/w
b
I/bI/wb/wb/w
)(                    
)(~~                    
)~(~                    
~~
~
                    
~~~
∆−×∂++=
∆−×∂+−+−=
∆−−−−=
+−∆−−=
+−−=−

C
CC
CCC
C
φδδ
φ
w
w
www
 (E.7) 
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where  
θθ
θδ
∂×=×∂−=
−×∂−=−=−=
)()(        
)]([~~
w
I/e
w
I/e
w
I/e
e
I/e
w
e
w
I/e
e
I/e
w
e
w
I/e
w
I/e
w
I/e

CIC
 (E.8) 
Note that we
w
e ][
~ CIC ×∂−= θ  in the above equation.  
Substituting Eq.(E.8) into Eq.(E.7) and the resultant Eq. (E.7) into Eq.(E.6) leads to 
ww
e/w
w
I/e
w
I/e
w
e/w
ww
I/w
w
I/e
w
e/w
ww
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w
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w
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w
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Therefore, 
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I/e
w
e/w
w
e/w
w
I/e )()]()[( ∆−∂×++∂×+×−=∂ θδφφ   (E.9) 
where 
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a
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δ
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


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+
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=
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a
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a
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1
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1
y
1
x
a
a
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000
h)(R
v
h)(R
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h)(R
v)cos(
h)(R
v
h)(R
v)cos(
h)(R
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v
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000
00
hR
1
-
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10
   
In order to correct the attitude angles, the relationship between the tilt errors 
and the Euler angle errors has to be determined. Let the computed Euler angles be 
expressed in terms of their true values plus error terms as follows: 
www
~
  ,
~
  ,
~ δψψψδθθθδφφφ +=+=+=  (E.10) 
Substituting Eq. (E.10) into the left side of Eq. (E.1) and expanding both sides of the 
resultant equation, the following equations relate the tilt errors to the Euler errors. 
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)cos(
)sin()cos( ywxw
θ
φψφψδφ ∂+∂−=  
ywxw )cos()sin( φψφψδθ ∂−∂=  
zywxww ])sin())[cos(tan( φφψφψθδψ ∂−∂+∂−=  
In vector form, they can be rewritten as 










∂
∂
∂
=










z
y
x
Euler_err
tilt
w φ
φ
φ
δψ
δθ
δφ
T  (E.11) 
where Euler_errtiltT  is the transformation matrix from the tilt errors to the Euler errors, 
given by 














−−−
−
−−
=
1)sin()tan()cos()tan(
0)cos()sin(
0)cos(
)sin(
)cos(
)cos(
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ψθψθ
ψψ
θ
ψ
θ
ψ
T  (E.12) 
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APPENDIX F 
GNSS Navigation Equations 
Given these nominal points at the time kt , 
T
000 ]z,y,[x and T000 ]z,y,x[  , Eqs. 
(4.50) and (4.51) can be linearised as follows: 
i
r
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
)z-(z-)y-(y-
x
)x-(x-
r)(r cdtzyt i
i
i
i
i
i
ii
k
i ++++=−≡ δ
ρ
δ
ρ
δ
ρ
ρδ  (F.1) 
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i
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i
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0
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x
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

+
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−
+
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+
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=≡
δ
ρ
δ
ρ
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ρ
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ρ
δ
ρ
δ
ρ
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 (F.2) 
where rv  and rv  include the additional errors resulting from the linearisation, dt  and 
td  are the unknown receiver clock phase and frequency errors, and T]z,y,x[ δδδ and 
T]z,y,x[  δδδ are the unknown receiver position and velocity error vectors,  
2
0
2
0
2
00 )zz()yy()xx()( −+−+−= iiiki tρ  (F.3) 
)z-z()z-z()y-y()y-y()x-x()x-x()( 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
k
i t
ρρρ
ρ ++=  (F.4) 
From Eqs. (F.1) and (F.2), at least four GNSS satellites must be observed 
concurrently in order to resolve three unknown position states, three velocity states 
and two receiver clock error states. Therefore, when more than four GNSS satellites 
are visible, the GNSS navigation equations can be rewritten in vector form as 
follows: 
rpGNSS pHr += δδ  (F.5) 
rLOSVpGNSS  pHpHr ++= δδδ  (F.6) 
where 
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
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
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is known as the direction cosine or the 
line of sight (LOS) vector of the satellite i  in terms of the ECEF coordinates and 
LOSH  is the visible satellite LOS DCM. 
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APPENDIX G 
Doppler Radar Navigation System 
Doppler navigation system is an aircraft self-contained dead-reckoning system. 
A Doppler radar mounted underneath an aircraft can obtain the velocity vector of the 
aircraft relative to the ground by measuring the Doppler shifts of radar beam signals 
returned from the ground. A three-beam Janus Doppler radar system is illustrated in 
Figure G.1 with two forward-looking beams pointing to the right and left sides of 
airframe, respectively, and one beam looking backward. This radar system can 
measure three orthogonal components of aircraft velocity[1]. Two types of the 
Doppler radar mechanisations are used; one fixes the radar antenna array to the 
aircraft body frame, and one continuously stabilises the radar antenna array to the 
local horizontal by means of an attitude reference system. The airframe-fixed radar 
system resolves aircraft velocity in the body coordinates while the attitude stabilised 
radar system obtains aircraft velocity coordinated in the local horizontal frame.  
These two measurements can be formulated in the wander frame as follows 
b
DR
w
b
w
DR
~
~
~ vCv =  (G.1) 
where bDR~v  is the Doppler radar output. 
Therefore, 
DR
w
b
b
DR
w
b
b
DR
w
b
DR
b
DR
w
b
w
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)(
 )()(~
CvCvC
vCIv
+×∂−≈
+×∂−=
φ
φ
 
or 
DR
w
b
www
DR )(~ Cvvv +∂×+= φ         (G.2)  
where bDR
w
b
w vCv =  is the true velocity of aircraft and DR  is the Doppler radar error 
vector.  
From Eqs. (4.30a) and (G.2), the velocity difference between the INS-derived 
and Doppler radar-derived velocities can be normalised as follows: 
DR
w
b
ww1ww
DR
w
INS )()]([~~ CvvvvIvv −∂×−−+×∂−=− φδθ  
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Therefore,  
DR
w
b
w1nv
p
w
DR
w
INS )(~~ CvvpTvv −∂×−+=− φδδ  (G.3) 
 
 
Bb
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bx  
bybz R
b
 
Figure G.1 Three-Beam Janus Doppler Radar Configuration 
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APPENDIX H 
SRIMU Error Equations 
Substituting Eqs. (5.17) and (5.18) into Eq. (5.2a) and using the first-order 
Taylor series expansion for each element of the design matrix H  result in  
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Therefore, 
∆  can be driven as follows 
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Observing the form of the above equation, 
∆  can be further represented as follows: 
Diag	DiagH )()( AzEl +=∆  (H.1) 
where ()Diag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the elements of the elevation 
misalignment vector El  or the azimuth misalignment vector Az , the elements of the 
matrix 	  correspond to the coefficients of the elevation misalignments in the matrix 
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∆  and the elements of   are the coefficients of the azimuth misalignments in 
∆ . 
Approximating the measured state vector   in Eq. (5.20) by its estimate ˆ  
given in Eq. (5.3), a generalised formulation of the measurement errors caused by the 
SRIMU misalignments can be expressed by  
GmmH
H(Hm =∆=∆ − T1T )       
Therefore, 
b
instru
T1T ) HC

H(
G ∆=∆= −  (H.2) 
The SRIMU error terms given in Eq. (5.16) are represented in the instrument frames. 
From Eqs. (5.16), (H.1) and (H.2), the total SRIMU measurement error is 
ElAzSFD
instru )(Diag)(Diag)Diag( m Σ+Π++=∆
 (H.3) 
mCbinstru=Π , m	Cbinstru=Σ  
where )  ,( ElAzxx =  are the misalignment angle vectors, SF  is an n -dimensional 
scale factor error vector, )(mDiag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the SRIMU 
measurement vector m , )(ΠDiag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the vector Π  
and )(ΣDiag  is a diagonal matrix consisting of the vector Σ . 
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From Eqs.(5.2b) and (5.26), a transformation from the measurement space to 
the measured state space and the parity space can be described by the following 
block matrix, 
{ }













−
SpaceVector Parity  The
Space State Measured The)(Spacet Measuremen SRIMU The
T1T
P
HHH
 
or 
 m
P
HHH
p







=




 − T1)(
 
The inverse of this matrix transforms the measured state space and the parity space to 
the measurement space. From the SRIMU measurement equation, H  is a sub-matrix 
of this inverse matrix, which determines the transformation from the measured state 
space to the measurement space. Let M  be a sub-matrix of this inverse matrix, 
which specifies the transformation from the parity space to the measurement space, 
then the following relationships are created.  
[ ] 
PM0
MHHHMH
P
HHH
≡





=




 −− T1TT1T )()(
 
and 
[ ] [ ] MPHHHH
P
HHHMH ≡+=





−
−
T1T
T1T
)()(  
From the above two equations, the following matrix equations can be derived.  
0)( T1T =− MHHH   (I.1) 
3−= nPM   (I.2)  
nMPHHHH =+
− T1T )(   (I.3) 
Because the matrix 1T )( −HH is non-singular, then from Eq.(I.1),  
0MH =T   (I.4) 
The problem is to derive a matrix M  that satisfies the conditions given in Eqs. (I.2) 
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and (I.4). If and only if TPM = , applying the following constraint conditions on P : 
0PH =  and IPP =T , then 
3
T
−
≡= nPPPM  
and  
0)( TTTT ≡== PHPHMH  
From Eq.(H.3) 
T1TT )( HHHHPP −−=  
Let  
T1TT )( HHHHPPU −−==   (I.5) 
then U  is an nn× -dimensional symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix because the 
rank of PPT  is the same as the rank of P . The upper triangular parity matrix P  with 
positive diagonal elements can be computed by the following algorithms∗. 
 11
2
11 UP =  
 0=ijP  for ij <  
 1111 / PUP jj =  for nj ,    ,3,2 =  
 	
−
=
−=
1
1
22
i
k
kiiiii PUP  for 3,,3,2 −= ni   
 iikj
i
k
kiijij PPPUP /)(
1
1
	
−
=
−=  for nijni ,,1  ;3,,3,2  +=−=  
 
                                                 
∗
 Potter, J. E. and Suman, M.C., Thresholdless Redundancy Management With Arrays of Skewed 
Instruments, AGARD AG-224, 1977, pp. 15-1 to 15-25. 
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Table J-1 Inertial Sensor Simulation Parameters 
Sensor 
Parameters  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gyro drift time const 
(sec) 
480 470 465 475.5 590 480 
Gyro drift err (deg/hr) 0.74 0.7 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.63 
Gyro bias err (deg/hr)* 40|2.0 40|1.9 35|2.2 35|2.3 45|1.8 42|2.1 
Gyro SF err time const (sec) 280 260 270 260 300 265 
Gyro SF error (ppm) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Gyro Az misalign err (arcsec) 4.3E+1 3.7E+1 3.8E+1 3.7E+1 3.7E+1 4.0E+1 
Gyro El misalign err (arcsec) 4.4E+1 3.8E+1 3.8E+1 3.8E+1 3.6E+1 4.5E+01 
Gyro noise (deg/sqrt(hr)) 0.71 0.7 0.78 0.72 0.68 0.71 
Accel drift time const (sec) 360 360 365 360.5 366 360 
Accel drift err (ug) 160 170 154 165 175 150 
Accel bias err (ug) 310 320 330 333 312 320 
Accel SF err time const (sec) 250 260 250 260 245 260 
Accel SF err(ppm) 400 415 420 410 420 405 
Accel Az misalign err (arcsec) 4.0E+1 4.8E+1 4.7E+1 4.38E+1 4.1E+1 4.0E+1 
Accel El misalign err (arcsec) 4.6E+1 4.7E+1 4.5E+1 4.2E+1 4.0E+1 4.68E+1 
Accel noise (ug/sqrt(hz) 100 100 105 100 102 110 
* The first column is a typical value of slave node sensor biases and the second column is a typical 
value of the cg node sensor biases. 
Table J-2 GPS Error Simulation Parameters 
 
Error Sources 
Standard  
Deviation 
Time Constant 
 (Second) 
Note 
Ephemeris error 3 (m) 1800  
Ionospheric error 3-7(5)(m) 1800 Rx location and SV elevation 
dependent 
Tropospheric error 1-5(2)(m) 3600 Rx height and SV elevation 
dependent 
Rx Clk Frq error 
Rx Clk Pha error 
0.2m/s  Random walk, equivalent 
range rate error, random drift 
Pseudorange noise 1-3  Rx dependent, white noise 
Doppler meas noise 0.1-0.3 m/s  Rx Dependent, white noise 
SA effect  33 180 Second-order Markov 
Simulated GNSS 
Attitude errors 
Roll and Pitch 0.250 
Yaw 0.20 
 White noise, dependent on 
PDOP 
Table J-3 ADS and Magnetic Heading Simulation Parameters 
Sensor/System 
Output 
Sensor Errors Standard Deviation 
(1-sigma) 
Note 
Scale factor error (%) 0.02 Random process 
Time delay error (s) 0.06 Random process 
 
Pressure Height 
Measurement noise (m) 2 White noise 
True Airspeed (TAS) Measurement noise (m/s) 0.5 Total TAS error 
Heading deviation (deg) 20 Random constant Magnetic Heading 
Heading variance (deg) 0.50 White noise 
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Table J-4 Initial Navigation State Error Parameters 
Parameter Initial Errors  Note 
L-Position Errors 
H-Position Error 
400m 
150m 
Met by GNSS positioning solution and 
pressure altitude 
Vn, Ve 
Vd 
1.0m/s 
0.5m/s 
Met by GNSS velocity solutions 
Attitude Errors 10 Met by GNSS-based attitude solution or 
inertial initial alignment 
 
Table J-5 Parameter for MW-GLRT Requirements  
Accelerometer 
Bias (g) 
Accelerometer 
Noise (mg) 
Gyro Drift  
(0/hr) 
Gyro Noise 
(0/s √Hz) 
Velocity 
Error 
Attitude 
Error 
2E-4 0.25 40 0.012 Max 12 knots 
for 2 minutes 
Max 20 for 
2 minutes 
Integrity Requirements: 
Probability of a false alarm is 10-6  
Probability of a missed alarm is 10-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure J.1 GPS Measurement Simulation Algorithm Architecture 
 
ipSV_  
ir  
iSV_P  
RXt  
ipSV_  
ir  τ
 
GPS System Time (seconds) at the time of data transmission rct  
Reference Time: Day, 
Month and Year 
Compute GPS Week 
Time (seconds) 
GPS 
Ephemera Select visible Satellites 
and Compute Positions 
and Velocities of these 
satellites 
A/C True 
Position & 
Velocity 
 
Compute True Ranges 
& Range Rates 
Generate Transmission 
Times Pseudoranges 
Range Rates 
GPS 
Measurement 
Error Models 
Generate 
GPS Rx Time 
(seconds) 
Rx Clock 
Error Model 
 
GPS 
Navigator iSV_V  
Distributed 
Kalman Filters 
  
 
 
APPENDIX J 
 J-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure J.2 System Compensation Architecture
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